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J. Herbert Parsons

Mind and the Nation

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Mind and the Nation

A Précis of Applied Psychology

BY

J. HERBERT PARSONS

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Mind and the Nation

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A Treatise of Applied Psychology



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MIND AND THE NATION.

Chapter I.

INTRODUCTION.

No thoughtful person in these times, caught in the toils of a world-wide catastrophe, can be content to live only in the present, full to overflowing though that be of problems of unequalled complexity and perplexity. No matter what his position may be, the blissful sense of security, born of many years' peace and luxury, has been irretrievably shattered. Like Mr. Britling, for years he smothered the danger-signals with a cloud of specious arguments, economic and otherwise, or even more commonly averted his gaze from the writing on the wall. When dogmatic denial at last failed to afford a false peace of mind in the face of the amazing and brutal reality, he perforce accepted the accomplished fact and in an astonishingly short space of time incorporated it into his mental being. This apperception of a new experience reacted differently upon different individuals. In the vast mass of our countrymen it aroused a righteous indignation, a Nemesis in the true sense of the word, which manifested itself in the never-dying glory of our "contemptible" Army and an unalterable determination to destroy the accursed thing. Amongst the intellectual élite, many of whom were physically too old or incapable to join actively in the struggle, the auto-suggestion which at an earlier period had suppressed unpleasant warnings or induced a Gallio-like attitude assumed a fresh rôle. The novel idea became so intimately welded into the mental complex that it lost all semblance of novelty, except in so far as it demanded an ex cathedrâ protestation of its

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inevitableness. Hence the shower of pamphlets which rained from the press—historical, geographical, philosophical, religious. Never before had such a wealth of learning been distributed broadcast in snippets by distinguished authorities! Foremost of all were the modern historians, who should have uttered the warnings in peace time which they now demonstrated so infallibly when it was too late. As for the politicians, the worst sinners, they were too busily occupied in making the best of a bad job. The shamefaced apologia, which might have been expected, was avoided by a display of feverish activity.

This unedifying phase has passed. The prosecution of the war is such a gigantic task that few have time or inclination to unravel the tangle which led to its inception. But thoughts reach forwards to the peace beyond the war, and brains are busily engaged in moulding it according to the heart's desire. Books and committees innumerable, not to mention columns in the daily and weekly press, are devoted to reconstruction, which has received official recognition by the formation of a new Government department under a Cabinet Minister.

It is instructive to cast a glance over the topics which have hitherto formed the chief items in these discussions on reconstruction. As might be expected Industry looms largest. In the Report of the Committee of the Privy Council for Scientific and Industrial Research for the year 1916-17 we find a list of Standing Committees on Engineering, Metallurgy, Mining, and Glass and Optical Instruments. Allied to these are research committees on Mine Rescue Apparatus and Abrasives and Polishing Powders, as well as inquiry committees on Lubricants and Lubrication, Zinc and Copper, and Irish Peat. An Appendix gives the text of a pamphlet on the Government Scheme for Industrial Research. Nearly allied to the various Industrial Schemes is Scientific Research, so nearly allied, indeed, that the boom in science, so far as it has any considerable public and political support, is directed almost entirely to the physical sciences. The scientists themselves emphasize and reiterate the importance of pure science, but even *their* strongest argument is that only through it can material advance in the practical applications of science be attained.

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An authoritative appeal is made in the admirable series of essays contained in "Science and the Nation" by Cambridge Graduates. In biological science Agriculture is naturally the predominant topic at the present time. The enormous expenditure entailed by the war has raised the reconstruction of economic methods into a prominent position. Economics not only deal with finance, but also with the even more complex problems of the relations of Labour and Capital. None of these topics can be dis severed from the wider subject of politics in general. This is the most complex problem of all, and it is noteworthy that the first legislative enactment which has been promulgated in reconstruction is a franchise bill.

The patent facts which emerge from the foregoing remarks are that we were all living in a fool's paradise before the war; that we, one and all, from various motives—hebetude, fear, bigotry, political expediency, &c.—ignored or suppressed the signs pointing to the war; that many people have deluded themselves with the idea that they have explained the causes of the war, though we have not yet touched the fringe of the subject; and that the hope which springs eternal in the human breast is now the motive force for projects of reconstruction, many of which fail to grasp elementary facts of human nature.

Amid the swelling chorus of reconstruction one voice is strangely silent. All these manifestations of human endeavour—industry, science, politics, religion, and war itself which includes them all—are products of the activity of the human mind. Surely then, psychology, which is the science of the mind, should have its say.* When one considers the matter, the mental horizon of each of us is very

* Even those scientists who are most indignant at the neglect of science by the State and most energetic, or at any rate most voluble, in advocating reform, ignore the claims of psychology. In the Memorandum issued by thirty-six of them in February, 1916, Science is defined as "the ascertained facts and principles of mechanics, chemistry, physics, biology, geography, and geology." Psychology is rightly regarded as a branch of biology, but there is little doubt that the professors forgot it altogether, and the psychologists were presumably, like Baal, asleep or gone hunting. In truth, Psychology is the Cinderella of the Sciences. It has no lot or portion in the Royal Society unless it steals in under the cloak of physiology, nor in the British Academy except as a hanger-on of philosophy.

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limited. Even the most active, the cleverest and most erudite, passes his life in a very narrow sphere of mental activity. It is therefore perhaps not surprising that psychologists for the most part are chiefly occupying their time in investigating interesting cases of war neurosis ("shell-shock") and such-like subsidiary problems of their subject. These ought they to have done and not to leave the other undone. Psychology has a grievous heritage from the past. So long as it was purely introspective it could afford little guidance in these vast problems. So it plunged into the vaster problems of existence, and got lost in the mazes of metaphysical philosophy, which are not science and probably never will be. Darwin, among the benefits which he conferred upon mankind, was the means of rescuing psychology from the thralldom of mediæval thought and pointing out its true ancestry, coeval with animal life. Since then it has been a positive science, and its laws, though difficult to discover, are no longer past finding out. Unfortunately it has not yet wholly freed itself from its shackles: otherwise its voice would have been heard. Not only is it a science, it is *the science par excellence*, for all others and philosophy itself are subject to its laws.

It is for this reason, among many others, that the teachings of psychology should be heralded and acted upon at the present time. Many, perhaps most, of the mistakes of the past have been due to the limited interests and outlook of the various classes and individuals which make up society. Psychology is all-pervasive and, rightly considered, provides a guide to the integration and organization of the diverse opinions, motives and aspirations of all classes of the community and of communities *inter se*. The increased complexity which is characteristic of a high grade of evolution has of necessity led to minute specialism, and the multiplication of specialists has far out-distanced the co-ordination and organization which should have been concomitant. A broad grasp of the wider relationships and interactions of social problems has been conspicuous by its absence. Progress has thus carried with it the seeds of disintegration, the ultimate consequence of which is anarchy.

Psychology is thus a touchstone of the past and of the present; it is also a touchstone of the schemes of the future,

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in so far as the future is amenable to scientific assessment. Important as it is for these wider co-ordinations it is equally important in all the minuter details of human activity, individual or social.

These are large claims to put forward, and they require valid arguments for their support. There is no lack of arguments, but for many reasons it is difficult to set them forth in such manner as will make any cogent appeal. The subject is abstruse and is in its infancy. In common with other branches of biological science its laws have not the mathematical precision and universal validity of physical laws. Its professors disagree among themselves, even more than most professors are apt to do. It is only just commencing to free itself from the contamination of metaphysical subtleties. Moreover, there is much that goes by the name of psychology which is by no means worthy of the name.

I propose in this essay to give a very brief outline sketch of what I regard as the scope of psychology in its relations to modern problems, and more particularly the criteria which it provides for estimating and correlating the diverse factors and for elaborating practical schemes of reorganization. In order to render these criteria intelligible and to demonstrate their validity it will be necessary to indicate how they have been arrived at and the scientific foundations upon which they rest. In a mere résumé of a complicated subject, every detail of which is highly controversial, some dogmatism is inevitable, pardonable, and even desirable. I shall commence with a description of the evolution of the human mind. My view of it is admittedly tentative, being founded upon a necessarily imperfect knowledge and a necessarily fallible weighing of the evidence. I hope that frequent references to authorities will mitigate the inadequacy of the record.

Though it is difficult to write a précis of what is itself nothing but a sketch, a few words as to the line of argument may be of use at this stage. The human mind has evolved by a process of adaptation and continuous development from the minds of prehuman ancestors. It is recognized that the behaviour of lower animals is actuated chiefly by instincts. These are inherited characteristics, and though they are

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firmly implanted and give rise to constant types of behaviour they are by no means rigid, but are subject to modification by the application of intelligence to the lessons of experience. The instincts are still the prime motive forces of behaviour in man, though the development of intelligence has culminated in reasoning powers which exercise a considerable amount of control over their activities. Man is a reasoning animal, but he uses his reason far more to justify his actions, which spring chiefly from inherited tendencies arising from instincts and from traditional modes of behaviour, than as a guide to conduct. Furthermore, as Aristotle said, "Man is by nature a social animal, and he derives this characteristic from his gregarious ancestors." The psychology of the past has failed to realize the supreme importance of this fact. The determining factor in human conduct is that part of his environment which consists of his fellow creatures. In primitive times a man's social relationship practically monopolized his mind; his subsequent mental evolution has been a gradually increasing individualization.

At the present time instincts and the habits derived from traditional customs and impressed upon individuals from the earliest years by education are the main springs of conduct. Only the select few, and they only to a very limited extent, act according to the dictates of pure reason. Moreover, pure reason, being employed in making deductions from premises which ignore the prepotent rôle of these fundamental springs of conduct, arrives at false conclusions. Only by an exhaustive inductive study of the human mind, its biological evolution and its manifestations in primitive conditions, in history, and in contemporary life can a scientific knowledge of its nature and activities be obtained and a sound basis secured upon which to build schemes for future progress.

I wish very emphatically to premise that I shall deal only with the *science* of psychology. In this matter I accept unreservedly the views set forth by my former teacher, Professor Lloyd Morgan, in his "Instinct and Experience." So far as science is concerned we have to deal with the world of experience as we find it, and we have nothing whatever to do with any Source or Cause or Agency such

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as Platonic Ideas, Berkeley's Eternal Spirit, Kant's Transcendental Ego, Schopenhauer's Will, Driesch's Entelechy, Bergson's Life, the Animist's Soul, and so on. "All we can do, in Science, is to correlate the new with the old." There is one proviso to be observed in this statement, viz., that man's ideas of a supernatural Agency, gods or a God, have a profound effect upon his behaviour, which in McDougall's definition, is the subject matter of psychology. As such, they are objects of experience and motive forces, and as such must therefore be assigned their appropriate—very great—value as influencing conduct.

Further, with regard to the criticisms of persons, classes, institutions, &c., which will be found in the following pages, I would have them viewed from an academic standpoint and judged at a purely scientific valuation. Though not devoid of that emotional element which is the propelling virtue of enthusiasm they are contaminated by no feelings of animus. Let them stand or fall according to the measure of truth that is in them.

PART I.—MIND.

Chapter II.

COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY.

THE New Psychology has its origin in the "Origin of Species." The application of the Darwinian hypothesis to the problems of neurology and psychology has revolutionized both sciences. Not only has it led to the discovery of new facts, but it has combined them with the old material in a new configuration. Seen by the light of the theory of evolution, the nervous system, like other animal structures, shows continuity of development from the lowest organism to the highest. Variations and mutations which proved useful in the struggle for existence have been perpetuated in various species. In the vast majority of extant species the organism has become so adapted to its environment that equilibrium has resulted, and the species persists in a condition of apparent immobility. Some species, by the incorporation of appropriate variations and the development of useful new ones, have reached higher stages in the evolutionary span. Others have degenerated and relapsed into lower stages, such as those of parasitic organisms, equally, however, adapted to their special environments. Hence arises the question: What is the criterion of higher and lower in the evolutionary scale? The best answer seems to be—the species which most successfully controls its environment, moulding it to its own advantage and rising superior to adverse circumstances. By that criterion man still retains the pre-eminence which his egotism has long appropriated. Biology none the less teaches the lesson that he holds it at the risk of losing it. It affords him no evidence of pre-ordained certainty of tenure, but rather of implacable subjection to the rules of the game.

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Everyone will admit that somehow or other consciousness is bound up with the activity of the nervous system. I shall not discuss the thorny question of the relationship of body and mind. I shall proceed on the assumption that consciousness, the subjective expression of mind, whether human or sub-human, is in some way or other concomitant with nervous activity, and that so far as science is concerned consciousness does not exist without nervous activity. Further, just as there is continuity in the development of the nervous system from the lowest organism to the highest, so there is continuity in the development of consciousness. The development of both nervous system and consciousness is associated with increasing complexity. Stated more accurately, there are repeated differentiations of more primitive chaotic conditions into simpler elements: some of these are selectively segregated and re-synthesized into new complexes. This process, which I have called the apocritic principle, gives rise at certain stages to such qualitatively new manifestations that they may be described, even scientifically, as creative. Thus, in the physical world a suitable set of conditions gives rise to crystallization, a phenomenon which no scientific genius could have foretold. So, in the biological world, changes of a similar type occur. Three well-defined stages may be marked off in the evolution of consciousness. The first is the sentient stage, such as is found in unicellular and lowly multicellular organisms. The second is the perceptual stage, such as is characteristic of lower mammals, &c. The third is the conceptual stage, found probably in man alone, or at any rate only in animals which have some form of true speech. Looked at from the point of view of the nervous substrata of consciousness, the sentient stage develops into the perceptual by the differentiation of nervous tissues into so-called reflex arcs. The perceptual stage, with its predominant instinctive reactions, is essentially a stage of compound reflex actions.

In the lowest or sentient stage the organism responds by movement to various stimuli, which must be applied by direct contact. With the development of the reflex arc a contact stimulus sets up a nerve impulse in a sensory nerve fibre, which is communicated to a nerve cell, and thence

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by means of a motor nerve to a motor apparatus or muscle. A very important stage of evolution is reached when certain sensory nerve endings are so differentiated that they become susceptible to stimuli such as light and sound waves. In these cases the direction from which the stimulus proceeds is appreciated. Viewed subjectively, the stimulus appears to come in a definite direction from a spot situated at a distance from the animal: it is said to be projected in that direction, and hence these sensory organs have been called projicient (Sherrington).¹ Judged by the criterion of evolution stated above, an immense stride in the subjection of the environment to the needs of the organism has been made. The old useful non-projicient sensory organs, such as those of the varieties of touch (pain, heat and cold, &c.) and taste are retained: probably smell is more projicient in the lower mammals than in man.

Since the individual can be conscious of his own experiences alone we can only surmise the consciousness of other individuals, and with still less certainty the consciousness of other animals. Probably there is consciousness of a sort even at the lowest stage, and each fresh differentiation leads to a richer consciousness. At the sentient stage it probably resembles our tactile sensation. Thus, in its primitive condition every nervous activity, including even motor responses, arouses consciousness in some manner. As complexity increases a well-marked tendency is observed for the lower forms of consciousness to become submerged. They are not abolished, but their submergence facilitates the appropriate response of the animal to the given experience: it has a definite survival value. Thus, in ourselves, many reflex acts produce no conscious response.

The perceptual stage is specially characterized by instinctive reactions. The term instinct has been used with many varieties of meaning. Biologists are accustomed to lay most stress on the motor side of the animal's activity. Thus, Lloyd Morgan² defines instinctive behaviour as that which is, on its first occurrence, independent of prior experience; which tends to the well-being of the individual (i.e., it is "practically serviceable on the occasion of its first performance") and the preservation of the race; which is similarly performed by all the members of the same

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more or less restricted group of animals; and which may be subject to subsequent modification under the guidance of experience. It is serviceable for (1) Self-preservation—avoiding danger, by shrinking, quiescence, or flight, warding off attacks of enemies: (2) Nutrition—obtaining food, capturing prey, &c: (3) Reproduction—winning and securing a mate, protecting and rearing offspring: (4) Survival of Species—co-operating with others, &c. These instinctive reactions are carried out by the lower (sub-cortical) brain cells and the spinal cord, structures which have been organized to respond thus by centuries of racial preparation as the outcome of natural selection and of other factors in organic evolution. They are thus inherited characteristics. Probably in all animals which possess a cerebral cortex, consciousness, at any rate cognition, results from its activity alone. The lower centres are, however, connected by nervous paths with the cortex. The instinctive response leads to stimulation of the cortical cells and consciousness is aroused. The conscious response can be analysed into two factors—cognition, or the knowledge or intellectual appreciation of the given experience, and emotion, the affective or feeling element. The knowledge acquired in the first experience of its kind leads to a modification of the instinctive response when a similar experience is encountered. Physiologically, the cortex reacts upon the lower centres; psychologically, the instinctive response is modified by intelligence.

Psychologists are accustomed to regard instinct somewhat differently, laying less stress upon the motor activities. Thus, McDougall³ holds that the primitive instincts, like a reflex act, are each compounded of an afferent group of impulses which give rise to the perception of the situation and the appreciation of its meaning, combined with a specific emotional excitement, and an efferent group of impulses, leading to a specific motor response or a tendency to such response. For example, the sensations of a startled deer are synthesized into a perceptual cognition of the terrifying situation, and this state is accompanied by the emotion of fear, giving rise to the motor response, flight. This is a typical example of an instinctive response on the perceptual plane. Besides the instinct of flight and the

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emotion of fear, McDougall enumerates other pairs of "primary" instincts and emotions, such as repulsion and disgust, curiosity and wonder, pugnacity and anger, self-abasement and subjection, self-assertion and elation, the parental instinct and the tender emotion, and so on. Though emotions are very difficult to analyse as compared with cognitions, many undoubtedly have very definite distinguishing characters, so that each kind of emotional excitement may be regarded as "an indication of, and the most constant feature of, some instinctive process." This criterion of an instinct, however, is not very precise, for there are many instinctive reactions in which the emotional tendency is by no means of a well-defined specific quality. Such are the sexual instinct or instinct of reproduction, the gregarious or herd instinct, the instinct of acquisition, the instinct of construction, and so on. Moreover, imitation can scarcely be refused the designation of an instinct, and though it can sometimes be regarded as the conative or motor element of an instinct whose cognitive expression is suggestion and affective expression sympathy, this is by no means always the case.

Thus, both from the biological and the psychological points of view, much yet remains to be elucidated in the problem of separating out the instinctive factor in conscious processes. None the less, recent work has done much to throw these inherited characteristics into relief.

The brain of man and of the higher anthropoid apes is distinguished from that of lower mammals by the enormous development of the cortex. This is *par excellence* the organ of intelligence, i.e., of the highest development of the cognitive side of mental life. *Pari passu* with its increasing development goes a growing control of the lower instinctive reactions. The modification of these reactions in inferior species by the intelligent application of the lessons of individual experience, to which I have referred above, becomes transformed into a much more complete submergence and subservience. Doubtless the emotional elements in the instincts of lower animals fill their field of consciousness much more fully and with greater vividness than in man. The partial suppression of these elements is partly due to their modification by a growth of the cognitive element, a

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greater "backstroke" reaction of the increased cognitive element upon the instinctive, and the greater complexity of the interpenetration of thoughts and instincts in the richer conscious life of man. It is also partly due to the law of submergence of the lower elements of consciousness with increasing differentiation, though this may be the mere result of the factors mentioned. At any rate, the instinctive reactions are much more under the control of "reason" in man, and there is a well-marked tendency for their conscious elements to be weakened or even totally submerged in the subconscious plane.

These instincts, then, are inherited characteristics. Though inherited, they are plastic and subject to modification by experience. Since it is generally thought that acquired characteristics are not transmitted to offspring, these intelligent adaptations are not handed on. This shortcoming of heredity is largely corrected by imitation,⁴ whereby the actions of one animal are repeated without apparent sufficient motive by his fellows. Moreover, an action once performed lowers the resistance of the nervous channels employed, so that the same action is repeated with greater ease. In this manner habits are formed: and habits, transmitted by imitation from generation to generation, form a traditional mode of behaviour which in the higher species is called custom. In this connection also it is to be noted that repetition dulls the conscious response. Just as, phylogenetically, the earlier instincts tend to be submerged in the subconscious plane, so in the individual habits tend to be carried out "un"-consciously. Neither thereby loses its motive power: rather, on the other hand, it thus escapes in large measure from conscious control. The subconscious is the home both of inherited and acquired characteristics. It is often difficult or impossible to separate the hereditary or "instinctive" from the acquired or "intelligent" elements in any given mode of behaviour, but it is quite certain that instinctive reactions are not limited to lower animals, nor intelligent reactions to man. Lower animals are not guided by instinct alone, as was once taught, nor is man guided by reason alone, or even preponderantly. The foundation of his mental structure is a thick stratum of inherited tendencies and dispositions,

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largely submerged in the subconscious plane, upon which his reason plays, like the waves upon the ocean.

Nor are his inherited characteristics limited to his instincts. With the acquisition of speech, i.e., the capacity to convey thoughts from one individual to another by means of an elaborate system of symbols, chiefly vocal, another great creative phase in mental development was rendered possible. The dog knows his master, but has no conception of man in general. By conceptual thought concrete percepts are analysed into their elementary attributes, and these are resynthesized into abstract ideas—a good example of the apocritic principle. The acquisition of the concept endowed the species with all the potentialities which distinguish man from the lower animals. It was a partial release from the bondage of the concrete, but it was the gain of a freedom fraught with peril. It is too often forgotten that evolution is not necessarily upward progress. Degeneration is also a chapter in Darwinism,⁵ and the riot of abstract ideas might well have led to the extermination of the species. To abstract ideas we owe not only the advances of civilization and science, but also the self-made bonds of superstition. It would be an instructive study, for example, to attempt to estimate the errors and catastrophes due to the exaltation of a symbol, e.g., a word like "reason," into a self-contained entity.

During the nine or ten thousand years of which we have anything that can be called historical evidence of man's activities, there is scarcely a sign of any fundamental change in his brain or its modes of activity. Nevertheless, it can scarce be doubted that such changes have occurred during the hundreds of thousands of years which have elapsed since pliocene man made his appearance. His cortex, like the rest of his body, has followed the laws of evolution, though perhaps the curve is asymptotic. Hence we must suppose that the minute configuration of the labyrinth of cells and fibres which compose his cortex contains structural groupings which are inherited; and which subserve inherited tendencies. It is best to distinguish these as innate tendencies, and to reserve the term instinctive for the sub-cortical activities. It is at present impossible to analyse different inherited tendencies into their

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innate and instinctive categories, but it is important to realize that some at least of the higher mental manifestations, such as music, mathematical ability, and so on, may be truly inborn, though they differ fundamentally from the instinctive characteristics, both in their neural basis and in their biological value. For Lloyd Morgan, "the conative or psychological end, correlated with cortical process, is pleasure and satisfaction in living the racial life," whereas "the biological end of the sub-cortical process is survival."

When an organized system of emotional tendencies is centred about some object it may be usefully termed a sentiment (A. F. Shand).⁶ Love and hate, formerly regarded as emotions, are typical sentiments. There are innumerable complex emotional states, some of which (admiration, reverence, gratitude, scorn, &c.) may be regarded as compounded of various primary emotions, whilst others imply in addition the existence of sentiments (reproach, jealousy, resentment, shame, bashfulness, joy, pity, &c.). The importance of the sentiments is in relation to the character and conduct of individuals and of societies. "It is only through the systematic organization of the emotional dispositions in sentiments that volitional control of the immediate promptings of the emotions is rendered possible. Again, our judgments of value and of merit are rooted in our sentiments; and our moral principles have the same source, for they are formed by our judgments of moral value (McDougall).³

Chapter III.

ANTHROPOLOGY.

EVOLUTION is not only an affair of the individual in isolation. It is an affair of the individual in relation to his environment, and his environment is not only physical but includes his fellow-creatures. Indeed, in all multicellular organisms the biological unit is to be regarded as the male *plus* the female, rather than either alone; and in many the group is a unit, divorced from which the individual is a helpless outlaw. Man is notably to be numbered among the gregarious species, and the instinct of the herd has been potent in his evolution.⁷ Biologically considered, morality is a social attribute: it is behaviour in the individual which is conformed to the benefit of the group and species. And so it remains from the bottom to the top of the scale, though in the conceptual plane it has received continual accretions of more or less doubtful authenticity.

The most recent researches⁸ show that anthropoid ape life began in mid-tertiary (oligocene) times; that it soon branched into small (gibbon, siamang) and great (orang, chimpanzee, gorilla, man) orthograde primates. Still in oligocene times the latter divided into the ape and human stems. Running parallel courses through the miocene, the human stems gave rise in pliocene times to two types, one heavy-structured and ape-like, commonly known as Neanderthal man, the other lighter in structure and nearly resembling modern man. The heavy type died out in Mousterian times, leaving no progeny. Man thus resembles the gibbons and great apes in having heavy and light types, of which the siamang and hoolock are the respective types of the former, the gorilla and chimpanzee of the latter. In social life modern man is most allied to the baboons, Old-World tailed monkeys which live a pre-eminently gregarious life. Most primates are gregarious, except the

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gorilla, which lives a patriarchal life with his wives and children. But out of the looser association of the other monkeys baboons have evolved a social organization, with scouts, sentinels, discipline and mutual aid. "Their further advance might be possible but for the obstacle opposed by man, who, advancing by a parallel road, has already occupied the place they might have gained. Man, whilst often inclined to the patriarchal system of the gorilla, would never have reached his present dominant position had he not, besides making good his physical deficiencies by means of mechanical appliances, and supplementing his powers by making use of other animals, at the same time multiplied his individual resources by a co-operation of a kind similar to that of the baboons" (Spurrell).⁹

When we consider man's structural weakness as compared with other animals, and especially the mammoths and woolly rhinoceroses amongst whom he was cradled, we may well wonder that he ever survived. It was due to the versatility and minutely differentiated but elaborately organized intelligence subserved by his labyrinthine cortex. His weakness confirmed his inherited tendency to associate with his fellows for common safety and advantage. His versatility led him to devise weapons and tools, which the lack of specialization in his limbs enabled him to use to best purpose. It also taught him to adapt himself to new conditions, frequently forced upon him by the migrations caused by profound changes in the world's climate and other forces. His struggle for existence against Nature succeeded by virtue of mutual aid. Later the struggle was against competing communities.

At first all were hunters and gatherers of the natural products of the earth. Then came the beginnings of agriculture and the pastoral life. Throughout these stages kinship was the basis of the social bonds. The communities formed clans of which the members were in a real sense members one of another. They even considered themselves to partake of the nature of the groups of animals and plants around them, as is shown by the prevalence, perhaps the universality, of totemism. Their individuality was almost limited to their totemic relationships, which were inextricably mixed up with their kinship in the maternal line.

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Pastoral life introduced patriarchy, and father-right eventually ousted mother-right, except for a few still surviving historical examples. The necessity for co-operation grew as men learnt to cultivate the land and tend flocks and herds. Then came the division of labour, by a simple process of evolution. However welded together, men still show individual differences, and each does by preference what comes easiest to him: hence specialization and increased effectiveness.

The growth of communities and their forced migrations led to competition and war. The primitive clan shows little evidence of individual superiority amongst its members; such as there is is limited to the old men, who may also be magicians. The clash of contending communities forces into prominence the necessity for central control and favours those who possess the gifts of leadership. Hence arises the war-chief. The development of the kingship¹⁰ is a complicated affair, in which patriarchy determines the king's hereditary right, religion his divine right, magic his gifts as a wonder-worker, and war his function as war-lord.

The settled life of the agriculturist permits of the growth of civilization. One of its most important early phases is the interposition of human labour between the production of food by Nature and its consumption by man, thus putting a premium on servitude. Second, it permits the accumulation of wealth and the possession of individual property. Wealth, whether it consists of women, "corn in Egypt," or other desirable things, excites the cupidity of neighbours and leads to the specialization of a class of soldiers to protect the wealthy community.

These more highly developed societies show, therefore, differentiations within the simpler, more primitive tribe. Out of the jelly-like primitive mass emerge specialized workers, central authorities, slaves and soldiers. Mutual aid becomes diversified and shows a growth of individualization. The society becomes stronger by the co-ordination of classes towards more or less well-defined aims, involving a repressive attitude to strife within the community in order that an undivided front may be presented to the enemy without the gates. Thus we see a shifting of the social bonds from kinship to authority. It assumes many forms

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in different early societies. These are so many natural experiments, conforming to Nature's law of induction. Progress is attained by the method of trial and error.

It would seem at first sight impossible to obtain any knowledge of the mental characteristics of primitive man. The chance, however, is afforded by the survival of savage races, which are at any rate in a very lowly and quasi-primitive condition. Just as species have become side-tracked and have persisted, so primitive men have become isolated and have remained relatively unchanged. The lowest savages are represented by Bushmen, Pygmies, Negritos, Andaman Islanders, Semangs and Veddahs. Rather higher are the Tasmanians (now extinct), Australians, Ainus, Hottentots, Fuegians, and Forest tribes of Brazil and Guiana. The higher savages include most North and South American Indians, aborigines of India, &c. (A. Sutherland).¹¹

It is difficult for us to get any clear idea of the earliest concepts for many reasons. First, because we have to depend upon data derived from savage tribes which have progressed little beyond the primitive state, and we do not know exactly how much they have progressed, or how much their ideas have become contaminated by intercourse with civilized people in the centuries which have rolled over them. Second, because it is well-nigh impossible to get into accurate communication with the savage mind through the medium of a language, imperfectly understood, and suited to their thoughts but foreign to ours. Third, because their ideas are not sharply defined at all, but are vague, at the same time semi-concrete, and what we call for want of a better term, mystical. Yet we can get some notion of their thoughts, and they teach us that primitive man in the earliest known stage does not differentiate clearly between living and inanimate Nature. We have to attempt to place ourselves in the position of people with no conception, or only the faintest, of mechanical causation. The only active causation which they can in any sense accurately apprehend is their own voluntary action. Even here they have attained only a dim idea of "self," and that idea is much nearer the animal than the human self. Their conative, or striving, voluntary, activities are impelled almost entirely by emotions. Cognition plays quite a secondary part. Yet

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they see around them immense and often appalling activities, not only of what we call living creatures, but also of the physical elements—rain and fire in the thunderstorm, earth in the earthquake, and so on. These activities seem to them to differ little from the activities of animals and plants, and indeed the earth itself seems to give forth the latter. So they attribute these activities to a strange, mysterious, elusive sort of force, which they call *mana*, or *wakonda*, or *orenda*, and many other terms, all meaning the same thing, in various parts of the world: for this hazy conception crops up in so many primitive societies that it must be regarded as universal at this stage.¹² *Mana* is "what works to effect anything which is beyond the ordinary power of man, outside the common processes of Nature" (Codrington).¹³ *Mana* is much more even than this, and as so many anthropologists have shown, it is a conception, dim and chaotic indeed, of the greatest importance in the history of the human mind. Above all, *mana* is full of emotional content. It expresses a chaos of fear and wonder, which latter is a blend of fear and subjection or negative self-feeling.³ It is the hub of the "pre-animistic" stage of evolution of the mind, where all activities out of the ordinary are ascribed to this impersonal, but at the same time vaguely animate, agency (animatism).^{12b} With the growing knowledge of the self as an agent, animatism passes into animism,¹⁴ in which the world is peopled with spirits, immaterial forces built in the likeness of men but of greater and mysterious potency. Just as negative self-feeling makes the man submissive—fearful and awestruck—in the presence of a man of superior strength, or one possessed of *mana*, e.g., a medicine-man, so his submission becomes abject in the presence of the still more awful powers of Nature. The thing possessed of *mana* becomes too fearful to be touched—it is taboo. When it attains the animistic stage and is quasi-personal it becomes sacred, and inspires reverence. Since it is taboo it is "unclean"; thus we get the curious combination of sacred and unclean. This is the embryonic phase of religion. But since some natural activities, of profound importance to the savage, such as rain and the growth of plants and animals, are less awe-inspiring than others, man made all sorts of

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experiments to control them, being guided chiefly by similarity and the association of ideas—ideas which were at this stage vague and nebulous. Hence arose magic, which with the growth of apparent success extended its sphere of influence to more awe-inspiring activities, such as sickness, pestilence, and so on. So far as submission was the predominant feature of the emotional stage the rite was religious: so far as this feature was self-assertion it was magical. Since any act of any individual might involve the whole tribe in some natural catastrophe the religious act was pre-eminently collective and social, hence moral. Since each man controlled Nature more for his own good than for that of the tribe, the presumptuous control of Nature being ever regarded somewhat askance, magic became more individualized, a fact first pointed out by Robertson Smith.¹⁵

While feeling himself one with Nature as a whole, man felt himself still more intimately bound up with some natural group, usually an animal group. The fact is certain, for there is great probability that totemism was universal at this stage; the reason is obscure. The evidence proves, that illogical as it seems to us—pre-logical as Lévy-Bruhl¹⁶ will have it, though that is going too far—the savage believes himself to be literally a member of his totemic group; an Australian native of the kangaroo totem literally believes himself to be a kangaroo. These grotesque and apparently unreasonable ideas are of course metaphysical and are only of importance to the *science* of psychology in so far as they influence the actions of men and of society, and contribute to their mental evolution. As such they are of profound importance and cannot be left out of account. *Inter alia*, they were the pre-eminent cause of that social solidarity which alone enabled the tribe to survive. As Bagehot¹⁷ long ago rightly pointed out, the first upward step in progress towards civilization was the establishment of a hard-baked “cake of custom.” “Law, rigid, definite, concise law was the primary want of early mankind.” Customary laws were the natural outcome of the ideas sketched above. They consisted largely of rites and prohibitions, many of them utterly absurd to us, but above all rigid and immutable, because the safety and very life of the tribe was

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thought to depend on their observance. "A good rule is better than a bad one, but a bad one is better than none" (Bagehot).

It is difficult to grasp the inner meaning of this early stage of thought. It is fascinatingly yet exasperatingly strange even to the anthropologists who have so patiently studied it and collected vast volumes of information about it. It is unknown to the majority of thinking people, and its influence has only just begun to filter into the minds of a few of those who occupy those seats of the mighty, University chairs. Yet from this primitive protoplasm were born by differentiation magic and its offspring science, religion and its offspring philosophy, custom and law, social classes and political institutions. It is the key to the sanity of sages and the absurdities of men. It is worth while to endure the horrid pains of thought for a few moments if thereby we can glean some lessons for the future from the fertile soil of the past. At any rate, let us try to grasp a few of the chief features of this mode of thought and trace them a short distance down the historical path.

In the first place the tribe, the clan, and the totem group are the essence of the savage's existence. All the world is visualized from that standpoint; it is projected outward into the world around, so that that macrocosm is modelled on this microcosm. With singular uniformity the tribe is found to consist of two divisions or phratries, each of which consists of two clans; these are split up into numerous totem-groups.¹⁸ These totem-groups include non-human groups, usually edible species of animals and plants, or phenomena upon which the food supply depends, or, later, tools used in procuring food. A vital continuity and unity characterizes the group. Every other group is in some degree alien to it, and every other tribe is a potential danger to be treated as an enemy. This attitude engenders a vast system of social obligations and prohibitions relating especially to food and sexual intercourse. These are enforced upon the members of the tribe with the combined energy of the tribe as a whole. When a boy reaches a certain age he undergoes rites of initiation. He lives alone in the bush, except for the frequent visits of the elders of

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the tribe, who instruct him in the mysteries of life and of the tribe. He is submitted to the severest ordeals of starvation, exposure, and torture until his mental condition is such that he sees visions and dreams dreams. He is in a state of the utmost receptivity to suggestion. Then follow the actual rites of initiation, when the emotional storm is raised to hurricane fury by the combined efforts of all the male members of the group, aided by such artificial means as the mysterious bellowings of the bull-roarer, and so on. Thus is the youth born again into the tribe. Henceforth his mind is a replica of the mind of the tribe; what it thinks and feels—above all *feels*—he also thinks and feels.

When the tribe moves to a fresh encampment, the ground, and the sky as well, are mapped out into four regions, which are allotted to the four clans. As time goes on all the world becomes divided into four parts, and each part is subject to the same taboos as the clan with which it is identified.^{12a} But the tribe is also divided into two phratries, and however this arose it is permeated with the idea of sex, for the phratries are usually exogamous, i.e., there can be no intermarriage within the phratry, but the male of one must always marry a female from the other. The primitive enmity of group for group is in this case reconciled by marriage. From these sources sprang the four elements of the early Greek philosophers, the segregation of pairs of contraries, "which sometimes carry on a sort of warfare with one another, and then again become friends, and go in for marriages and child-bearing and nursing up of their offspring."* From them sprang, all with a sense of dividing and mapping out boundaries, Moira (Destiny) and Nomos (Law), Nemos (Sanctuary) and Nemesis (Avenging Anger or Righteous Indignation), Ethea, the haunts of the country in which one ranges, and so *customs*, established behaviour, habits. In due time Moira gives place to Zeus, who takes on her function, only to be displaced in turn by Nous, pure Reason.¹⁹

Primitive men do not "think" so much as "feel" and act. The group "is, in fact, what it collectively *feels* and

* Plato, Sophist, 242, c.

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does; all that matters about it, all that is (as we say) 'essential,' is its behaving as it ought, fulfilling its functions, performing its custom. It is, probably, in the light of this idea that we should interpret the alleged 'identity' of the human clansmen with their totem species" (Cornford,¹⁹ quoting Lévy-Bruhl).¹⁶ This phase is very prominent in the Australian *intichiuma* ceremonies, in which the totem-group performs collective magical rites to ensure the propagation of the totem animal. The chief feature of these rites is dances which we say "imitate" the gaits and behaviour of the animal, but which should rather be described as pre-presenting the group-behaviour (J. E. Harrison).^{20b} Magical action in this stage consists in actually doing what you want done; sympathetic or collective emotion expresses itself in "imitative" action. From this arises sympathetic magic and "participation" (Lévy-Bruhl).¹⁶ By the law of participation a man can be at the same time an emu; the picture or name of a thing or a part of a thing, e.g., hair or nail-clippings, have all the effective force or *mana* of the thing itself. Hence the mystic sacred name, which is taboo; it cannot be uttered on pain of death or dire calamity. Primitive logic knows no shades and measures; when it connects, it confounds; when it distinguishes, it opposes (Durkheim).^{12a} Thus the part is the same as the whole, and like can only act on like. Ridiculous as these ideas seem to us, the underlying manner of thought is the same as when we say that heat is a mode of motion (Durkheim).^{12a}

In this stage of thought there is little beyond collective feeling, emotion and action. The idea itself is so immature that there is no conception of subject and object, no true representation other than collective representation. There is collective force, *mana*, outside the individual which impels him to behaviour uniform with the rest of the group. In its positive aspect it is obligatory, in its negative aspect it is taboo. From taboo arise Moira (Destiny), Nemesis (Righteous Indignation), Diké (Justice), Aidôs (Good Form),²¹ and ultimately the modern Conscience, things which fence people in (Horkos, fence, curse, oath), and restrain them from Hubris (excess and wanton arrogance,²¹ wickedness).

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Mana, mystic though it be, is not an abstract, immaterial force. The trammels of the concrete still cling to every primitive concept, so that *mana*, which is the most abstract yet reached, is still envisaged as a something which resides in the perceived object or person, or in some part of it, conferring potency upon it, or rather, *being* its potency, yet still material and possessing spatial relations. This spatial, material character is quite definitely continued on into later philosophical conceptions, such as the Logos of Heracleitus, the Being of Parmenides, the Nous of Anaxagoras, the Love and Hate of Empedocles (Cornford¹⁹), and how much farther it is difficult to say. It still clings to the ghost, and even the soul in some of its many connotations. *Mana* is the lineal ancestor of the Nature (physis) of Greek philosophy (Hubert and Mauss).²² Nature has two sides: one static—the “nature” of a thing, its constitution, structure, essence, the world, observed as a system of phenomena; the other dynamic—an active force, law (nomos), which is first group-born behaviour, then group-ordained constraint, generating, *inter alia*, convention.

So far as we can grasp its meaning, the earliest *mana* stage of which we have any knowledge seems to us to be magical rather than religious, but it is really a blend, or rather, an undifferentiated continuum of both. Its foundation is social, and its classification of the things around, the objects of the environment, is based upon their importance and utility to the society, upon their social meaning. The key to further evolution is the apocritic differentiation—selective segregation and resynthesis—reclassification, brought about by changes in the social structure. These changes were doubtless in part due to internal development—increase in population, leading to increased complexity, and so on. The enormous resistance to such causes is seen in the persistence of the primitive tribe right down to modern times among so-called savages. Study of them shows the marvellous complexity which the totemic groups, with their intricate criss-crossing of exogamic rules, might sustain without disintegration. More important were the external forces of the environment—the lack of food, the expansion which brought contact and war with other—

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ipso facto inimical—tribes. Such were some of the causes which led to the great migrations, of which there is abundant anthropological and archæological evidence, as well as well-marked historical traces. These great changes must have led to greater development of intelligence, and therewith greater control of instinctive reactions, in the tribes which survived. The solidarity of the social unit could not withstand the sledge-hammer blows rained upon it. The totemic group can live on only in relative isolation. Migration means weakening of the links, and therefore growing liberty from the narrow social bonds. Gates are opened in the prison wall of Moira (Strict limitation (*μέρειν*), "what is ordained" (Destiny), and Nomos (Strict distribution (*νέμειν*), Order, Law). A chief characteristic, however, of the apocritic principle is that, segregate and re-synthesize as Nature will, even to the extent of a creative new-birth, the offspring eternally retain *some* deep-lying traces of their ancestry, submerged but not obliterated.²³ Moira gives place to Zeus, but the dasmos of the gods—their limitations of power and prerogative—is the own son of its parent.

The breaking-down of the narrowly-restricted emotional mentality of the small totemic group manifests itself first in the growth of the realization of the vastly greater *mana* of the social group. The individual, from scarce consciously feeling and acting the tribal life, becomes, dimly at first, conscious of the great force weighing down upon him. The ever-widening cleavage is a growing individualization, a growing knowledge of Self in relation to Society. The embryonic knowledge is, as before, full to the brim of emotion—chiefly fear and awe of the power "not ourselves." This is the point at which religion, as most people understand the word, becomes differentiated, but there is a long course yet to be run ere gods appear.

The social development of the tribe, whether brought about by migration or otherwise, manifests itself by gradually developing new social groupings. Instead of totemic units shot through with complex sex and kin relationships, the latter begin to gain in importance. At any rate, this is the case so far as the nations of Western Europe are concerned. If we had complete information

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of the development of other nations, we might doubtless find that the tribal group evolved along various lines—that Nature again progressed by a method of trial and error. So far as the so-called Aryan races, and still more so far as the Semitic races, are concerned, patriarchy extends back to the dawn of history. For them the patriarch was probably the first chief; but there is evidence that before history dawned the transference of authority from the tribe as a whole to the chief was a partial and gradual process. Perhaps at first he was only a chief for warlike purposes. If so, why was he chosen? Surely because he possessed more *mana* than anybody else. Any individualization, whether manifested in greater skill over the elements (magic), or in war or otherwise, would be attributed to the possession of more *mana*. All those who seemed to possess more power over the elements became grouped into new social units. Hence arose the magical societies. The delimitation of families by blood ties, showing the differentiation of the totem-group into new-born human and non-human groups, led to new "family" groups on the one hand, and natural groups—earth, fire, air, rivers, rocks, trees, &c.—on the other. This multiplication of groups coincided with greater individualization. *Mana*, from being a vague, chaotic, all-pervasive force, acquired the germ of individuality, and since power could only be likened to—and therefore identified with—the only power individuals knew, viz., their own emotion-charged activities, which seemed mysteriously to impel them from within, the groups were envisaged as endowed with similar—still impersonal, but quasi-individual—powers. Animatism had passed into animism. These new-born spirits, or dæmons, as we find them in a more advanced stage in Greece, were still impersonal, still collective representations of the social forces of the new social units. The same type of emotional rites was employed for initiation into the magical society, and similar rites—*rites de passage*²⁴—enforced collective authority and moulded and welded minds in other departments of life. In their later Greek development each society had its dæmon—magical, though "contaminated" by other, chiefly religious elements, in the Kouretes, Telchines, Idæan Daktyls, Korybantes, Satyrs, Bacchæ

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and Bacchoi, &c.^{20b}; familial, in the dæmon of the gens. "Dæmons, in Greek theology as elsewhere, remain impersonal; they consist of will and force without individuality, because they are each the soul, not of an individual object, but of a species or kind (*γένος*), to which they are related exactly as the dæmon of a human kindred (*γένος*) is related to his group" (Cornford).¹⁹

Where the tribe passed into an agricultural stage, the impelling of the earth to render its products assumed pre-eminence. Hence the dæmons of fertility^{10b}, with their innumerable cults, the origin of which in *rites de passage* is overwhelmingly demonstrated.

Four types of dæmon emerge from a study of Greek religion: those of (1) the gens; (2) fertility; (3) the magical society; (4) natural elements. From these arose, by interaction and further individualization, the king, the hero, the mystery god, and the Olympian god.

The king did not spring into autocracy at a single leap, nor has he ever in the most complete absolutism lost his dependency upon the social will. The collective authority of the tribal group survived, especially in law, far down the ages and in the social groups of every nation, and is not extinct to-day. But when the division of labour evolved the chief, he naturally acquired the collective authority in the particular sphere or spheres in which he acted. At first he is "an externalized group-soul—a dæmon." As such he becomes pre-eminently the arch-magician, who regulates the weather and the crops, which thus become indissolubly bound up in his health and fulness of life. When these show signs of failing he is promptly executed and replaced by a more perfect specimen. As dæmon of the gens he acquires all the patriarchal authority, later elaborated into the prerogatives of political power. With the growth of individualization the dæmon becomes the god, and therewith the king also becomes a god. It was no mere egoism or arrogance which apotheosed the Roman Emperors during their lives. But like the Olympian gods, with complete apotheosis the king lost touch with humanity, and collective authority more and more reverted to an impersonal form, rising superior even to the king himself as man, and assumed the form of Law.

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Allied to the evolution of the king was that of the eponymous Hero. Just as the king in his magical functions was the mere embodiment of the collective dæmon, when he was killed the dæmon still lived on in another corporeal home. With completer individualization the dæmon became the spirit or soul, which thus appeared to be possessed of immortality. The Hero is originally the immortal spirit of the tribe, as is shown by the fact that his is simply the singular form of the tribal name. When the tribal hero or chief of later days died, his spirit lived on and endowed the eponymous Hero with his attributes of prowess and intellectual superiority. In his character of tribal representative, he, too, like the king, possessed magical power and became particularly associated with the Agathos Daimôn, the good spirit of fertility.²⁰³ Hence he becomes nearly allied to the mystery god.

The mystery god, whose prototype is Dionysus, is essentially the dæmon of a human group, which is represented by his thiasos, or band of mænads and satyrs, or bacchæ and bacchoi. These were initiated into his group by rites which are the direct descendants of the tribal initiation rites, and like them shot through with sexual, reproductive emotion. The tie between the human and the non-human members of the group, so strong in totemic times, still clings to the mystery god—god of fertility, and the ever-recurring cycle of birth, life, death, and re-birth. So nearly is he bound to humanity that he never becomes pure god; he was always shut out of Olympus. He is the essence of religion, the god-man; entering into his followers, so that they become filled with the god (en-thusiasm), whilst they in turn rise out of themselves (ec-stasy) and lose themselves in the god. In their aspect as gods and goddesses of fertility the mystery gods are children of mother earth, gods of the underworld. Demeter and Kore, Semele and Dionysus, Kybele and Persephone, are all variants of the same train of primitive conceptual thought. The Mother and the Maid and the Mother and the Son were the real forces of Greek religious life, permeated with the deepest instincts and emotions of human nature, before whom the gods of high Olympus were but pale abstractions. In subsequent evolution the mystery god gave rise to

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Orpheus in religion and to Pythagoras in philosophy. As religion, the mystery god leads up to monotheism or pantheism; for him polytheism is but "one nature with many names." As social cement, the mystery god establishes communism and equality. From Orphism Christianity inherited a rich legacy through its Alexandrian executors.

The Olympian god is a complete contrast to the mystery god. He is the product of still further advance in individualization. There are signs of anthropomorphism in the Hero, but it is kept in restraint by his essential tribal origin; he is the tribal *dæmon*, chained to earth and the underworld, and even Herakles never reached Olympus. In the Olympian god anthropomorphism has full play. He is a magnified Man, with whom man can have no communion. He assumes the powers of Nature, and his *mana* is so great that man's magic *mana* cannot compete with it. Man can only cringe, beg, and persuade. *Do ut des* is the essence of Olympian religion. Not that the god's power is absolute or unlimited; the Olympians are organized on the model of the patriarchal family. Their *dasmos*, or distribution of function and prerogative, retains the primitive spatial framework, the delimitation of *Moirai*; thus differing from the temporal framework of the mystery god's domain, the recurrent cycle of birth and death and reincarnation. The Olympian religion is the type form of polytheism. As a fount of morality it was sterile, dragging on a contemptible existence throughout Greek and Roman times. Yet it permeated the Aryan races, and persists to-day in the monstrous Teutonic gods. Perhaps the greatest service which it rendered mankind is that it prepared the way for science. "The formation of a pan-hellenic religion meant that the Olympians left their provinces to go and form a polity of their own on the top of a mountain. Finally, they leave the earthly Olympus and vanish into the sky. Nature, dispeopled of gods, is left free for science" (Cornford).¹⁹

We have seen that the evolution of gods from the primitive collective *mana* was a process of individualization. It must not be thought that the collective *mana* lost its social significance in the process. It followed the apocritic principle, and even in its most advanced form retained the

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traces of its origin. Often the social *mana* survived side by side with the personal *mana*. Thus, in later totemic times the social *mana* became identified with a mythical ancestor, and part of this *mana* entered into the individual at birth. Many savages believe that individuals possess two or more souls.¹⁴ Homeric man had two souls; one individual, his *eidôlon* or *psychê*, which escapes from his mouth at death; the other, his *thymos*, associated with his blood and embodying his vital forces. The latter is his "social" soul, which the *eidôlon* can assimilate only by drinking blood, thus regaining consciousness. The *eidôlon* or *kêr* is an object of fear, and reappears as the gorgon, siren, sphinx, and *erinyes*.^{20a} It is assimilated to the spirits of the underworld, and its rites are the rites of aversion: *do ut abeas*. The *dæmon* or genius of a person is, on the other hand, beneficent, the guardian angel within him.

I have briefly sketched some aspects of the progress of the primitive mind down to the origin of well-developed religious ideas. Again the question forces itself upon us—What have these crude beliefs to do with scientific psychology? I have already mentioned the obvious fact that they are potent motives of conduct; it is necessary now to show that they are also the germ-plasm of ordered thought.

The Greeks appear to have held that thought, in the form of *Athênê*, sprang fully armed from the head of *Zeus*. Enough has already been said to show that this was not so. The concept had a long struggle to free itself from the trammels of the concrete. Some traces of the process can be gathered from studying the languages of primitive savages, their methods of counting, &c. Thus the Cherokee language has numerous forms for "we," such as I and thou, I and you, I and you two, I and he, I and they, we two and thou, we two and you, and so on. A Ponka Indian who wishes to say that a man has killed a rabbit must use words which mean "the man, he, one, animate, standing up, has killed by shooting an arrow the rabbit, him, one, animate, sitting down."¹⁶ It is to be remembered that these Indians are not nearly so primitive as the Australian natives, yet such an Indian cannot conceive the generalization that a man killed a rabbit; he must picture to himself

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a particular man, under particular circumstances, killing a particular rabbit.

The principal feature which is observed in primitive thought is that the characters and attributes of things, as we know them, are not distinguished from the things themselves. In philosophical language the categories of the understanding, such as ideas of time, space, class, number, cause, substance, personality, and so on, are not yet distinguished. The process of individualization of which we have given examples is the evolutionary method whereby order is gradually brought about in this chaos. Probably the first step is the development of self-consciousness. The differentiation of the inchoate primitive self is projected into the outer world in exactly the same way that the cosmogony of the tribe is a projection of its tribal constitution. In due time "concrete experience is reflected with sufficient distinctness in mental pictures or images, and the thought world, instead of being a distorted and confused rendering of the world of sense, is rather its counterpart and duplicate" (L. T. Hobhouse).²⁵ In the next stage "the picture" ideas, loosely defined and uncritically connected, are transformed into definite or "abstract" conceptions; the "general" notion vaguely applied into the universal, which, wherever used, has one constant meaning. Such concepts, of which those of number and quantity, and of spatial and temporal order, are probably the first to arise, are connected, developed and tested by systematic methods of analysis and synthesis" (L. T. Hobhouse).²⁵

These quotations doubtless suggest what probably occurred, but what is really more important for our purpose is that the reason why they occurred is to be sought in the development of the social organism. According to Durkheim,^{12a} the categories "are born in religion and of religion; they are a product of religious thought." These categories are, as it were, successive recrystallizations from primitive chaotic ideas. Spatial divisions are of collective origin, in that they are built upon the tribal divisions. With the interaction and interpenetration of tribes spatial divisions become revised, and at the same time more generalized, so that larger numbers of men accept the same delimitations. With further revision they become

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universalized. Similarly, time is measured by the tribal life. Natural phenomena play a larger part here because the life of the tribe is intimately bound up with the seasons. But the seasons are under magical control, so that time becomes measured by the periodical recurrence of rites, feasts and public ceremonies (Hubert and Mauss).²⁶ A man's time and space is at first limited to the tribal life; with the gradual broadening of his outlook and individualization of his mind his ideas of time and space conform to those of the world at large. His fixed points and coordinates coincide with those of the society, and without society they could not have been fixed. Like social institutions, they are the tools of thought (cf. Durkheim).^{12a}

Still further generalization occurs when the distinction of persons, attributes, relations, and functions is raised to the conception of personality, attribute, relation, and function. As the analysis and resynthesis of sensations creates percepts, and the analysis and resynthesis of percepts creates concepts, so the analysis and resynthesis of concepts creates ideals.

Chapter IV.

MENTAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL.

THERE is another source from which we may obtain some inklings of the primitive mind. Embryology, inspired by the theory of evolution, teaches that the development of the structure of the individual of any species is a recapitulation of the structural evolution of the species itself. The proved validity of the recapitulation theory is one of the firmest foundations of the theory of evolution. Necessarily the recapitulation is a minified version of the original; ontogeny is a compressed phylogeny. It is like memory; it recalls only the salient features of the original. Moreover, the stages are modified and obscured in subservience to other requirements in the developing organism. The brain, like other structures, conforms to this law; we may therefore expect to find traces of the racial development of the human mind in the growing mind of the child.

The first activities of a baby belong to the reflex and instinctive order. Crying, sucking, coughing, shrinking from a blow, and so on are essentially reflex acts. Grasping, struggling, crawling, &c., show more complex reflexes organizing into truly instinctive reactions. These instinctive reactions are modified only by the pains and pleasures experienced. Subjectively, so far as can be reasonably deduced, the child's first step in cognition is the learning to distinguish between himself and things outside himself. This is the dawn of self-consciousness. In it his own body plays a peculiar part, especially his limbs, for when they are the seat of sensations of pain, &c., they are parts of self, but when they are seen or touched they resemble objects in the outer world. "Thus the conception of the bodily self is in large part dependent on the development

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of the conception of things as persistent realities of the external world; and the conception of those things is in turn completed by the projection into it of the idea of the self as a centre of effort, a cause of movement and of resistance to pressure" (McDougall).³ If this conjectural *projection stage exists*—and it is little more than a conjecture—it is the only purely individualistic, non-social stage in the growth of self-consciousness.

The next stage is the *animistic stage*. Things and persons are not distinguished, but as persons are the predominant feature of his environment, especially the mother with her tender care, all things, animate and inanimate, participate in the animate nature. Persons being the predominant objects of interest, the distinction between persons and things gradually but only slowly develops.

The next two stages are the *imitative* and the *sympathetic*. As the early stages are those of the self in relation to the body and in relation to things, these are essentially the self in relation to persons. In the imitative stage the child copies the behaviour of the persons around him, especially in his imitative play.²⁸ Finding that his actions arouse different attitudes in other persons—praise, reproof, anger, &c.—he learns to respond sympathetically. This stage is one of the greatest importance, for in it the accumulated social instincts and traditions of the race, embodied in the persons around him, are brought to bear upon his developing mind when it is in the most plastic condition and most open to suggestion. Thus early is he initiated into the moral code of the society into which he is born.

The foregoing stages are all predominantly instinctive. In the next, the *prohibition stage*, the self is brought into relation with authority. The child's behaviour is controlled by a system of rewards and punishments; in fact, the whole tribal authority is brought to bear on him, moulding his mind to the customs and beliefs of society by the potent agency of fear, the great inhibitor of action. In this stage the "backstroke" of intelligence, reacting upon the instincts, gathers strength, and gradually modifies, controls, and tends to submerge the instincts.

During this time the primitive instincts have been

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developing, manifesting themselves in innumerable ways, and becoming organized into sentiments. According to McDougall,² the characteristics of the next stage of normal development are the prominence of self-assertion and negative self-feeling, as modified by fear, and the moralizing effect upon this complex of active sympathy. It may therefore be termed the active sympathetic stage. Much of the child's behaviour at this stage is dominated by negative self-feeling or subjection to those of greater prestige, whether of age or strength or skill or what not. Familiarity, however, breeds contempt, and as he enters into relationship with more people, and the people of different social communities, he assumes to them an attitude of self-assertion or of submission, according to the emotions they evoke in him and to his inherited disposition. Often he exhibits the superlative egotism of youth. It is the stage of self in relation to communities. These emotions of fear, self-assertion, and negative self-feeling are normally modified and moralized (in the common use of the word) by active sympathy, an emotion which springs from passive sympathy and the herd-instinct. "Active sympathy impels him not only to seek to bring the feelings and emotions of his fellows into harmony with his own, but also, since that is often impossible, to bring his own into harmony with theirs" (McDougall).³

In this manner, and by the exercise of certain quasi-altruistic extensions of the egoistic sentiment, the self is brought into relation with society as a whole. The defects of public opinion as a moral force are that the motive forces are fundamentally egoistic, though, as we have seen, essentially collective in origin; that public opinion offers no restraint in the absence of the danger of being "found out"; that its moral force is neither better nor worse than that which has been established by custom and tradition in the given society. Any further advance is due to moral judgments, which are dependent upon the elaboration and co-ordination of sentiments.^{4,5}

In the primitive tribe there is a rigid code of conduct. In modern society there are innumerable communities, each with its moral code. Some moral judgments are common to nearly all communities, such as the iniquity of lying,

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stealing, murdering, &c.* These are enforced upon the child with the whole weight of society. They become so deeply engrained that they are accepted axiomatically; they may be called imitative moral judgments (McDougall).³ Others are subjects of diverse opinion, upheld in one community, winked at in another, condemned in a third, and modified in a fourth. These are original moral judgments, and "they are ultimately based on emotions either of indignation or approval" (Westermarck).²⁹ Doubtless all originally had this origin, as Westermarck has taken great pains to prove, the approval or resentment depending upon the collective mentality of the given society. There is scope for much diversity of opinion on original moral judgments, and hence the force of public opinion is weakened.

The sentiments may be classified into three groups according to their objects: The concrete particular, the concrete general, and the abstract, e.g., love for a child, love for children in general, and love for justice or virtue. It is through the development of abstract sentiments "that the individual's moral development and the refinement of his moral judgment, both of his own acts and those of others, is effected, and that his moral principles are formed. And it is as regards this development of the abstract moral sentiments that the individual is most open to the influence of his social environment" (McDougall).³ These abstract sentiments he finds exemplified and discussed in the language and literature of societies, in the lives of worthy men, in history and romance. A man's moral code is therefore the product not only of his own age and society, but of countless ages and societies, and of his own instincts and innate dispositions, as well as his environment and education.

* Cf. "Natural Law" (*lex naturalis, jus naturale*). See Maine, "Ancient Law," 1861.

Chapter V.

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THE bulk of sociological literature is so vitiated by the intellectualist fallacy that human activities are the outcome of logical reasoning, and consequently that the rational explanation of an event, whether a war or the development of a political institution, &c., is final and immutable, that it is necessary still further to emphasize the preponderant part played by inherited instincts. "Each instinct is a great source or spring of the psycho-physical energy that supports our bodily and mental activities" (McDougall).³ The path of mental evolution is a spiral. Instinct is the crude material upon which reason works. It is modified by experience; experience arouses reason, which in turn reacts upon instinct. We may therefore expect to find that the instincts are the source of the chief socializing tendencies, and that many of the difficulties of interpretation are resolved by this fact.

It is not at first obvious how *pugnacity* fosters socialization. Yet it is clear that pugnacity unrestrained must lead to destruction. In the interests of self-preservation it must be guided by prudence, and consequently only the prudently pugnacious individual will survive the process of natural selection. In the conflict of tribes, which we have seen is a primitive condition, prudence manifests itself as fear, and the killing of enemy tribesmen is done by stealth; but when organization under a leader occurs pugnacity ceases to be imprudent. It is therefore a potent factor in causing the recognition of leadership and obedience to command. Group selection fosters gregariousness of the aggressive type, such as is found amongst wolves. Owing to the fact that this type is best organized, it is in the early stages of evolution also the most moral. Thus, as McDougall points out, the savage head hunters of Borneo are better housed and live more moral lives, even in the ordinary sense of the word

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"moral," than the peaceful tribes of the coast. It cannot be doubted that the same rule applied to the ancient Assyrians, the Huns, and other predatory nations. The specific emotion linked with pugnacity is anger, which is the source of moral indignation. From it sprang criminal law, for punishment was originally retributive, and still bears traces of this motive (cf. Westermarck).²⁹ With the growth of civilization pugnacity becomes sublimated into emulation, so far as civil life is concerned. The socializing and evolutionary value of emulation in games, science, industry, art, and all that ambition effects cannot be denied. Pugnacity is the motive force of aggressive gregariousness, typically illustrated by the Germans to-day. Emulation seeks to preserve its victims, not always from worthy motives, but often in the interests of self-assertion. It is a potent motive force in democratic gregariousness.

The socializing effects of the *sex instinct*, and of the *parental instinct*, which is derived from it, scarcely require demonstration, but the former illustrates very forcibly the desocializing tendencies which reason may impose. The sex instinct—undeniably an instinct in the narrowest sense of the term—is essential to reproduction, and therefore to the survival of the species. There is no reason to think that it has undergone any diminution in strength, in spite of the Registrar-General's statistics. It is clear that natural selection must eliminate those in whom it is weak. Like other instincts, but in peculiarly high degree, its satisfaction is pleasurable. Consequently reason, in the interests of egoism, has found many methods of frustrating its socializing tendencies. It is only necessary to mention infanticide, celibacy, prudent control, the diminution of religious and social sanctions, and, indirectly, venereal diseases. The sex instinct is indeed so strong that, from the most primitive times, it has been the source of innumerable customs and restrictions which have had unifying tendencies. On the other hand, it has been subversive of many social sanctions owing to the strong egoistic impulses which spring from it. It illustrates, indeed, the gradually increasing proclivity of conative aims with progressive evolution. Thus, in the primitive state, and in subjects of low moral development, the proximate conation is self-

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satisfaction, and the ultimate end of the biological process may be but dimly conceived, even unknown, or callously ignored. The primary act, indeed, sets in motion a chain of instinctive reactions, each of which is successively the stimulus to the next. Only with the higher development of its socializing tendencies, and earlier in the female than in the male, does the sex instinct project conation forwards to an ultimate end, which is itself the main stimulus of the parental instinct which follows in its train. This in turn gives rise to tender emotion which overflows into other channels, in which the sex instinct, whence it springs, is scarcely if at all discernible. The focussing of this affective state upon an object, concrete or abstract, creates the sentiment of love, the highest manifestation of altruism. Thus the sex instinct is the most potent of any in its socializing tendencies, and though these are often frustrated by the conflict of desire, this fact is more than counter-balanced by the vicarious manifestations of the tender emotion. The sexual origin of the cult of the Mother and the Child, which is so prominent a feature of religion from the earliest times to the present day, cannot be denied, and few will refuse to admit that the same feelings lie at the root of benevolence and philanthropy, which have been the ethical motives of countless social reformations, e.g., the abolition of slavery, the reform of prisons and asylums, the amelioration of the condition of the poor, &c. It is to be noted that these are criteria of a sound democracy, and that the aggressive type of the herd instinct is inimical to them.

Further, the sex instinct determines innumerable features of daily life. It dominates dress, which features both as a garb of modesty and as a lure. It pervades social games and recreations. It is the most powerful stimulus to the acquisition of wealth in the vast masses of society. It is coincident at puberty with an accession of energy which is often sublimated to useful and ideal ends. It is the motive force of art, refinement, and æsthetics.

Imitation is the term used for so many psychological processes that it has been almost as much abused as the term instinct. Some of these are certainly not instincts in the precise sense of the term. Nevertheless, the pro-

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pensity of copying the actions of other members of the species is so primitive in animals, and so widespread throughout the animal world, that it cannot be doubted that it is an inherited characteristic and has all the potency of an instinct. It is in its very nature a socializing agent. It is the foundation of tradition, and is thus essential for continued progress. As already pointed out, it fulfils the functions which were formerly ascribed to the transmission of acquired characteristics. Though its rôle in evolution has undoubtedly been exaggerated by Tarde,⁴ Mark Baldwin,²⁷ and others, it must still be admitted to be very great. As a conservative agency, in maintaining the customs of daily life, domestic, political, and religious, imitation is the prime force. It is largely the cause of the homogeneity of groups, which is the *sine qua non* of gregariousness. Modes of action, as we have seen in Chapter III, arise from modes of feeling rather than thinking. The thinking is applied afterwards by backstroke, and while the mode of action persists, owing to imitation, with extraordinary vitality, the reasoned explanations vary with the current modes of thought. These facts are nowhere so well exemplified as in religious rites, which in the early days of civilization in Egypt, Babylon, Greece, &c., were thought to owe their efficacy to minute precision in the ritual acts. If the act was rightly and duly performed, it was a matter of no account what interpretation was put upon it. Myths are but the primitive rationalizations of primæval rites. This characteristic still persists in the formalism of ecclesiastical, courtly, and domestic ceremonies, and has pervaded thought itself. Just as rites persist unchanged, so do many customs. These survivals from primitive times have been well studied by anthropologists, and they and the successive, often mutually destructive, meanings which have been attributed to them form an instructive chapter in psychology. The imitative actions of groups naturally persist longest and least modified in isolation. When communication between different and differently environed groups increases there is a general approximation to homogeneity, but the differences are often submerged rather than obliterated, and are liable suddenly to spring to life with renewed vigour.

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Imitation is not only a merely conservative socializing force, it is also an agent of progress. Individuals who in some way or other acquire prestige, whether by conspicuous physical, mental, or moral superiority, are specially likely to be imitated. Each imitator is a new focus, so that the spread tends to be in geometrical progression. As the imitators increase in numbers mass-suggestion accelerates the process. The examples of this kind of imitation are innumerable, and include such trivialities as conventions of speech, modes of dress, and games, as well as all the arts of civilization. They are ably discussed by Tarde and McDougall. The former has pointed out that in international collective imitation it proceeds from within outwards. Thus, in "the imitation of British parliamentary institutions by other nations, there occurs first a period during which the ideas and sentiments underlying them are imitated; and it is not until this assimilation of ideas has passed beyond the stage of fashion, and they have become a part of the national tradition, that effective imitation of the institutions themselves is possible. If such institutions are imposed upon a people by authority before this stage of assimilation has been reached, the institutions will be liable to break down hopelessly" (McDougall).³ (Cf. the Duma; also *v.* p. 49, note.) In a nation imitation tends to spread from the upper to the lower classes; in this manner aristocracies have performed valuable services. "Progressive nations have been the nations whose social organization comprises an hereditary aristocracy and a hierarchy of classes; whereas the unprogressive nations, those which, though strongly organized have ceased to progress, are those which have had no native aristocracy, or have been organized on the caste system—a system which precludes class-imitation" (McDougall).

The socializing tendencies of the *gregarious* instinct have been well worked out, and applied to the conditions of the War by W. Trotter.³⁰ Some insects (e.g., the bee and ant), and animals (e.g., dog, horse, elephant, baboon, and man) are social animals, living together in large collections; i.e., they are gregarious. The evolution of the gregarious instinct is analogous to that of multicellular organisms, and marks a similarly important step in the evolutionary ladder.

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*Biologically, there is also an analogy, for both steps have the effect of protecting immature, but potentially advantageous variations. Variations such as resulted in the change to the upright posture, &c., were probably of such a nature that if they had occurred in isolated individuals these would inevitably have succumbed. Being protected in a herd they were enabled to survive. So now the protecting shelter of society allows many "sports," advantageous and otherwise, to survive and propagate. "The process going on in the satisfactory developing gregarious animal is the moulding of the varied reactions of the individual into functions beneficial to him only indirectly through the welfare of the new unit—the herd. This moulding process is a consequence of the power of intercommunication amongst the individual constituents of the new unit. Intercommunication is thus seen to be of cardinal importance to the gregarious, just as was the nervous system to the multicellular" (W. Trotter). Thus within the group natural selection becomes modified, so that in human society to-day it has free play only between nations, which are therefore the units of biological natural selection as applied to man.

"The cardinal quality of the herd is homogeneity" (W. Trotter). The members must possess sensitiveness to the behaviour of their fellows ("consciousness of kind" (F. H. Giddings)), a condition which is brought about by imitation and mutual response to suggestion. As each member of a flock of sheep follows its neighbour, and is in turn followed, each possesses the germs of leadership. The leader at a further stage of evolution is but a magnified specimen of the same type. He must still retain complete likeness to the members of the herd, but the same qualities may show moderate excess in one or more directions. Since it is imperative that the herd should have an infallible capacity for recognizing its members great variation is inadmissible. Hence, originality is suppressed. The opinions of the herd are so universalized that they are accepted without cavil. They are "a priori syntheses of the most perfect sort, needing no proof but their own evidence" (W. James). So much is this the case that, when an opinion arouses a strong feeling that it would be

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ridiculous, stupid, or wicked to doubt its valency or inquire into its foundations, it may be suspected that it emanates from the herd and is primarily non-rational, though it has generally been submitted to secondary rationalizing justification.

The members are sensitive only to herd suggestions, which assume the character of beliefs. They are relatively insensitive to experience, so that in the clash of motives for action the herd impulse generally wins. Habitual response to these collective opinions leads to crystallization of thought and action, and accounts for the conservatism and bigotry of old age, &c., and the opposition to advance in science, industry, and politics. Herd opinions thus live long and are deeply embedded in the minds of the members. They are products of ancient modes of thought, and therefore, when viewed by the light of increased knowledge, they are non-rational or even irrational. Owing to the force of the herd instinct they are accepted as axiomatic beliefs, in spite of the fact that they may be contrary to reason and experience. They are however criticized in the light of reason, and are generally so ingeniously rationalized that their validity passes uncensored by the majority of the herd.

Homogeneity demands free intercommunication between the members of the herd. The members are never happy when isolated and are always fearful of or inimical to outsiders. Close intercommunication engenders sympathy and gives rise to altruism, which is thus a direct outcome of the herd instinct and is a source of union and strength to the community.

At a higher level speech facilitates intercommunication and propagates herd opinions. The expressed approval or disapproval of the herd identifies the member with or dissociates him from the herd. Disapproval engenders all the discomforts of isolation and vice versa; so that the herd instinct is the true origin of "conscience." So too it is the source of imitative moral judgments" (v. p. 37).

The herd instinct is on the whole inimical to the instincts of self-preservation, nutrition, and sex; and also to altruism, for the manifestations of the latter are innovations, and as such merit the martyr's crown. The clash of these instincts gives rise to mental conflict, a war between the resistive

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forces of the herd instinct and the impulses of the individualistic and particularly sexual instincts. The former usually win, and thus the resistive type of mind prevails, though the suppression of the other impulses leads to unhappiness, the thwarting of progress, and often mental instability.

Just as the development of the multicellular organism leads to specialization of the individual cells, so the development of gregariousness leads to specialization. In both, co-ordination is essential if the advantages of specialization are to be secured. Specialization is both restrictive and expansive. "Among the qualities of restrictive specialization are inability to live satisfactorily apart from the herd or some substitute for it, the liability to loneliness, a dependence on leadership, custom and tradition, a credulity towards the dogmas of the herd and an unbelief towards external experience, a standard of conduct no longer determined by personal needs but influenced by a power outside the ego—a conscience, in fact, and a sense of sin—a weakness of personal initiative and a distrust of its promptings. Expansive specialization, on the other hand, gives the gregarious animal the sense of power and security in the herd, the capacity to respond to the call of the herd with a maximum output of energy and endurance, a deep-seated mental satisfaction in unity with the herd, and a solution in it of personal doubts and fears" (W. Trotter).

Chapter VI.

HISTORY.

IN the foregoing synopsis of the evolution of the human mind I have laid stress upon the factors which have been least emphasized by most psychologists, but which in my opinion are most worthy of study by those who have in any way to do with the difficult tasks of ordering and co-ordinating social forces, guiding and educating children and men, ordering, controlling, and governing communities (social, municipal, ecclesiastical, national and international)—educationists, politicians, and legislators. Through neglect of the study of the instinctive and collective elements of the human mind by far the most potent motive forces of human behaviour and conduct have been to a large extent left out of account, until they have at last arisen in their might and confounded the theories and experiments of the wise.

With the arrival of civilization history proper commences, for a *sine qua non* of civilization is some system of material symbols for the transmission of orders and edicts to a distance. Knotted cords have fulfilled this function in one great civilization, but so far as we are concerned it has universally been some form of writing. *Litera scripta manet*, and history is made. The study of so-called pre-history is difficult owing to the paucity of material, the difficulty and pitfalls of reconstruction, and the strangeness of the people and their mentality. History is difficult from the wealth of material, its overwhelming complexity, and not least its familiarity and the stereotyped opinions which are held about it.

Civilization is made possible by (1) increasing the food-productiveness of the earth and thus enabling a larger population to inhabit a given area; (2) by the organization

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of the community so that peace reigns within its borders, food production is adequately catered for, and the community is protected from aggression. The basis of increased food production is agriculture; hence civilizations originated in fertile spots, such as the Euphrates and Nile valleys. They sprang up independently in various parts of both the Old and New Worlds: it must be concluded that they are a natural product of evolution. Barter and trade increase food production by bringing new sources into the sphere of influence of the community. Since civilization depends upon agriculture, civilizations show great uniformity. Organization of the community demands a leader or group of recognized leaders, the repression of internal strife (so-called "law-givers" and some form of police), the protection of the community from hostile communities (soldiers), and food producers.

The civilizations of the past have all had similar, but not identical, life-histories: all have been born, reached a zenith, decayed and disappeared. We may cite the early Egyptian (6000 B.C. to 4960 B.C.), Early Cretan (4960 B.C. to 4000 B.C.), Middle Cretan (4000 B.C. to 2600 B.C.), Mycenæan (2600 B.C. to 1200 B.C.), Classical (1200 B.C. to A.D. 450), and Mediæval (A.D. 450 to ?).

The rise of a civilization is a period of strife, in which the fittest community survives. At first it means the destruction of opponent communities; later their slavery, in which they become the food-producers. In the early stages the community is divided into a governing class and a labouring population. The governing class includes the leader and the fighters: it is a period of autocracy which lasts from four to six centuries (Flinders Petrie).³¹ For the aristocracy it is a period of growth of wealth and property, leading to luxury, which is tempered by refinement. The acme is reached when refinement, as judged by art, reaches its highest level. The government is then an oligarchy, in which leadership is still essential, but unity can be maintained by law instead of autocracy. This stage varies in length; in Greece and Rome it was about four centuries, in Mediæval Europe about five or six centuries. "Then gradually the transformation to a democracy takes place; beginning about the great phase of literature in Greece,

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Rome and Modern Europe. During this time—of about four centuries—wealth—that is, the accumulated capital of facilities—continues to increase. When democracy has attained full power, the majority without capital necessarily eat up the capital of the minority, and the civilization steadily decays, until the inferior population is swept away to make room for a fitter people " (Flinders Petrie).

Considered from the collective standpoint the essentials of civilization are leadership and slavery. Both are products of collective mentality.

We have already seen that early kings are the products of at least four collective units—the magical society, the religious community, the patriarchal family and the warrior class. These units consist, indeed, in greater or less degree of the same individuals, the religious community including all the members of the society, the magical and the warrior only certain sections; but in their specific relationship to the kingship they act as specific units, and as such confer such magical, religious, and political authority as the king possesses. At a slightly later stage the king combines all these authorities in his person, but they still remain in no less degree the products of the units which thus endow him. Apart from them he is a mere man, perhaps more intelligent and skilful than other men, but not therefore more powerful. Indeed, in early society the more intelligent and imaginative man, if he attempts to introduce innovations, is regarded as a danger to society. He offends the customary law and thereby the stupendous collective forces upon which it rests, thus endangering the whole society. Unless he succeeds in embodying in himself the collective authority he is very quickly taught his place or eliminated. Failure adequately to recognize these facts is the fallacy of the Great Man theory of history, which was always the picturesque failing of historians and has been rendered grotesque by Carlyle and the Germans.

Most early civilizations were the result of the conquest of the flabby inhabitants of fertile river valleys, rendered feeble and vegetative by the ease of living, by sturdy upland tribes, fortified by their struggles with inhospitable Nature. The enslavement of the conquered races increased food production and wealth, not only by mere increase of the

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number of labourers but also by the stern compulsion of the conquerors. Struggle for existence had formerly been the struggle of community with community: this continued with varying but generally diminished acuteness, at any rate in the early stages of civilization. The major stress of the struggle for existence was transferred to within the community itself. As Spurrell⁹ has pointed out "the main object of the community was not to promote the fittest to survive, but to fit as many as possible to survive" for purposes of mutual aid and greater luxury. The struggle had the effect of educating the masses, by means which were worse than brutal, to the virtues of restraint and submission, while it educated the governing classes to the arts of government. Both were due to the embodiment of social forces in individuals, utilizing the inherited instincts of negative self-feeling and self-assertion and accumulating a body of tradition of equivalent potency. "Law-givers" can only administer laws which embody the products of collective morality: laws fail which attempt to compel to new habits and moral codes, the germs of which are not already present in the collective mind.*

The unfit—whether for government or submission—were quickly wiped out by murder or sudden death. The fit survived, to hand on by heredity and tradition their civilizing characteristics to their progeny.

The progress of civilization, after its initial stage, is marked by the blurring of the two sharply defined classes. It is in some sense atavistic—a gradual reversion to an earlier type. The ruling classes, settling down to a life of luxury, ameliorated by refinement, press less severely upon the slaves. Manumission or emancipation of slaves supervenes and grows numerically.³² It is a sign both that the slave deemed worthy of freedom has so thoroughly learnt the lesson of restraint that he has become a harmless slave to the civilization itself, and that he has acquired greater capacity for harmless self-assertion. "Between the masters and the slaves there grew up what was called the free

* Innumerable examples of this neglected law could be cited from every period of history. In our own day it bids fair to frustrate the proposed legislation for the prevention of venereal disease.

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population. Into this were passed progressive individuals as they graduated from probationary slavery; but as the free population grew, civilization itself took the place of individual slave-owners on a large scale. Slavery for large sections of the people was mitigated into serfdom. Then the restraints even of serfdom were abolished, and everyone in the state was free. But as the free population grew, that is to say, as civilization itself took over the ownership of the slaves, the powers of the masters were curtailed, and they became less and less arbitrary rulers and more and more directors and organizers. Finally, all men were not only "free," but all had a voice in the management of things: the triumph of civilization was complete and the slavery of all equalized" (Spurrell). It reminds one of the physicist's final state of uniformly diffused heat, when the only conceivable *deus ex machinâ* is a Clerk Maxwell demon.

This description has doubtless the inherent inaccuracy of most generalizations. The slavery is never equalized, though the statement contains about as much truth as an average proverb does. It would be equally true—or untrue—to say that authority is equalized. The factors are too numerous and their interplay too complex to justify such broad generalizations, which are specially dangerous because they are made the premises of further, even more doubtful arguments, such as the pessimistic deduction that our own civilization is blindly following the course of the earlier civilizations, and is even now fast hurrying to destruction. (Cf. Spurrell). It is safer to restrict the field, and we may note in passing one psychological point. It is that collective habit shows the same character as individual habit. The acquisition of a habit by an individual is accompanied by, and even demands, conscious attention and arouses responses in consciousness; by repetition the conscious elements are submerged, and the habit is performed unconsciously. So, too, with collective habits. The authority of the king or the oligarchy is conferred by the conscious will of the people, but the recognition of the authority becomes in time an unconscious habit. Afterwards, if consciousness is brought to bear upon either, the habitual response is liable to be disarranged. The

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fingers which have learnt to execute a difficult piece of music without conscious effort refuse to respond when thought is brought to bear. So, when the submission to authority has become a habit, the intervention of thought may lead to chaos. But whereas individual habits reach the unconscious stage within a lifetime's span, the life-history of a collective habit is a matter of generations.

The inherited instincts and traditional habits and customs of a society evolve the complex of institutions, arts, and sciences which we call civilization, and this complex varies more or less in different societies. This "heritage" emphasizes the kinship of the individuals and expresses itself in the common use of the word "race." No race is pure, and half or more of the "heritage" is acquired and handed on by imitation. Races give rise to nations, and there, at any rate, are recognizable entities. Psychologically a nation is a congeries of innumerable communities (family, village, town, county, church, profession, trade, &c.), and each community has a collective mind which stamps the mind of every one of its component individuals with an indelible bias. Over and above all is the collective mind of the nation, which is created by the segregation of all the thoughts directed towards, and all the instincts in their relationship to other nations, and the re-synthesis of these components. The collective mind of the nation is its *mana*, a tissue of thought shot through with emotion: viewed from the standpoint of members of the Society, it is the State (*v.* Chapter X); viewed in relation to other Societies, it is patriotism.

Civilizations may disappear and leave no appreciable trace in the surviving people. Not infrequently, however, the conquerors stay the destruction and assimilate many of the features of the civilization which they supersede. Indeed, it is to their advantage to spare the conquered, so that these may minister to their luxury by arts and crafts which they themselves are incapable of initiating or perpetuating. Moreover, as has already been mentioned, early civilizations, though of independent origin, show peculiar similarities in rise and progress. So far as our modern civilization is concerned it owes much to its predecessors, and above all to the civilizations of the Hebrews, Greece,

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and Rome. From them Modern Europe has derived its springs of conduct by inheritance and tradition.

From the Hebrews we have derived a religion and an ethical code. The researches of archæologists and scholars have shown how these sprang from the same primitive source which gave rise to the great Semitic civilizations of Assyria and Babylon. Robertson Smith¹⁵ first pointed out the analogies between these early Semitic rites and beliefs and the still more primitive rites and beliefs of totemistic savages. He naturally aroused the indignation of the collective religious mind of his time, and was persecuted for his superior intelligence. In a dim and distant civilization men will perhaps admit the origin of their highest ideals from lowly sources as unconcernedly as they now accept their kinship with the anthropoid apes.*

To the Greeks more than to any other source we owe the clarification of the concept and the development of conceptual thought. The sketch which Cornford has given us of the transition from religion to philosophy throws a flood of light on the earliest and most obscure stages. The later phases are written in the works of Plato and Aristotle, and in the unsurpassed literature, history and art of Greece. If Modern Europe owes its religious ideals to Semitic sources, it owes its ideals of thought and science to "Aryan" sources, and above all to Greece. But both were in reality only striking phases in evolution from a common parentage, and neither group of ideals can with any accuracy be dis severed from the other. They interpenetrate, as Bergson would say.

Our chief debts to Rome are of later date. To it we owe above all our political institutions and law, and through it we became the heirs of the treasures of Greece. So far as religion is concerned, the Roman religion was even more "Olympian" in its character than the Greek, and more

* "If he but recognize that he himself and his virtues and aspirations are integral strands in the fabric of life, he will learn that the great tissue of reality loses none of its splendour by the fact that near by where the pattern glows with his courage and his pride it burns with the radiance of the tiger, and over against his intellect and his genius it mocks in the grotesques of the ape" (W. Trotter).

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Latins than Greeks were passively orthodox. A striking feature of the early Empire was the yearning in all classes for the satisfaction of their emotion-charged ("instinctive") impulses.³² They found a polluted outlet in monstrous sensuality, the delirious excitement of gladiatorial contests, and the orgiastic cults of Semitic and Egyptian gods. Springing from a common, far-distant primitive source, Greek and Semitic religion and philosophy had much in common. From ulterior motives their differences have been stressed all down the ages, yet the Christian Fathers reveal the likenesses to which their invectives show that they were blind. Alexandrian Neo-Platonism was the blend which linked Greek philosophy to Semitic and Egyptian religion, and even Christianity adopted the Logos. But it did far more. Its perfervid asceticism and other-worldliness supplied the exaggerated contrast to sensuality and hedonism which could alone stem the torrent. It provided a welcome relief both to Stoical serenity and to mere sensuality.

The early centuries of accepted Christianity in the Empire were devoted to missionary enterprise in its widest sense and to the crystallization of dogma. On the emotional side the ascetic element of Stoicism, Gnosticism, the Essenes, and so on, culminated in the hermits of the Thebaid. Greek ecstasy and enthusiasm ("being possessed by the god") led straight on to the martyr's crown. The service (*θεραπεία*) of the Olympian deity and the aversion (*ἀποτροπή*) of the underworld gods became coloured with Jehovah's love for his people and wrath for their adversaries. They found vent in the individual's ecstatic love of God and the Saints and terror of Hell fire, in the collective Agapemone and the persecution of heretics. On the cognitive side culture throughout the Empire was Latin, and the various barbarian peoples assimilated the new theories of life slowly and with difficulty.³³ The English and the Germans were never Latinized, and much that is peculiar to them in their subsequent development finds its explanation in this fact. The assimilation and fixing of dogmatic theology did not reach their climax until the publication of the "Summa Theologica" of Thomas Aquinas, who, in the thirteenth century, incorporated the

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rediscovered Aristotelian philosophy. The prime motive of life was the saving of the soul, which depended rather on conformity to the Church than on conduct. The rites were thus magical rather than religious; but the strong emotional impulses had far-reaching effects on conduct, as yet too little studied.

It was in these Dark Ages that Universities were founded—Paris, with its great school of Theology; Bologna, with its school of Law, handing on the Roman traditions; and Oxford, whose proudest boast should be that of having numbered Roger Bacon among its alumni, and thus given birth to experimental science. In them knowledge was only knowledge in so far as it conformed to the "Summa Theologica" or its equivalent. The criterion of Salvation reigned supreme, and Latin culture, with its glorious heritage from the Greeks, was fast fettered to the chariot of Theology. Yet the love of classical learning for its own sake peeped out. Jerome dreamed that he was excluded from heaven for being a Ciceronian, and Peter Damiani, John of Salisbury, and many others only accused themselves by their pious excuses. With the fall of Constantinople and the Italian Renaissance classical learning assumed a dominance, and rapidly acquired an arrogance, which have never been effectually thwarted.

The ineradicable instinct of curiosity ultimately gave rise to Rationalism—to Voltaire and the Encyclopædists. For a brief moment instinct found voice in the writings of Rousseau, and later arose in its might to cast down the idols of Reason. Rationalism laid the solid foundations for the growth of science and the scientific method, with their practical outcome in industrialism. On the other hand it begot a numerous progeny of Utopian panaceas for the social ills of mankind. It took account only of the cognitive side of the mental complex, well-nigh ignoring the even more important instinctive and affective side. Time has proved the failure of the panaceas, but the same methods and the same faulty data still sway the minds of politicians, administrators, educationists, masters and men.

The development of civilization is brought about by the spontaneous application of the principle of the division of labour. Innumerable communities arise within the Great

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Society. Even in savage tribes we meet with what we may call the frozen germs of subsidiary groups. Within the all-important clan there are secret societies³⁴ which are held together by special ties—the Man's House, which includes all the initiated members of the clan, excluding the women and children, male and female; the magical societies, held together by their carefully guarded mysteries; not to mention the totemic groups—emus, crows, witchetty grubs, and so on. The transition from matrilineal to patrilineal kinship was a strong disintegrating factor, but it was insufficient in itself to break down the rigid clan system. Probably the most potent factor in this respect was the acquisition of private property, and there is ample evidence to show how persistently the tendency was combated. Thus among the Eskimos at a certain season the personal acquisitions of members of the tribe were exhibited, and then distributed among the poorer members. The redistribution of land and annulment of debts at the Hebrew jubilee and among many other races in historical times are a survival of the same tendency.

In the course of the great migrations the patriarchal family grew in influence and steadily usurped authority within the clans. Such traces of the process as we possess are best seen in the barbarian Teutons, Celts and Slavs at the time when they first came in contact with the Roman Empire. It led to the individual accumulation of wealth and power and their hereditary transmission. Probably many clans broke up and disappeared, but the more vigorous survived. "They came out of the ordeal with a new organization—the village community—which kept them altogether for the next fifteen centuries or more. The conception of a common territory, appropriated or protected by common efforts, was elaborated, and it took the place of the vanishing conceptions of common descent" (P. Kropotkin).³⁵ Prince Kropotkin has given an admirable summary of the vicissitudes of the village community as described in the works of Sir Henry Maine, Kovalevsky, Vinogradov, Seeböhm, and others. It is a striking example of the workings of the communal mind in mediæval times. In it customary law reigned supreme, and as Maine says, rebellion against it was inconceivable because law, morality,

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and fact could not be separated from each other in those times. It is true that the disintegrating forces brought about changes in custom and evolution in customary law—the blood feud gave place to compensation (*wergeld*) and fine (*fred*), and so on. The study of these changes and the lessons which they teach, interpreted in terms of psychological science, revolutionize our ideas of history, which are for the most part founded upon the melodramatic behaviour of autocrats and the mercenary wars which they waged. In those days wars passed almost unheeded over the heads of these peaceful communities, and it mattered little to them who was king. They were the embodiment of the great subconscious collective mind, the repository of the instincts and traditions of the race—a slumbering volcano.

Feudalism did not abolish village communities. Though the members became serfs and the lord appropriated to himself many rights (taxes, mortmain duties on inheritance and marriages), they retained their common possession of the land and jurisdiction among themselves. Out of them arose the mediæval city with its guilds. These were but a further development of the same principles which evolved the *gens* and the village community. The mediæval city was in fact a federation of village communities interpenetrated by a network of guilds and fraternities. The immense results which they achieved in industry, art and science are well known: they were doomed to become a prey to the growing military states. Modern research has thrown a flood of light upon these communal establishments. A wealth of material has been collected, and already very valuable additions have been made to our knowledge. It has never yet been studied adequately from the psychological point of view. The first psychologist who awakes from his dreams of epistemology will find an almost virgin field awaiting him.

The interplay of communities and environment has led to innumerable experiments in political control. The studies of "bodies politic" (B. E. Hammond)³⁶ and their government is another almost unworked field in collective psychology.

When we arrive at modern times and present conditions the problem becomes infinitely complex. The growth of individualization which has been going on all down the ages

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has by no means culminated in that freedom of thought which is commonly postulated. Each of us to-day is not only a member of one community, but of many. Our collective thought as a member of each community is almost as firmly fettered as the thought of the Australian clansman—we are slaves to its notions, its instincts, its habits, its customs, its conventions. As we move, mentally, from one community to another, our collective thoughts change like a chameleon's skin. It is more remarkable that anyone should gain any consistency of thought than that all should be inconsistent. It is mainly attributable to the fact that many of the communities are like nests of Chinese boxes, one inside the other; the greater includes the less. And the dominating factors in our conduct are our collective instincts and traditions, not our reason. As a rule the smaller the community, within limits, the stronger the collective emotions and the collective suggestions and sympathy: at any rate, this is the case with the tender emotion and its derivatives in family life—love of parents and children, brothers and sisters; fear for their welfare; anger at those who threaten their welfare; and so on. The larger the community, the weaker the collective emotional impulses; but these are variable in their activity and can be raised to violence by collective suggestion, as instanced by mobs, revival meetings, panics, and in less degree the influence of the daily press. The smaller the group the more it is isolated; the larger the group the greater its prestige; self-assertion in the smaller may give place to negative self-feeling in the presence of the larger. Introduction to a new community is introduction to the relatively unknown, and the unknown has great prestige. Hence negative self-feeling is the predominant emotion, and is apt to be most profound in the presence of the Unknown God. Negative self-feeling is the emotional condition which renders the individual most susceptible to suggestion.

Thus each man to-day is a member of many groups—race, nationality, church, class, trade, township, family, and so on. To each he owes allegiance and gives it willingly—nay, involuntarily, by virtue of his herd instinct. Their claims war among themselves, combining and diversely

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recombining, thus determining conduct. What is called will is but the resultant of all these infinitely complex motive forces. The *sine qua non* of a relatively consistent behaviour is the possession of and the acting up to an ideal. Instincts and ideals are imponderable entities, and it is hopeless to expect accurately to foretell the actions of men. Yet *some* guidance may be derived from the study of collective psychology, which at any rate confirms the suspicion that the old standards are unreliable.

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PART II.—THE NATION.

Chapter VII.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY.

WHEN an anatomist studies a portion of the body, for example an arm, he adopts two chief methods. He dissects out each muscle from its origin to its insertion, he traces each nerve or blood-vessel in its course along the arm. In order better to determine the normal relations of these various structures to each other he freezes the arm so as to fix the parts, and then cuts a series of transverse sections. The same method is adopted for microscopical specimens. Thus the shape and relations of the various organs of a minute embryo are fixed in position by suitable reagents, embedded in an artificial matrix, and then cut into longitudinal or transverse sections. In this manner the natural relations can be discovered and mentally reconstructed.

In Part I I have attempted to describe what may be called a longitudinal section of mental evolution. The section is a mere outline sketch on a large scale—only a few salient points have been set down, only here and there have a few details been lightly sketched in. Just as the anatomist must bear in mind the shape and disposition of the bones when tracing the muscles, so here and there I have indicated the disposition of parts in fragments of neighbouring longitudinal sections. In order to obtain a just reconstruction it is necessary also to study transverse sections. In dealing in this manner with a living moving stream, such as the stream of human consciousness, the anatomical method fails through freezing everything into a static condition. The anatomist's dry bones can be made to live only by the physiologist's study of the parts in motion—the play of the muscles, the circulation of the blood, the telegraphic impulses along the nerves, and so

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on. So the psychologist, though he is forced to study mental processes by a method of analysis, must correct the distortions which he thus artificially produces by constant reference to the everlasting and continuous flow of consciousness. Bergson's chief contribution to scientific psychology—he is essentially a metaphysician—is the much-needed stress which he has laid upon this aspect of the subject, the importance of *la durée*, mental process, continuous but ever changing. When we further consider the mental processes of groups of individuals we find the same continuity with perpetual change. Where the river flows into the sea the fresh and the salt water meet and mingle; so mind acts upon mind and diverse mental processes interpenetrate.

So inextricably complex is this interplay of minds, this kaleidoscopic mutability, that only by freezing the stream into a momentary stability can any knowledge of the pattern of the parts be obtained. By this static method we are enabled to view the pattern as a whole and to study the parts in detail; but the pattern has no boundary, the parts interpenetrate, and while we pause to think the pattern has changed. The method is grievously faulty, but it is not quite useless. Mathematics uses the same artificial method in a less difficult field, and who will deny the utility of mathematics?

As we laboriously study the myriad phases of the iridescent pattern, artificially marking boundaries between the colours where no boundaries are, every imaginable method must be applied to draw the chart, to fill in the details, and to reconstruct in thought the moving stream. Scalpel and forceps give place to microtome and microscope, only to be followed by kymograph and sphygmograph and induction coil. So it is with the mental stream. After physics, biology, anatomy and physiology have said their say—and while they are still talking to some purpose—psychology steps forward and demands a hearing. By introspection she filled in one detailed fragment of the pattern, but only of a few of the terminal transverse sections of the series. By comparative psychology and anthropology and history other details in earlier sections have been filled in, and shadowy outlines of some parts of

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the changing pattern have been revealed. The stream has widened, and the details of the pattern have become infinitely complex. The last transverse section of the series is the greatest jig-saw puzzle of all. There is but one way of fitting the parts together, but it embraces every method. The hazy outlines which we have dimly discerned in former patterns have their places in ours, if we can only find them; and when we have found them, we may perhaps still more dimly guess their places in the sections to come. Man in his vast egotism even dares to think that he can impress upon the changing currents some deformations according to his own free will, and, whether he can or not, it is quite certain that he will go on trying.

Before I embark upon the at least harmless, but superlatively egotistic, task of trying to indicate a contour here and there on the latest chart and a minute change of contour here and there which appears desirable and not wholly impossible, it will be well to take a glance at our tools and gauges. They are a makeshift lot, and they badly want polishing and sharpening, but such as they are we must make the best of them. Most jig-saw puzzles have a definite shape and a definite edge, and one can start by building up the edge and working towards the centre. Unfortunately the Great Jig-saw Puzzle has no known shape and no edge. Little patches are better defined than others, and they have to be fitted into a pattern which is very nebulous and conjectural. Such little patches as we possess are all viewed through mental microscopes of different magnifying powers, and the only chance we have of fitting them together is to reduce them to the same magnification, using our sketchy chart as a criterion. We may therefore conclude that all our efforts must be directed to two main ends: (1) To get our patches as detailed and accurate as possible, and if possible to extend them by fitting on the appropriate pieces to their borders; (2) to correlate all the patches in all the sections we can make, so that our sketch chart may be as comprehensive and as consistent with those of previous sections as possible. Hitherto much more attention has been paid to the first requisite than to the second, with the result that our patches are all to different scales. I am sufficiently

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optimistic to think that we should make a considerable advance if we devoted more attention to correlation.* As a mere improvement in methodology it would be an interesting experiment to endow a few "Jig-saw" or "Liaison" professorships. The duty of each professor would be to make himself thoroughly conversant with the latest researches in two, three, or more allied branches of knowledge. He would devote his energies to the borderline problems of his allotted studies; he would act as a bureau of information to the specialized professors and students of those subjects. He would lecture on the relations between these subjects and their relation to general knowledge, their evolution, and the lines of most promising research. In terms of neurology, he would be an "association fibre."

It is now generally admitted that the term "social organism," dear to Herbert Spencer and his time, connoted a great fallacy. Yet like most *prima facie* analogies it contained a modicum of truth, and the tendency to treat it with scorn and obloquy has had the effect of destroying its value. There is an analogy between society and the individual organism, and its utility consists in the suggestiveness which it arouses in regard to co-ordination and correlation of parts. Just as the analogy between the nervous system and telegraphy is useful, if not pressed too far, so the analogy between the so-called "government" of society and conscious control in the individual is full of valuable suggestion. The analogy is indeed so obvious, and has been enlarged upon so frequently, that I need not go into details. It is necessary rather to emphasize the limitations of the likenesses. My object at present, however, is to point out that one of the methods which Applied Psychology may adopt with proper precautions is that which may be called the *physiological* method. Applied Psychology, like pure Psychology, rests upon the material

* "As a true scientific philosophy must bring the separate and self-regarding sciences, now for the most part speaking different and reciprocally unintelligible languages, into intelligent concatenation and co-operation, so a true psychology must be founded on a clear and distinct recognition of the essential continuity and constant flux of things in which all so-called causes are effects and all so-called effects causes: mind be conceived in thought as a part of the nature which its organization is in fact" (H. MAUDSLEY).

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basis of physiology, and knowledge of the underlying physiological processes which subserve the manifestations of consciousness clarifies our conceptions of the psychological processes of the individual, the community, and Society at large.

But this is only one of many methods or tools. It has been sufficiently proved in Part I that man is above all things a social animal, as Aristotle long ago said (*πολιτικὸν ζῷον*). In fact, it can scarcely be said that an individual exists, so much is the individual linked by living chains to the social mass. And in his aspect as an only partly desocialized unit, and in his behaviour in his collective relationships, which is integrated into the behaviour of communities, *anthropological*, *historical*, and *biological* methods of investigation are even more important than the physiological method. The strength of the application of these methods is in their developmental or evolutionary teaching; here we are on relatively sure ground. Its weakness is in the analogies which they present; and the fallacies of analogy can be guarded against only by the careful and precise collation of the results arrived at by the use of the several methods.

Pure psychology itself adopts many different methods for arriving at its conclusions, such as experimental—so-called physiological—psychology, introspection, comparative psychology, and so on. It should be noted that the same method is often put to different uses with valuable results.

In the application of psychology to education, industry, science, politics, and so on, all these methods have their value, and it is not always the most obvious method which gives the best results. To attain a just perspective all the results must be weighed against each other. For example, we have seen that the physiological method suggests the social organism theory, the logical conclusions of which show that it must be modified and controlled by other methods. In education the biological method gives rise to the "Culture Epoch" theory, founded upon Beer's "Recapitulation Theory" (p. 34), and leads to absurdities if not similarly controlled. The fallacies of the application of the historical method to politics are too familiar to require comment. On the other hand, in politics, as

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Graham Wallas* has shown, the simplest psychological law which analyses a conscious act into a cognitive, an affective, and a conative part, is at least as effective a tool as the methods of Hobbes (founded on fear), Bentham (on pleasure-pain), Comte (on love), or Tarde (on imitation).

The psychologist has many reagents in his laboratory, laws founded upon facts derived from various sources by various means. The reactions which they produce are often ambiguous, and require many confirmatory and explanatory tests; often the reagents seem inapplicable to the given problem and useless. On the other hand, he has hitherto seemed strangely inappreciative of some of the most valuable, especially those derived from "evolutionary" sources. The peculiarities of collective mentality; the clarification of the concept from the bondage of the concrete; the ever-widening projiciency of sensation, which has its correlate in the ever-widening projiciency of conation; the liberation of cognition, which has led "reason" to far outstrip average human capacities and desires—such are examples of tools in the psychologist's armamentarium which await more general and skilful use.

* GRAHAM WALLAS. "The Great Society." 1914.

Chapter VIII.

EDUCATION.

AFTER many centuries educationists are at last awakening to the fact that education has something to do with drawing out something which is already present. Of course, words often change in meaning, and derivation gives no accurate clue to the modern use, but it is not so in this case. Education is the leading out of inherent, though dormant energies, their fostering by suitable pabulum, and their guidance so far as may be into the best paths. Ideally education is the application of these principles to the individual with the ultimate aim of making him a fit member of the Ideal Society, but that is in the present phase of evolution too distant a projiciencie of conation to be of much practical value. We have to be content with the more proximate aim of moulding the individual so far as possible into a worthy citizen of the Great Society as it is to-day, while at the same time fostering those conceptions which tend to approximate the Great Society to the greater Ideal. "The highest morality of his (the educator's) place and period serves as his working ideal; and that morality takes specific shape in the virtues that are most prized by the best members of the community" (T. Raymont).*

Unfortunately people cannot agree as to what morality is. In the old days it was thought to have little or nothing to do with the intellect: the mind was a vacuum to be filled with various odds and ends of so-called knowledge, battered down with plentiful thwackings, the soul a thing to be "saved" by rites, and more bodily scourgings. So long as individualism reigned supreme in philosophy, from

* T. RAYMONT. "The Principles of Education." 1915.

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Hobbes to Herbert Spencer by way of Locke, Adam Smith, Bentham and J. S. Mill, there was little room for a sane view of morality. But the last individualist turned out to be the first collectivist, for Herbert Spencer's insistence on society as an organism led him to the truth that society determines the individual as much or more than the individual determines society. Modern psychology, as we have seen in Part I, teaches that morality is socialized behaviour: that "the essence of moral conduct is the performance of social duty, the duty prescribed by Society, as opposed to the mere following of the promptings of egoistic impulses" (McDougall). So, though "a long compass round be fetched," we return to Plato, who in the "Republic" deals with education as a purely social question, a provision of nurture for human nature.

It is to the credit of educationists that they have realized the importance of psychology more than any other leaders of men. Rousseau set the ball rolling with his "Émile," and it has been kept going by Pestalozzi, Froebel, and a host of others down to modern times, and Maria Montessori. Unfortunately to-day the psychologists in general are far from up to date, for reasons which I shall deal with later; so, with the exception of infant training, it has been a case of the amblyopic leading the blind. Nevertheless, the recognition of the supreme importance of psychology in one department of social life is a conquest of inestimable value. The application of psychology to infant training has revolutionized our ideas of how to bring up a child, and it is our knowledge of the impermeability of the hard-baked cake of custom which alone prevents us from being astonished that the same process has not revolutionized the education of boys and girls and men and women. In spite of reams of pedagogic literature mediæval methods reign in our secondary schools, pedagogic psychology lingers in the obsolete "faculty" stage, and even an enlightened educator holds such a false opinion of the scope of psychology that he writes as follows: "That psychology can furnish no adequate guidance in the framing of curricula is only part of the larger truth that it cannot decide any question relating to the aims of education. . . . What these aims shall be, however, depends upon our ideals of life and

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conduct, and not upon anything that psychology professes to teach us" (Raymont). Even the now discredited Herbert Spencer had a truer outlook, for his psychology taught him that education is "a preparation for *complete living*."

If we are to make any advance it must be realized that psychology embraces the whole of Society, that individual psychology is but social psychology individualized in the manner sketched in Part I of this essay, that individual behaviour is a social product, and that morality is behaviour conformed to the practices, and in its highest expression conformed to the ideals of Society.

INFANT TRAINING.

In a thesis advocating the claims of applied psychology, infant training is one of the few examples of the victory won. No one now would dream of denying the importance of psychology in this sphere if they realized the fact that the methods of Pestalozzi, Froebel, Montessori, and others were merely applied psychology.

The human infant is born into the world already equipped with a mass of inherited propensities which range from simple reflex acts, such as crying, sucking, grasping, and so on, to potential instincts of the greatest complexity. Structurally, the unborn child's frame passes through a series of stages which are a modified epitome of the structures of its primitive ancestors. This law of recapitulation applies equally, *mutatis mutandis*, to the functions which are subserved by structures, and hence to mental evolution. The infant thus equipped with a mass of dormant instincts and innate proclivities, which are common to it and its fellows, and partake in large degree of the characters of the instincts of its animal precursors and of the proclivities of its human ancestors, is introduced into a new environment. The new-born child is a helpless animal, and passes through a longer stage of maternal care than the offspring of any other species. Hence its innate propensities and instincts develop during a period of tutelage through which they undergo profound modification. This tutelage is of two kinds, fostering and directive. Just as the mother

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nourishes her child's body with suitable food, so she fosters its character—which is its mind—with more or less suitable pabulum. In addition she endeavours to direct its behaviour—which is the motor expression of its mind—into the channels which she has learnt to regard as best for its future welfare. It will be admitted that the fostering care and the directive influence of the great majority of mothers leave much to be desired. Both, in the mothers themselves, are founded upon inherited instincts and innate dispositions which have been modified by acquired habits and traditional customs, the results of their social and physical environments. The fostering and the guiding principles of tutelage together constitute the beginnings—and indeed the end—of education.

The proper place for the child during the first six years of life is in the home, as a member of its first and smallest but most important community, the family. Its training may be supplemented by visits to the Froebelian Kindergarten or the Montessori School. In the earliest years its mental activities manifest themselves in purely motor form, passing from reflex acts to instinctive acts, which latter are very soon complicated by the interaction of instincts and modified by environmental conditions. As the actions grow more complex they become synthesized into various forms of play, which, whatever their origin, are of profound biological significance. The cardinal point, however, for our present purpose is that the infant's mental life at this period manifests itself in preponderant manner in motor activities, which, further, appear to be spontaneous.

The most fundamental tendencies of all organisms are (1) to avoid pain, and (2) to attract, prolong, and repeat pleasurable experiences. These early, quasi-spontaneous activities deal, therefore, with purely concrete experiences, and are on the perceptual plane. They are modified and varied by imitation. Painful stimuli result in the most primitive instinctive responses. Pleasure is derived from the satisfaction of desire, i.e., the sensory stimuli derived from the organs of touch, vision, and so on, give rise to an affective state, which in turn manifests itself in some striving or conation. Pleasure, then, is derived from satisfied conation, and its amount varies with the conative effort, if this

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be not too great. Pleasure is therefore the consciousness of "something attempted, something done."

Conation, to be within the bounds of possible satisfaction, must be proximate in the early stages. A child's interest is in doing something, and is centred in the details of the process rather than in the result. As it grows older its conation becomes more proficient, and it does things which do not in themselves interest it in order to reach the more remote end. As it grows up the remote end may recede until its satisfaction involves weeks, months, or years of conative effort.

From these considerations we conclude that educationists would do well to bear the following facts in mind:—

(1) That the "Open Sesame" is *interest*. (a) What interests the child is doing something within its powers, yet exercising its powers to the extent of demanding conscious effort. (b) What interests the older boy or girl is the satisfaction of some instinctive or innate desire, which is relatively proximate, yet involves a proficiency of conation beyond the pleasures of mere doing. (c) What interests the man or woman may be a very remote end which involves prolonged, and often distasteful, conative effort.

(2) That ontogenetically, as well as phylogenetically, cognition begins with the *concrete*, and reaches the abstract by varied and repeated analyses and re-syntheses. Hence education should start with the concrete and lead forward by gradual stages to the abstract and the ideal.

(3) That in early childhood the fundamental tendency to attract, prolong, and repeat pleasurable experiences should be the instrument of education. Only when the child has developed sufficiently to have reached the dawn of Self in relation to Authority (v. p. 35) should the tendency to avoid pain be utilized, and then chiefly in the more definitely social, i.e., moral aspects.*

* "The System of teaching and of enforcing discipline by Excessive Prescription still pervades the atmosphere of some Elementary Schools." . . . "Prescription, whether by stuffing, or by restricting the free play of the faculties, crushes the self-evolution of the growing mind" (H. B. GRAY and S. TURNER, "Eclipse or Empire"). Cf. E. HOLMES, "What is, and what might be."

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Speaking generally, each child of a given society is born with much the same mass of proclivities as its fellows and into much the same environment, so that common principles of education can be adopted. But since the object of education is to fit the child to fulfil its functions as a citizen to the highest possible extent, the differences of individual children count far more than would otherwise be the case. The main mass of the child's proclivities in its fundamental properties, which largely constitute its mental disposition and emotional temperament, is relatively little susceptible to environmental influence. Indeed, where it departs in any marked degree from type, it is pathological and requires special methods of treatment. Hence, from the point of view of mother and teacher, their function is largely one of observation. Each child's mind requires analysis and diagnosis, just as a doctor diagnoses a difficult case. Both the inductive and the deductive methods should be employed. The effects of the mental pabulum supplied should be observed and its nature modified according to results. From observation the preponderant proclivities of the child are noted, and the directive influence is applied in the form of encouragement or repression. Each child should be the object of thorough psychological study. It follows that the ideal mother and teacher should be well equipped psychologists themselves. So far as the mother is concerned, we must take her as we find her; she can be improved in this respect by the gradual growth of new and better traditions alone. The teacher, on the other hand, should be carefully selected and appropriately trained. Herein lie the strength and the weakness of the Montessori system. Dr. Montessori herself is a woman with innate genius for the part and the acquired training which carries it to success. She founds her system on the principles of spontaneity and liberty,* modifying the mental pabulum according to the child's capacities, and leading the growing mind along the best paths, which are also generally the lines of least resistance. Unfortunately the majority of infant teachers resemble the majority of mothers. Just as

* See E. P. CULVERWELL, "The Montessori Principles and Practice." 1914.

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the latter force any unsuitable diet upon their children, bringing them up with the incompatible accompaniments of smacks and the baby's comforter, so the former stuff the children's minds with indigestible lessons, coercing them by punishments and spoiling them by cajolery. At no stage in education is the equipment of the teacher so important as in the early stage. This is the period of diagnosis par excellence, and requires the highest qualities and the best training. In the later stages the path is mapped out, and the teachers are specialists.

The Montessori system is a great improvement on earlier methods of infant training if—and only if—the teacher thoroughly understands its principles and is conscientious and diligent in carrying them out: otherwise the free scope given to the spontaneous activities of the child—letting it have its own way, in other words—must rapidly degenerate into “spoiling” the child and creating pandemonium in the class. As a matter of fact the stress laid upon liberty of action is exaggerated; it is the swing of the pendulum from the old method of repression. It is obvious that the system in practice involves firm guidance and control, as is indeed admitted by Dr. Montessori where moral principles are at stake, and as is almost equally patent in the ordinary classes, even though the authoress appears to be unconscious of the fact. The gentle and subconsciously persuasive means adopted are the germ of discipline. From the beginning to the end of education—i.e., throughout life—there is no abiding happiness without discipline, whether applied with equity from without or self-inspired. For happiness is the pleasurable affective state produced by the integration of one's instincts and sentiments into harmonious relationship with one's fellows in the Great Society, or, on a higher plane, with the imaginary galaxy of saints and heroes who form the Ideal Society. It will be easily understood why discipline plays so fundamental a part when we reflect that no conative effort can attain satisfaction without order—the orderly sequence of appropriately adapted activities. Hence order—kosmos, discipline, law—is the ground plan of all the instincts, sentiments, and mental processes which are destined to fruition.

Judging from a purely theoretical standpoint, it seems

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to me that the Montessori system would be improved by the inclusion of some of the Kindergarten technique, especially modelling with plasticine. Moreover, neither system makes full use of drawing. One of the earliest joys of childhood is to scribble with a pencil upon paper, and this soon develops, especially with a little encouragement, into drawing houses and animals. When we remember that the earliest writing of savages was pictography, it is surprising that more use is not made of these early joyous efforts of the child. By using ruled paper children could be easily induced to draw houses which showed some approximation to stability. In time they would learn to draw the letters of the alphabet, then written letters, &c. Capital letters might at a later stage be made an introduction to very elementary geometry. Then rulers and compasses should be given to them, and they could copy more elaborate designs. By the use of ruled paper the elements of arithmetic might be taught graphically. In fact, drawing might be made an admirable "liaison" subject—and that at a very early age.

SCHOOL TRAINING.

When, in the treatment of disease, we find a large and varied assortment of "cures" advocated for any given ailment, it is a fairly sure sign that the doctors know very little about the cause and nature of the ailment. By analogy we are led to suspect that educationists not unfrequently find themselves in a similar plight. At any rate, very few people—except custom-bemused parents—seem to be satisfied with the later stages of English so-called "primary" education, and still fewer with "secondary" and public school education. Of course, the truth of the matter is that we are passing through a long-drawn-out transitional period. The hard cake of custom is being pulverized under repeated blows, the last and greatest of which is the War. I do not propose here to discuss the development and establishment of the pernicious system which resulted from the scholasticism of the Middle Ages, and has been perpetuated by the errors of a false psychology. It is more important to inquire into the

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causes of disruption and their bearing upon reconstruction, and into the causes of the colossal inertia of the system which obtrudes well-nigh insuperable obstacles to reform.

The causes of disruption have received a large amount of attention, direct or indirect, in so far as they affect education, because they are the great movements which have revolutionized the mode of life of our civilization. They are all bound up in the growth of Industrialism and the progress of Physical Science. These have given rise to a totally new outlook on life, which the old educational system was quite unfitted to subserve. Not that this system was wholly wrong: had it been so it could not have put up so good a fight. It is rather that industrialism and physical science have outstripped the more complex biological socializing activities of the human mind, producing a pathological inco-ordination. These movements have led to a hitherto unimagined accumulation of wealth and growth of luxury, unevenly distributed and uncompensated by any equivalent growth of refinement and art. Hence they have been desocializing tendencies, and have generated a banalistic "materialism" without adequate socializing ethical control. Since they are desocializing tendencies, they are scientifically justly described as immoral. It is to be noted that an unbalanced over-development of one side of human mentality carries in its train disruptive forces which threaten the stability of Society.* What, indeed, shall it profit a civilization if it gain the whole world—or at least a "place in the Sun"—and lose its own soul?

It is probable that the War will tend to readjust the

* These thoughts bring out one of those fundamental causes of the War which have hitherto found expression only in scattered obiter dicta. If the Church had been really alive to the immensity of its opportunity it could scarcely have failed to utilize the scientifically undeniable argument that the War is due, perhaps more than to any other cause, to the universal weakening of religious principles. In the present stage of human evolution the mass of mankind—and still more of womankind—requires the stimulus of religious belief of some sort or other to make it behave ethically. Viewed in the light of scientific psychology religious belief is a collective attitude of mind, which may or may not have some supernatural sanction. Whether it has or has not is not a question for science to decide. Doubtless the clergy of all sects and shades of opinion have preached the doctrine to their own

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balance. It can hardly fail to put a curb on luxury, even if it should fail to promote refinement. Much depends on the men who come back, but they will find a large lump to be leavened. Moreover, the War has had enormous socializing energy. It has knitted the Allies together with bonds which will not readily be broken, and it can scarcely be doubted that it has made the English-speaking race—Britishers, Colonials, and Americans—into one community such as has not existed since the American War of Secession. This being so, the result will be reflected in education. However antiquated, erroneous, and ill-founded her methods may have been, the ultimate aim of education has always been to fit the young to become worthy members of Society. Education alone, falteringly it is true, but still with conscious purpose, has striven to keep the balance of mental life secure. And it is to education that we must look for the readjustment of the balance in the Society of the future.

The causes of the inertia of the old educational system which baulks all efforts at reform are manifold. The most powerful is deeply ingrained custom, derived from centuries of tradition. There are no customs so deeply rooted as those which are thought to possess some supernatural sanction, and education belongs to this group. Modern education was born of the Church in the Middle Ages, and it is only within quite recent times that it has become partially emancipated. Everyone will admit that the prime object of education is morality, but the definition of morality will vary with every shade of opinion. So long as morality is regarded as conformity to religious doctrine there is no

congregations—the people who did not require to be converted. That they have not preached it far and wide in the Press and elsewhere is due to the fact that their community is narrow, and therefore their collective mentality is narrow also. Hence, even if it has reached the ears of the unconverted, it has been stated in such a “pious” form that it was futile to expect it to make any lasting impression. Nevertheless, judging from some signs of a changed attitude to religion now prevailing, there is reason to think that the ghastly experiences of modern warfare may prove more powerful sermons than any preached in Westminster Abbey or the City Temple. Yet the fear arises that the hypnotizing spiritualism of “Raymond,” the grotesque tenets of the late, but immortal, Mrs. Eddy, and the machinations of crystal-gazers may prove as potent as either.

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hope for progress in education. So far, at any rate, as the State, i.e., Society at large in its corporate capacity, is concerned, morality must be defined in scientific terms, i.e., as conduct which is in conformity with the highest needs of Society. Only so far is Society at large concerned with the morality of education. If various sections of Society wish to inculcate a morality of their own definition they must limit their attentions to the members of their own individual communities—wherein, indeed, they should be given a free hand.

Allied to this general cause is the inertia of the schoolmaster. Originally a member of a religious order, he has never succeeded in divesting himself of the traces of his origin, whether still in Holy Orders or a layman. Apart from the clergy, there is no community so inadequately trained for its special functions as the schoolmasters. However morality may be defined, and whether it is a preparation for another world or not, it certainly deals in practice with conduct in social relationships. What can the average schoolmaster, himself the product of ordinary school and very specialized University training—if indeed he have the latter—know of the future requirements, mental and moral, individual and social, of his pupils in their innumerable walks of life? The majority are going into business, others into various professions—law, medicine, engineering, science, agriculture, &c. Of such things the schoolmaster is profoundly ignorant. Narrow in training, he is naturally narrow in thought and outlook. Until the clergy and the schoolmasters add a lengthy apprenticeship to the “world” in some of its many-sided “worldly” aspects before embarking upon their life’s work, they will fail as egregiously in the future as in the past to fulfil their functions in Society.

Coming now to less general causes of educational inertia, the greatest is vested interests. These are a many-headed hydra, but one of their worst manifestations is the deadlock which exists between higher schools and the Universities. The causes of this deadlock are manifold. A few only can be mentioned here. At the root is the traditional education system itself, petrifying both the schoolmasters and University dons. Resulting from this, and having all the pernicious potentialities which money possesses, is the

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system of endowments for scholars, lecturers, and others, which, good in itself, is stultified by conservatism, legal restrictions, and inelasticity. Scholarships are the bait dangled before boys and schoolmasters by the Universities, often leading the former to an impasse, from which the only escape is to perpetuate the system by becoming schoolmasters themselves, and the latter to a disgraceful neglect of the intellectual development of the great mass of boys who are not likely to win University honours for the school. Thus the schools cater for the Universities, and the Universities for the schools. A vicious circle is set up, and reform is almost impossible. The schools *dare* not introduce comprehensive reforms, and the Universities are prevented from doing so by the dead weight of custom, gilded by endowments, and the votes of mentally moribund Masters of Arts.* To these causes are to be added the defects of the examination system and of school curricula, the specialization of University teachers without any effective liaison between them, and last but not least the absence of any criterion as to what really is wanted.

The only satisfactory criterion is psychology, but it is the science of psychology, as I have attempted to outline it in Part I, and not the obsolete psychology which was derived from introspection without the control of other methods. "Faculty" psychology, "cultivationist" psychology with its mental discipline gymnastics, and formal studies, even Herbartian psychology with its apotheosis of the moral-religious, must go by the board, though they are far from being devoid of salutary lessons, and particularly warnings.

The line which it has been customary to draw between "primary" and "secondary" education is nebulous, and has become more so with the lapse of time. Primary education started with compulsory reading, writing, and arithmetic, and needlework for girls (1870); English, geography, and history were added (1875); then elementary science (1882); then drawing (1890); then object lessons (1895). Secondary education formerly was practically

* H. B. GRAY and S. TURNER. "Eclipse or Empire," 1916.
H. B. GRAY. "The Public Schools and the Empire," 1913.

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confined to the classical languages. Obviously no satisfactory criterion was applied at all. If modern psychology is applied as a criterion education must be carried forward continuously in accordance with the principles already indicated. First and foremost, the child's *interest* must be sustained, and as his natural progress is from the concrete to the more and more abstract, utilitarian ends will not be found to be incompatible with the best education. If interest is kept steadily in mind as the all-important touchstone, the children will be early segregated into groups, and the largest group will be those with definitely utilitarian tendencies. For they will be the average, and the average will find no interest in remote conations. Their interest will be centred in proximate ends, and the teacher's function will be to guide with appropriately regulated discipline, so that, while interest is enhanced rather than diminished, the ends become utilitarian both for the individual and for society. It is useless to tell a boy that he will never get on in the world unless he applies himself to some uncongenial task. Getting on in the world is too remote a contingency, however desirable, to be an efficient stimulus. The discipline must be shown to have an immediate reference to some easily aroused desire. Desires are only the longing for the satisfaction of pleasant emotion-charged instincts and sentiments, and there are plenty of these to appeal to. So far as purely mental discipline is concerned, the three essentials of elementary education—reading, writing, and arithmetic—suffice, and it has already been shown, especially by Dr. Montessori, that these need form no very onerous burden. At a later stage discipline will be automatic if the youth has been properly diagnosed and set to work along the congenial path which affords exercise for his preponderant propensities.

It is lamentable to contemplate how fascinating school life might be and how wearisome it often is. The chief cause is that the teachers, if they have any conscious aim at all, apart from hoary tradition, are aiming at distant objects which do not appeal to the young mind in the slightest degree. Probably the greatest step in mental evolution before the conceptual stage was when the proficient sense organs which subserve sight, hearing, and

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smell were evolved. Then for the first time the animal began to look forward, and have desires which reached out into the unknown world beyond the tip of its nose. For all of us the satisfaction of proximate desires has a preponderance over that of remote; and this impulse is far greater in the young. As things now are, a boy, for admirable but remote ends, is stuffed with excellent food in large doses, like a Strasburg goose. It is not surprising that, like the goose, he gets fatty degeneration. The greatest aid to alimentary digestion is appetite, and the same applies to mental digestion. It is one thing to make a boy learn the bare facts of geography in their crude irrelevancy. It is quite another to teach him the same facts in their relation to physical geography, history, military strategy, industry, and so forth. Fortunately in this particular subject a new era has already dawned, and the success of the new methods surely points the moral that the great, if not the greatest, need in school education is more intimate correlation and co-ordination of the subjects.

H. B. Gray and S. Turner, the former of whom was Headmaster of Bradfield for thirty years, recommend the following curriculum for the Preparatory School:—

“(a) English, to include reading aloud (with just emphasis and elocution) of simple literature; (b) history grouped around lives and characters; (c) arithmetic with mensuration; (d) the elements of mechanics; (e) Nature study on a gradually expanding scale from local to national environments; (f) geography on a modern and scientific basis; (g) one modern language which, for reasons dealt with elsewhere, should be French; (h) drawing—freehand; (i) manual training, which, as in Public Schools, should be taught to all boys as part of the curriculum for one-third of the weekly periods now spent in non-productive games, such games to be limited to three afternoons a week, while one afternoon at least should be devoted to physical training.”

Geography, history, and literature should be taught as parts of a single subject, and diffuse reading should be actively encouraged. All three arise in the most natural way out of the story telling which appeals so unfailingly

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to all normal children. Essay writing should be begun as early as possible, and the boys and girls should be allowed to choose their own subjects. They should be encouraged to "get up" their subject from any source they can think of. Every school should have a good reference library for this and other purposes. The actual essays would, of course, be written "out of the children's heads" after the preparation was completed, and every effort should be made to stimulate competition. The choice of subjects and the manner in which they were treated would be quite invaluable to the teacher in diagnosing the mental tendencies and capacities of the individual children, and should be utilized in grouping them. Formal lessons in grammar would be reduced to a minimum, most attention being paid to analysis; grammar, indeed, would be learnt for the most part incidentally through reading and composition, and not least through the teacher's example.

Every boy and girl should learn French, which, of course, should be taught colloquially *by a native*. They should be given interesting books to read, such as Dumas' novels or anything else they might choose, subject to the teacher's consent and advice; they should be put on their honour not to use "cribs." When dealing with other countries books of interest to boys and girls should be read in good translations. In every case, so far as possible, and always in the case of Latin and Greek, the translations should have the original texts printed on the opposite page, as in the Loeb classics. This device would stimulate the curiosity of the children and facilitate the teacher's psychological diagnosis.

The teacher should exercise the greatest assiduity in inculcating exact methods of expression both in speech and composition, no matter what the subject of the lesson. Speech is the means of conveying thoughts, and every effort should be made to convey them as accurately as possible. Too much stress can scarcely be laid upon this point, for by constant attention to it the child is gradually and steadily led on from the concrete to the abstract; he learns to be precise in thought, for without precision of thought he cannot be precise in words, and when he has learnt precision of thought he has conquered most that

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the old mental gymnastics set out to teach. Moreover, he has made a vast stride towards future happiness, for much of the unhappiness in the world is due to verbal misunderstandings.*

So far I have dealt chiefly with those subjects which every boy and girl *must* learn somehow or other. We come next to mathematics and science on the one hand, and classics on the other. The antithetic separation of these two groups of subjects has done incalculable harm. It is scarcely going too far to say that hitherto scientific method has been taught better on the classical side of schools than on the so-called modern side; at least, such was the opinion of so great an authority as the late Sir William Ramsay. Per contra, it is merely a popular affectation, if not a mere sign of laziness, for people of good education to pride themselves on their inability to grasp mathematical and scientific principles. If it were true, they would be devoid of all reasoning capacity. Yet the fact remains—and it rests upon a sound psychological foundation—that there are two types of mind, one which exhibits interest chiefly in the more concrete physical facts of life, and another whose interest is centred chiefly in social phenomena. The former may be conveniently designated the scientific type, the latter the biological.

The *scientific* type of mind often discloses itself quite early, though the manifestations may be towards mechanics rather than any enthusiastic attraction to algebra and trigonometry. It is the type to which not only great mathematicians, but also great physicists and chemists and

* "It would be a grievous shock to most minds if they were obliged always to use words signifying clear and distinct ideas. Even metaphysical philosophy might suffer hurt were its terms bound to have definite meanings, which they seldom have, and the same word the same meaning in different minds, which it seldom has.

"Progress and humanity are fine-sounding words which captivate the imagination, but observation teaches that men are in the habit of ascribing immense value to, and joining in approbation of, a word when they are not agreed as to its exact meaning, are tacitly agreed perhaps to understand it differently or not definitely at all, and to denounce the unseemly behaviour of anyone who, exposing the vagueness or irreconcilable difference, asks for a precise definition." (H. MAUDSLEY).

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engineers belong. In their younger days these youths often display an amusing contempt for literature and the so-called "humanities," and in their later life they often show a grotesque lack of judgment in subjects outside their own. It seems as though their minds were attuned only to facts of mathematical accuracy. When they attempt to deal with biological problems where no such accuracy obtains they fly to the opposite extreme, apparently revelling in their unscientific antics, like truants from school. This group should be early switched off into its fore-ordained path.

I have no hesitation in saying that it is the group which is easiest to teach, though up to the present time, so far as school education is concerned, it is the worst taught. It is easiest to teach, because it finds interest even in the arid precision of its thought. On the other hand, it is the most difficult to educate, in the true sense of the word, because it is all at sea among the vague complexities of collective life. Hence, in the sphere of morals, it usually adopts the conventional attitude, i.e., it accepts the current dogmas without troubling to think about them at all, except perhaps on Sundays, or it flies to the extremes of crude materialism or esoteric spiritualism. In the present struggle for existence this group rules the roost, and I should be the last to deny that in the present crisis our salvation rests primarily with them. It is none the less necessary that in the future, if our civilization is to survive and progress, their individualistic outlook on life should be leavened by socializing tendencies, or if their mental constitution is such that this is impossible, their activities should be restricted to the functions which subserve civilization, as opposed to Kultur and the pursuit of material wealth and luxury.

The *biological* group is composite, including the bulk of the rest of mankind, though there is a vast intermediate group of mediocrities. In its typical form the members of this group are dunces at mathematics. They may be induced with many groans to follow a simple geometrical problem, but an $a + b$, or a $\sin \theta$, absolutely passes their comprehension. This is probably invariably due to bad teaching. They are not necessarily all born classicists.

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They are clearly unfitted for physical science, but they often excel in those walks of life which involve a knowledge of "human nature" and a sympathetic attitude to their fellows. For them a so-called classical education produces better results than any other at present available. Yet it is far from meeting the many and diverse necessities of the case.

For this mode of education, in spite of its wonderful opportunities, is rendered in practice as stultifying as possible. This is doubtless due to its origin in mediæval scholasticism and the cramping effect of centuries of pedagogic routine. Schools and universities have been affected alike, and reform seems hopeless, for the worst enemies of the classics are they of their own household. The supporters of classical education urge two main arguments: the beneficial mental discipline and the cultural advantages of a sound knowledge of the literatures and civilizations of Greece and Rome. As regards the first, it is based on a false psychology, and even if the mental discipline theory be accepted, there are other mental disciplines equally good and more useful, but they have never had a fair trial, nor, it may be added, been advocated or tried with much discernment. Greek and Latin grammar may be good mental discipline, but if a language must be used, Sanskrit, or even Osmanli, would serve the purpose better. As for the second plea, theory and practice are at variance, for the average, or even more than average, boy ends his school career with little useful knowledge of either literature or civilization. Yet I firmly believe that this argument is sound, but the cart is put before the horse. Greece and Rome, as the greatest forerunners of our own civilization, rightly claim a large part in our educational curriculum; but they should be studied as civilizations and literatures first and foremost, and only secondarily, if at all, as the corpus vile for philological gymnastics.

If we consider for a moment the distribution of the male population, it will be at once obvious that the vast majority of boys are destined to become clerks or manual workers—slaves of our civilization, for it is a mere euphemism to say that slavery has been abolished. The fact should therefore be boldly faced that, education being the fitting of the

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individual for best fulfilling his function in Society, the swarms of mediocrities must be educated to that end. The futures of a large proportion of boys are practically fore-ordained, owing to the social status and relative poverty of their parents. While every opportunity should be given by free education, grants and scholarships to enable exceptional members of this group to rise to higher things, the education of the majority should be directed to fitting them best for their appointed vocations. More harm than good is done, both to the individuals and to Society, by attempting to qualify them for stations which they are mentally unfitted to occupy, or from which they are debarred by the fell clutch of circumstance. India is not the only place which has manufactured disenchanted, dissatisfied, and anarchical Babus by well-meaning but inappropriate education. For those who are to become clerks the greatest attention should be paid to writing, arithmetic, geography, history, and, if possible, a foreign language. In the later stages these subjects should be taught in their special relation to commerce, and the later stages should not be left to too late an age. In many parts of the country the boys will be destined for manual work of a definite kind—coal mining, cotton spinning, some branch of engineering, and so on. The schools in those parts should cater specially for these pupils.

Probably most educationists will strongly object to these suggestions on the score that they are narrowly utilitarian and inadequate morally. But, as Jacotot said, "*Tout est dans tout*," and social morality can be taught as well on a utilitarian basis as on any other; indeed, it can be taught on no other foundation. It is true that the mental outlook of these boys will be narrow and their aspirations and conations proximate, but in the vast majority of cases these will be in accord with their capacities. The teacher should certainly endeavour to stretch their capacities to the widest limits; only thus will their greatest happiness be assured: and this can be done best by arousing all the interest possible in their work. It will be said that there is little interest to be found in it. That is a fallacy. There is always intense and abiding interest in any work well done, and most people find greatest satisfaction in the work

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which they do best. Moreover, any work can be made the nucleus of wider interests, and there are few boys who would not be stimulated in their work if its relations to Society at large were more fully explained to them. It is doubtless sheer drudgery to join up the broken threads on a spinning mule hour after hour, but even that might be made more interesting if the boy knew how a spinning mule came to be invented, what other processes the thread goes through, where the raw material comes from, how it is subsequently woven, and why people wear clothes.

By such means the boy's ambition would be aroused if he have any; but it is useless to arouse it if it is to be given no scope. This raises far-reaching questions of the relations between employers and employed, which will be dealt with later. One detail must be mentioned here. Only the elements of the relations between his future work and Society could be taught in the schools. It is essential that time should be given to the employees to continue their studies—not only in evening classes, but by technical instruction during the day. But that, too, is not enough. If a workman is to take an intelligent interest in his work and in all that appertains to it, if he is to acquire a sane view of his relations to his employer and to the State, he must have suitable opportunities, not only for increasing his knowledge by classes and study, but also for living a decent and healthy life at home, and for recreation and intercourse with his fellow-workers somewhere else than in the public-house.

The case of the girls is even more complicated than that of the boys. In so far as women maintain their conquests of the vocations which have hitherto been regarded as men's their education must follow similar lines, but it is certain that many very difficult and complex problems relating to women's work will arise in the immediate future. It is equally certain that if the peculiarly complex psychological aspects of these problems do not receive careful consideration, socially disintegrating forces of the most serious type will be set in action with disastrous results.

For boys whose social status, or unusual aptitude, fortified by pecuniary assistance, opens the way to a more ambitious future, the proximate conation is that of passing

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some standard examination, such as the London matriculation, or one of the many Oxford and Cambridge tests of a well-spent childhood. These examinations as at present constituted are, of course, founded upon current educational methods, in which facility in the classical languages plays too great a part. There have been signs of improvement in this direction, and as W. C. Dampier Whetham* says, "It is a healthy sign that the majority of their (i.e., public school) boys who come to Cambridge have now to set to work at the last minute and learn the ridiculous modicum of Greek still demanded of them in the previous examination. This is a gain, for the boys now waste six or twelve months instead of six years." This writer, a Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and a distinguished physicist, advocates a curriculum based on a critical study of Scripture and the Book of Common Prayer; on the Latin, French, and English languages and literatures; on the history, constitution, and economics of Britain and the British Empire; on elementary mathematics with natural and mechanical science, and on some training in drawing, music, or other of the arts as a mode of self-expression. For my own part I should leave religion to be taught at home or by the religious bodies. The moral effect of making it a compulsory school subject is lamentable, just as lamentable, and more serious, than the usual inculcation of a hatred of Shakespeare by "teaching" it in schools. To make Scripture a subject of examination is simply anathema. Similarly, it is in my opinion a mistake to make formal drawing, music, or other of the arts a routine school subject. Facilities should be provided for boys who show some special predilections for the arts, but so far as the curriculum is concerned these should be instilled in the ordinary course of work, just as an appreciation of good literature should be instilled, and not by formal lessons.

H. B. Gray and S. Turner advocate a similar Public School curriculum, omitting the scriptural elements, for they say that "the whole atmosphere of Public and Secondary Schools is presumed to be pervaded by religious teaching"—a somewhat large assumption! They depre-

* W. C. DAMPIER WHETHAM. "The War and the Nation." 1917.

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cate the watertight compartments for the segregation of the abler boys, and also any hard-and-fast line of demarcation between the Classical and the Modern Side, which "rests on no scientific principle, and is injurious to balanced intellectual growth." Science "should displace the old classical curriculum in the ordinary boy's education." In Examinations, "the multiplicity of which is probably the greatest curse of English education which exists to-day," the French methods should be adopted.* The authors also advocate the system of "accredited schools" of the United States. According to this plan, students, on the recommendation of the headmaster of an accredited school, are admitted to higher places of education. Gray and Turner deprecate specialization in Public Schools before the age of sixteen. Three groups are then formed: (a) Literary; (b i) commercial; (b ii) scientific. In Secondary Schools (i.e., Grammar, Municipal, and County Schools), however, "alternative courses of (i) English, French, Science, and Mathematics; (ii) English, French, one other Modern Language, and Commercial Mathematics, should begin for boys who have arrived at the age of thirteen and a half or fourteen."

There is another side of school life which has received far too little consideration, viz., the collective side. Boys and girls are tied far too much to the mother's apron-strings at home, and, still more, are kept far too much under the master's thumb at school. Girls' schools particularly are hotbeds of hypocrisy, where sneaking is a virtue and all natural instincts are vices. Boys are saved from some of the worst evils of the system by the comparative freedom and healthy exertions of the playing fields, and not least by the traditional heritage of "good form" and "playing the game." What an inestimable boon the latter is to British boys can only be realized by comparing their ideals of decent behaviour and fair play with those of the boys of other nations. Upon this unique and, it is to be hoped, imperishable basis Dr. Arnold founded the régime of schoolboy "honour," which did more to foster the highest ideals of social morality in his pupils than all his teaching

* See CLOUDESLEY BRERETON, "Studies in Foreign Education."

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or even his sermons. Under too rigid supervision boys and girls become secretive, self-helpless, and unable to assume responsibility. Freedom from restriction becomes the opportunity for libertinism, which can be restrained only by the rule of the rod, and many devils replace the one cast out. Dr. Arnold's Rugby has proved that the school can be a self-governing State, whose lawgivers are friendly guides, not tyrannous autocrats. But that ideal will not be frequently realized until schoolmasters are chosen with discrimination and trained in accordance with the teachings of social psychology.

The training in mutual aid which children commence in their homes should be given wider scope in the school. In public schools it is at present almost limited to games, and at a later stage, among the idle rich, to sports. No sane Englishman who has lived to see the magnificent response of sportsmen and college athletes to the country's call in the present War will decry the merits of games and sport. But man does not live by bread alone, and few will deny that some of the time and energy devoted to those occupations would be better used otherwise.* There are many "Blues" who have been brilliant scholars, and who shall say in which sphere their reward of satisfaction and happiness was greater? How many athletes have discovered later in life the interests and joys of intellectual work, and deplored the loss of irreclaimable hours? *Μηδὲν ἄγαν* is the correlative of *mens sana in corpore sano*. The evil of the cult of games is seen at its worst in the martyrdom of some boys of scientific, literary, or artistic bent of mind. These are a small minority; but if the psychological propensities of individual boys were more carefully studied, and if more attention were paid to the satisfaction of their proximate conations, it would be as easy to form a "maths" or a "stinks" team as a rugger team or a cricket eleven.

The Boy and Girl Scouts movement has done great work in inculcating a sense of collective responsibility and mutual aid among the young people of certain classes of

* "Manual training should take up at least one-third of the hours now devoted to non-productive (*sic*) games Another one-third of the leisure hours should be devoted to military drill" (H. B. GRAY and S. TURNER).

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society. War work of some kind or other has provided a similar stimulus for all classes in the last three years. It is to be hoped that these lessons of the War will not be lost in peace time, and that co-operative work and amusements in the house, the allotment or garden, the school and elsewhere will survive and spread. It is true that English boys can legitimately pride themselves upon their traditional good form and fair play, but no nation is so individualized, and should therefore consciously cultivate socializing influences, as the English.

Much more difficult, yet on a much higher plane of national importance, is the psychological problem of ameliorating class prejudices. This is an essentially social problem, and it can be solved only by the long process of building new traditions upon old foundations. Everyone admits that the restoration of national prosperity depends upon a rapprochement between employers and employed, a living appreciation of the dignity of trade and commerce by the upper classes, and the development of an activating belief in the dependence of individual upon national prosperity. These and cognate themes have been admirably propounded and supported by irrefragable arguments in countless books which have dealt, directly or indirectly, with reconstruction after the War. Yet psychology teaches that the motive force of these reasonings is preposterously small, for they have practically no emotional content except among the intellectual élite whose conations reach out to unattainably remote ideals. As matters now stand, the upper classes, who, whatever their faults, are, speaking generally, the most refined, find it impossible to support the discomforts and overcome the revulsions of feeling which are incident to the attainment of an intimate acquaintance with the devious paths of trade and finance and a soul-stirring knowledge of the caged and thwarted lives of clerks and working men. The feudal tradition is too strong, and at most they more or less grudgingly admit to their society the final product, the plutocrat, not for his intellectual or national worth, but for the tribute which he brings. It is only by education, duly conducted according to the tenets of applied psychology, that the upper classes can be led to explore this, to them, unknown world,

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and that the lower classes can be brought to understand and strive for the rewards of a wider, and in the truest sense richer, life. So far as the latter are concerned, the opportunities must be provided by more decent and healthy modes of existence and a greater share of the wealth which their more efficient methods of production will create. Without these opportunities it is futile to expect a rapprochement, for they alone can arouse and sustain the aspirations which education alone can teach the workers how to satisfy. The lot of the upper classes is the happier—to him that hath shall be given—for they possess the opportunities; but the aspirations are dormant or deviated towards less desirable goals. It is for education to arouse and direct them by building up a modified and better tradition. Schoolmasters must adopt an entirely different attitude towards trade and commerce, thus educating not only their pupils, but also the parents. “The teaching profession do not deny the claims of trade: they generally merely ignore them” (E. J. P. Benn).^{*} In future they must not be content with the condescending attitude that “the story of the industrial and commercial condition of Britain is worth telling to our school children,” but must use every opportunity to preach the “Dignity of Business.”[†] The teaching of geography and history rightly commences with Great Britain, and ought to deal most of all with the Great Britain of to-day. The romance of industry could be made almost as attractive as the horrors of the French Revolution, and much more instructive than the polygamy of Henry VIII. “It might become a regular part of every school programme for the boys to make a monthly visit to some neighbouring manufactory or works . . . The wonders of machinery, the marvels of power, the fascination of organization could all be made to interest school children. The boys of ten of the future might conceivably have other ambitions beyond the careers of the policeman, the fireman, the sailor, which at present monopolize their ideas” (E. J. P. Benn).

^{*} E. J. P. BENN. “Trade as a Science.” 1916.

[†] H. E. MORGAN. “The Dignity of Business.”

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HIGHER TRAINING.

Boys on leaving school either commence at once to earn their living or proceed to some form of higher training. The former belong to the wage-earning class, the so-called proletariat. With these we have no concern at present; we shall return to them in the next chapter. Those who embark upon a further course of instruction may be classified into those who enter "business," those who commence some form of technical education, and those who continue general education into its higher, advanced, and more abstract spheres. Of course, these divisions are convenient rather than sharply defined. The boy who enters business may be a wage-earner from the start, but his wages are a mere incentive, not a living wage. Moreover, the two first groups not infrequently continue their general education for several years before beginning business or strictly technical work. It will therefore be best to consider the higher flights of general education first.

The boy who seriously undertakes higher educational training—for we can safely leave out of account the son of wealthy parents who goes to the University simply because it is the proper thing to do—will usually have revealed signs of either a scientific or a biological type of mind, using those terms in the sense already described (p. 87). If he has not it will be due either to a relatively exceptional balance of mental characteristics which he possesses, or to lack of diagnostic acumen on the part of his teachers. So far as the cleverest boys are concerned the diagnosis will almost certainly have been made, even under the crude conditions which persist in our public schools, for the bait of scholarships provides a powerful stimulus to discrimination both to the boy and his teachers—especially the latter.

The scientific bias may manifest itself either by pronounced ability in mathematics or by eager interest in machinery, physics, chemistry, and the "whys and wherefores" of natural phenomena. Now these branches of knowledge belong par excellence to the cognitional side of mentality. In themselves they possess no emotional content and no social meaning. It is only with their applications to Society that the social element comes in. They

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are the workings of purest thought, almost unfettered by contingent affective states. Yet not entirely so, for the interest which prompts them arises out of curiosity, so that Graham Wallas is fully justified in his assertion that thought itself has the characteristics of an instinct.* Even so, it is the most individualistic of all the instincts. Hence I think it cannot be denied that these subjects are the easiest of all to teach, and easiest of all to learn by those who have the innate capacity. They embody order, cosmos, law in the purest and most rigid form. In the realm of the pure physical sciences, no matter how great the complexity of the problem, it is subject to analysis of mathematically "absolute" precision. Herein lies the key to the colossal precocity of physical science—and of industry, which depends so much upon it—as compared with the biological sciences.

So far as the teaching of pure mathematics and physical science in our universities and technical training schools is concerned modern psychology has few new suggestions to offer. Even to their proximate applications to engineering, industry, and commerce the same remark applies. It can afford guidance in details, such as the choice of students fit for this form of training, the modifications in the methods and order of teaching according to the remote end in view, and so on. Many details of this nature have already received attention by educationists, and many more are now being submitted to searching investigation and criticism by men best qualified to deal with them. Difficult as these problems may be, they are simplicity itself compared with others which confront Society to-day. These deal in large part with the remote effects of the applications of physical science to commerce, industry, and war—effects which have profoundly modified Society in all its features—population, constituent communities and their physical, economic, and moral inter-relations. On these problems psychology has much to teach.

* "The producer of new thought gratifies an intellectual vital hunger; the curiosity to know in order to grow in mind being as fundamental an instinct of life in mind as the appetite of hunger or the lust of feeling in body, and in truth sometimes almost as eager and reckless in its gratification."—H. MAUDSLEY.

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It should not therefore be impossible to place the teaching of the physical sciences on a sound basis and to elaborate the curricula into logical and consistent gradations. The plans which will be adopted by universities and technical schools in the future will reveal the methods which should be used in the preliminary teaching of science in higher schools. There is a good reason to hope that the standing reproach of the "modern side" of schools, that their science teaching is useless—often, indeed, worse than useless—will be removed.

The problem of the mathematical genius offers peculiar difficulties under existing conditions. It has often been the lot of a poor student to pass through a brilliant career at school and Cambridge, crowning it with a high place in the Mathematical Tripos, and find himself in a cul-de-sac at the end. Just too low in the list for a Fellowship—perhaps because his year had a particularly bright set of men—he has been condemned for the rest of his life to teach elementary arithmetic and algebra to other prospective victims in a public school. Fortunately a few years ago the bait was deprived of some of its allurements by the abolition of the Senior Wrangler. Many Wranglers, more happily endowed with this world's goods, have developed into Bishops and Judges, and one Judge at least has succeeded in utilizing his great mathematical knowledge for the benefit of the State. It is to be hoped that the movement to educate the public to an appreciation of the value of pure science will have the effect also of providing mathematicians with posts which carry a pecuniary reward appropriate to the exceptional ability of those who hold them. The Clerk Maxwell, or Kelvin, or Helmholtz, who combines the supreme genius of mathematician and physicist, is a *rara avis*. Might not approximately similar results be obtained by a closer liaison of mathematicians with physicists, chemists, engineers, economists, and so on?

Boys with the biological type of mind will usually take the Arts course at the University. For the most part, totally irrespective of their probable future careers, they will spend many weary years over Latin and Greek grammar; they will acquire a smattering of ancient history and philosophy, a bowing acquaintance with English history,

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less geography, and a few other odds and ends of "knowledge." If they learn anything of science, of psychology, of the evolution of man and his mind, it will be chiefly outside their classes, and, indeed, their most valuable education will be a continuation of the most valuable part of their public school life—a knowledge of their fellows, derived from intimate intercourse in the playing fields and on the river, an absorption of the collective mind of their community—good form or bad form, according to the crowd they gravitate into. If they are wise or fortunate enough to do so they will read for an honours course. By that means they will gain a real knowledge of at least one subject—classics, history, mathematics, a modern language, &c. These will have grasped a genuine treasure, and for nine men out of ten the classical prize will be the most valuable. Their one subject will be a sure foundation upon which they can build; but they will have to be their own architects.

Every university has its Faculties of Arts and Science—as though they were hostile territories. *Mirabile dictu*, Mental and Moral Science usually appears in each, though, as taught, it is far more Arts than Science. Now no man of university standing, or at any rate worthy by innate capacity to be such, can become qualified to take the place which it is his privilege and duty to occupy in modern Society if he is ignorant of the current modes of scientific thought. It is a travesty of higher education if these essentials are omitted from his curriculum and he is left to pick them up as best he may. Science has revolutionized modern Society, and the theory of evolution has revolutionized modern thought. Every man should specialize on one subject or group of subjects, but every man who attains university rank should also acquire such general knowledge as will enable him to form a fairly consistent broad view of the universe and his place in it. It is not necessary that the knowledge should be deep, but it must be sound. The course for every university degree should therefore include a series of lectures on science from the evolutionary point of view, explaining what is often called the grammar of science. In the pass course in Arts, room would be made

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for it by cutting out many of the useless hours devoted to Latin and Greek grammar and translation.

Such a course, properly conducted, would not only describe the history and development of man and his relations to other species and to his environments, but would also sketch the evolution of his mind somewhat on the lines which I have drawn in Part I. It would further classify knowledge according to the various sciences, describing the domains of each and their relationships to each other. It would lay stress upon the all-important *methods* of science and the canons of scientific thought, not failing to emphasize the fact that these are just as applicable to literature, history, and the "humanities" as to what are more narrowly termed the sciences. The course would indeed be the fundamental "liaison" course, and if it was so designed as to fulfil its purpose it would spontaneously and inevitably assume the character of a course on Psychology and its applications. The students in fact would learn psychology without knowing it, after the same fashion that M. Jourdain talked prose. The teacher, however, would have to be a well-trained psychologist, using that term in the proper and scientific manner. Let us consider briefly how psychology is generally taught at present.

It has been mentioned that Mental and Moral Science, which includes Psychology, figures in both Arts and Science courses. It is pre-eminently a liaison subject, yet hitherto it has completely failed to exercise any integrating influence. The reason of this failure will be best appreciated by a cursory examination of any ordinary syllabus of Philosophy and Psychology.

The most striking feature of such a syllabus is the predominance of logic, ethics, and philosophy. So far as it is scientific it consists almost entirely of the application of deductive logic to purely intellectual problems, and the history thereof from Thales to Bergson. So far as social psychology is concerned this part of the syllabus is content with the observations and speculations of Plato and Aristotle—undeniably the surest historical foundation—and the mazy divagations of their innumerable metaphysical successors. This is not modern Science, nor,

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except incidentally and in small part, science at all. When we turn to the part of the syllabus labelled "Psychology" we cannot escape the conclusion that, apart from a few of the applications of experimental psychology, it deals almost exclusively with introspective psychology. It is individualistic through and through, and this statement is only ameliorated, not invalidated, by the fact that there are a few lectures on comparative and anthropological or primitive psychology.

The reason for this lamentable state of affairs is not far to seek, though it stretches back in time to mediævalism. It is writ large—in capital letters—in the University degrees of the professors and teachers, who have seldom received any adequate training in physiology, neurology, or any of the biological sciences.

My contention is that the *science* of psychology, and its applications, cannot be taught adequately, or indeed at all, except on the basis of a sound knowledge of zoology and the habits of animals, physiology, and especially comparative and human neurology, introspective and experimental psychology, anthropology, and history. So much invaluable knowledge and experience is gained by a complete medical curriculum in addition that it is in the highest degree desirable that the teacher should also be a fully qualified medical man. The Universities of Oxford and Cambridge appear to have realized that this view is justified.

Until it is generally recognized that Psychology is a science, based and built upon the science of biology, and that there is a wide gulf fixed between it and philosophy, which is metaphysical, and therefore supra-scientific, speculation, there can be no great advance in psychology, and its applications to social conditions must inevitably be obstructed or frustrated by futile babbling. Not until alchemy had shed its trappings of vain speculation and emerged as the inductive science of chemistry could it be applied to the use (and abuse) of mankind. As time rolls on and man's mentality grows and evolves science may perhaps make conquests in the realm of metaphysics, but for practical purposes to-day a rigid line must be drawn between science and metaphysics, even though the line be hypothetical and need shifting as knowledge increases.

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We must be content with a liaison of the sciences; the liaison between science and metaphysics does nothing but disservice to science. As scientists this should be our self-denying ordinance in the future as it has been in the past. Just as it was difficult to evolve cosmos from the chaos of primitive thought, so it is difficult now to keep speculation within the bounds of legitimate hypothesis. The problem is the same. The unscientific pragmatism of a William James and the alluring eloquence of a Bergson serve to point the moral.

When psychology is scientifically taught in our Universities it will be divorced from philosophy (as now generally understood), and transcendentalism will be allotted to the philosophers or kept for the psychologist's leisure hours. Outside teaching there is infinite scope for research. The collective mentality of groups and classes of human beings will be investigated by evolutionary and historical methods (the longitudinal section) and, what is still more necessary, by the study of the inter-relations of groups and classes (the transverse section). Most attention will be directed to the subconscious and emotional activities which provide the preponderant motive forces. It is in this respect that Sociology has failed to produce the results expected of it, for it has concerned itself chiefly with rationalism and the more extreme and pathological expressions of the irrationalism of the crowd. There will be a wide field of research at home, in the University itself. The psychologist, by written and verbal precept and by example, will apply his tools and gauges, his statistics and laws, to history, ancient and modern, to anthropology, archæology, religion and all the sciences. The teaching of history will be socialized and democratized, and the evolution of civilization will be seen in a new light, which cannot fail to cast its rays forwards into the future. By focussing his attention upon the apparently illogical actions of groups, investigating them statistically and in detail, the psychologist will find innumerable natural experiments going on under his eyes. He will be in the position of a physician confronted with multitudes of diseases awaiting diagnosis. Upon the surface of the stream of group activities are the eddies of rational thought, the average quasi-scientific

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explanation of effects by inadequate causes, whose inadequacy is revealed by diversity of opinion. The intellectualist scoffs at the inconsequent arguments of the Hyde Park orator, yet, if he only knew it, their very inconsequence holds the key to the difficulties which his superior intelligence fails to account for. It is the result of the clashing of instinctive and collective motives vainly trying to find expression in words, which are symbols as yet as inchoate as the thoughts they attempt to express. To diagnose the disease the psychologist must search out these underlying emotion-charged motives, analyse and segregate them, before they can be submitted to rational re-synthesis. Then only will the diagnosis be accurate and the cure brought within measurable distance.

In the majority of cases the semi-rational arguments of the orthodox politician, economist, sociologist, &c.—Free Trader, Tariff Reformer, Radical, Conservative, Socialist, Syndicalist, and so on—are but the crystallized shibboleths of thought, symbols of pristine conceptions which vary their content as they are handed on from man to man, retaining an ever-dwindling core of the original meaning, but gathering vast and varied accretions of inconsequent deductions. Thus the label and the party cry are as chameleon-like as their purveyors. *Quot homines, tot sententie!*

The field is unlimited and almost untrodden: it is dark and foggy and beset with quagmires, but it is no will-o'-the-wisp that beckons the explorer onwards.

The failure of psychology in the past has been due to the fact that it has been almost entirely subjective. In introspection the object of study is also the medium through which the observations are made. It can only reveal, not what man's mind is, but what the individual thinks and feels that his own mind is. Introspective psychology "has distracted thought with innumerable falsifications, but in all its secular cultivation has produced no body of generalizations of value in the practical conduct of life" (W. Trotter).*

Until some objective method was devised no progress

* W. TROTTER. "Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War." 1916.

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was possible. I have already outlined the teachings of evolutionary psychology in Part I. In it, as W. Trotter points out, (1) action is made as far as possible the subject of observation rather than speech; (2) the whole range of animal life is surveyed in order to discover what instinctive impulses may be expected to operate in man, and how intelligence reacts upon instinct; (3) the criteria are sought out whereby instinctive impulses or their derivatives arising in mind can be distinguished from rational impulses, or at any rate motives in which the instinctive factor is minimal. The intellectualist view, naturally flattering to man's ineradicable egoism, and therefore generally believed, is that man is essentially a rational creature. Yet "the average educated man is willing to pronounce decided judgments, all of which he believes himself to have arrived at by the exercise of pure reason, upon the innumerable complex questions of the day. Almost all of them concern highly technical matters, upon none of which has he the slightest qualification to pronounce" (W. Trotter). The indictment could be elaborated *ad libitum*. Yet, if "man is not at all less subject to instinctive impulsions than any other animal, but disguises the fact from the observer and from himself by the multiplicity of the lines of response his mental capacity enables him to take, it should follow that his conduct is much less truly variable and much more open to generalization than has generally been supposed. Should this be possible, it would enable the biologist to study the actual affairs of mankind in a really practical way, to analyse the tendencies of social development, to discover how deeply or superficially they were based in the necessity of things, and above all, to foretell their course. Thus might be founded a true science of politics which would be of direct service to the statesman" (W. Trotter).

There is another objective method which has already produced most valuable results, though it has hitherto been confined to an unnecessarily narrow field. It has been pointed out (p. 45) that the clash of the restrictive forces of the herd instinct with the individualistic impulses of other instincts leads to conflict, resulting in suppression of desires and mental instability. It is now recognized that many mental disorders are due to such suppression

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of natural feelings. Freud has shown that in many cases these suppressed and often subconscious experiences can be brought to light by a process of examination which is called *psyche-analysis*. That undue weight has been attached to sexual complexes, and that Freud's followers have wandered far beyond the limits of decency, should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the method is founded on a sure scientific basis, and cannot fail to add much to our knowledge of the workings of the mind.

Lord Rosebery, in his opening address to the Imperial Congress of Universities in 1912, said that the functions of a University were (1) The work of research; (2) the training of higher intelligences; (3) the training of the average student for the business of life. These are wide generalizations, and imply ideals which our Universities show but feeble efforts to attain. And, indeed, it is doubtful if any one University should attempt to cope with so large a programme. It is unfortunate that none of the Universities has been constant to the ideal of the "*universitas*," which was the unification of knowledge. It is true that this unification was originally based upon a religious, and therefore metaphysical, plan, but if the principle had been kept in view and had been applied to the ever-growing and ever-differentiating mental activities of man, there would have been a focus of correlation and co-ordination which could scarcely have failed profoundly to influence the development of civilization. Instead of fulfilling this modest function the Universities have been actuated by the impossibly grandiose idea of teaching all the Arts and Sciences. Hence has arisen the deplorable practice of denying to any centre of higher education the rights and title of University standing unless all, or at any rate, the great majority of the "*Faculties*" are represented in it. A first-class school of Arts, or Science, or Law, or Medicine can only grant certificates which are regarded askance, and is denied the right to label successful pupils with the recognized titles of a University, unless it becomes affiliated to some such Juggernaut as the University of London. Even a Government institution like the Imperial College of Science has to be content with granting an A.R.C.S., the meaning of which nine people out of ten do not under-

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stand. Such a diploma may be the hall-mark of far greater attainments than the D.Sc. of some second-rate University, yet the latter carries more weight in the public estimation. The M.R.C.S., L.R.C.P is a better qualification in medicine than the M.D. of some Universities, but people do not realize it, and the holder is penalized. It is impossible to educate the public in all these minutiae, but psychology shows the way out of the difficulty. People recognize certain titles, e.g., M.D., as a standard of efficiency; it is therefore the social standard, and as such should be accepted, anyone who attains the requisite standard by the recognized course of study being granted the title.* If considered advisable it might be enacted by law that each title should have its source of origin cited in brackets, just as is now often done voluntarily, e.g., M.D.(*Lond.*).

With the extension of knowledge, the growth of science and industry, the attempts of Universities to gather all branches under their individual wings have proved a failure which would be ludicrous if it were not attended by disastrous results. The Faculties of Universities can be roughly divided into two groups: (1) Arts and Pure Science; (2) Technical Subjects, in which are included Law, Medicine, Agriculture, Engineering, &c. Each of these can be catered for best in certain places. The first group might be taught almost anywhere, but some Universities have long equipped themselves specially for the purpose, and have attained a prestige which is of great psychological value. All the curricula comprising the second group involve a preparatory course which is best catered for by the same agencies as those of the first group, and a specific course which can be carried out most efficiently in certain well-defined centres. It is a mere accident that in London both groups are almost equally well catered for, though the indubitable advantages of residence in a University,

* The Daylight Saving Bill is a successful example of the same application of psychology, albeit unconscious. Reason teaches that under certain circumstances it is advantageous to rise from bed an hour earlier, but people will not do so. Put the clock on an hour, and everybody conforms without a murmur or with no more than a harmless expletive or a British grumble.

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such as Oxford or Cambridge, are denied to the London student. But when all is said and done, man is a mobile animal, and there are positive advantages in migration from one place of study to another, if it be properly controlled. It is to be hoped, and may be confidently expected, that the older Universities will long remain the homes and chief centres of inspiration of what is generally understood by a "liberal education." They possess a tradition of unequalled merit in this sphere and are actuated by the highest ideal of social morality, that of moulding the minds of youth so far as may be to perfect citizenship. Here is a sure foundation, and a deeper knowledge of social psychology will provide the criteria for improvement and progress.

Recent years have seen the mushroom growth of numerous new Universities. For the most part they have been established in the great industrial centres, and owe their birth to the fertilizing influence of trade. The needs of commerce and technical education provided the stimulus, and the largesse of capitalists supplied the wherewithal. From the start they have been hampered by the false conception of a University, the "All the Faculties" fetish. Magnificent schools of science and technology have deliberately impeded their own free development for the sake of the empty honour of University status; they have sold their birthright for a mess of pottage. What shall it profit a Whitworth scholar to add D.Eng. to his name, if the efficiency and progress of his school, and thereby of his profession, and of the Nation, are obstructed by the dead-weight of bigoted, unprogressive, ill-equipped, and impecunious faculties? For example, in my opinion the multiplication of provincial Universities has done much harm to British medicine. Makeshift Faculties of Medicine have been instituted, in which the students are badly taught by professors who have no experience in teaching and who regard their classes as time wasted so far as their main aim in life, the practice of their profession, is concerned. Thirty years ago in London the teaching of students was as integral a part of the duties of a member of a Hospital Staff as attendance upon the patients, with the result that the teaching of medicine was unsurpassed. Provincial

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degrees in medicine have had a bad effect both on teaching in London and on the training of medical students throughout the country.

Surely in these days of rapid communication by post and rail it should not be impossible to co-ordinate curricula, parts of which are carried out in one place and parts in another. Cambridge and Oxford long ago succeeded in doing so for medicine, law, &c. The principle is of wide application, and would do much to remove many of the difficulties which beset higher Technical Education, especially in industrial pursuits. Let each centre do the work for which it possesses the greatest facilities. In this manner the work will be best done, and it will not prove difficult—always barring psychological inertia—to correlate the different parts of a curriculum, if the students are encouraged to migrate from one University or school to another, instead of having obstacles placed in the way of doing so.

Investigations carried out at Cambridge show that over 40 per cent. of students pass into some form of business life, while learned professions, Government Service, and academic pursuits each claim far smaller numbers (Whetham).^{*} Nearly all the preparatory, and many of the advanced, subjects required for any career are taught in some form or other, but the courses are often ill-adapted for the practical requirements of the students, and, except in Law and Medicine, there is a grave lack of co-ordination. The remedies are matter of detail, which are for the most part clearly indicated by "common sense." But it is notorious that the tenets of common sense are rarely acted upon, the reason being that they offend the inertia, traditional usages, and prejudices of people. Only the small body of the intellectual élite is partially amenable to the arguments of reason, and then usually in inverse ratio to the age of the individual. Progress has hitherto been effected by the enthusiasm, and often the fanaticism, of reformers, who unconsciously and unscientifically adopt methods which psychologists know to be necessary. These empirical and haphazard methods are wasteful and

^{*} W. C. DAMPIER WETHAM. "The War and the Nation." 1917.

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inefficient. If it is worth while to apply psychology to advertising in the cause of filthy lucre, surely it is worth while for the élite to call in the same aid for higher aims, especially as their realization is likely also to be attended with pecuniary reward. The attitude of the Universities is much the same as that of the British manufacturer—"Take what we have or go elsewhere." Until they agree to get into touch with their clients and lay themselves out to supply their requirements neither will progress. Psychologists know full well that they are confronted with the ingrained individualism of the British personality in these problems, but a fault realized is a fault half cured.

The need for rapprochement between Universities and trade, commerce, &c., is nowhere better illustrated than in the applications of physical science. The subject has been well ventilated of late, but emphasis may here be placed upon the necessity of reform in industrial methods before the Universities can play their part. The latter are fully capable and eagerly desirous of training chemists and physicists for industrial purposes, but until Industry is so reorganized as to provide reasonably remunerated posts for such students nothing can be done. When the demand has been created the difficulty will be, not in the training, but in the supply of suitable candidates, for it is a mistake to think that there is an inexhaustible supply of youths who possess the mental propensities and the originality which are necessary to make research workers. However, we certainly possess more originality than the Germans, and where they have succeeded we need not anticipate failure in this respect.

It is probably not possible to arrange complete curricula for each career, as is done in the cases of Law and Medicine. Since most of the students will pass on to some form of business, much more time should be devoted to geography, history, economics, and finance, present day industrial and political conditions, and science in its relations to industry. Education for the Civil Service should follow similar lines, the subjects being somewhat differently stressed, but to attain anything like a satisfactory curriculum radical alteration in the syllabus and marking of papers of the examinations will be essential.

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This applies particularly to Foreign Office and Consular appointments. The latter, of course, require to be put upon an entirely new basis, and Consuls in future will probably be appointed on account of their commercial knowledge. In both, modern languages will occupy a prominent position, and it is to be hoped that knowledge of oriental and uncommon languages will count heavily in the marking, instead of being ignored as at present, and will favour appointment to some spot where the language is of use! The foundation of the School of Oriental Studies is a sign of better things: at last we who possess the greatest Empire in the East have a school which approximates to the excellent and long-established schools of Oriental Studies in Paris and Berlin.

A select band of students will be aiming at a professional career. These will doubtless specialize early and devote nearly all their time to their particular group of subjects—classics, mathematics, physics, chemistry, and so on. Only the classical scholars should delve deeply into the mysteries of Latin and Greek philology. These specialists are of great importance to the State, and should be left largely to their own devices. But specialism has its own dangers of isolation, narrowness, and pedantry, which only exceptional will-power can overcome. This should be reinforced in the early stages by outside pressure. Attendance on the General Knowledge Course (*v.* pp. 94-5) will be compulsory for all, but each curriculum should have its liaison professors, and still more important, there should be liaison professors for allied subjects in different curricula, and attendance on some of these courses should also be compulsory. All these students in the advanced stage of their studies and all the professors throughout the University will be engaged upon Research work. So much has been written about the importance of Research in Science lately that it is unnecessary to labour the question here. Our Universities have nobly fulfilled their functions in Research in pure science in the past against severe handicaps. The most desirable innovation is the establishment of Industrial Research Studentships, like those in the Universities of Pittsburg and Kansas, but it is probable that these should be allotted to Technical Colleges (? Universities) rather

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than to the present Universities, with the exception of those specially favourably situated.

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The functions of a University are not fulfilled if it neglects the education of the community at large. Though its primary object is that of preparing individuals to become good citizens, each in his or her own most appropriate sphere of activity in the community, it should be equally its object to teach the community its place in the world and the functions, relations, and ideal aims of its several parts. At the present time the education of Society is left to the haphazard and inco-ordinated efforts of such diverse agents as the philosopher, the clergyman, the professor, the scientist, the politician, the novelist, and the Press, and it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that their various degrees of success are in the reverse order to that in which they have been cited.

From the highest to the lowest in the great community opinions, which so far as reason is concerned are the moulding forces and activating stimuli of social evolution, whether progressive or regressive, are determined, to an extent which is insufficiently appreciated, by the mental pabulum provided by the writers in the daily press. For economic reasons journalists are the purveyors of the proximate desires of their readers: they climb no Pisgah height to view a promised land, for it is to their interest to conceal the deserts and the noisome flood which lie between the chosen people and the goal. They elevate or degrade, mentally or morally or both according to the character of the audience they cater for, and it speaks well for our nation that their influence is on the whole good. They certainly educate in the sense of drawing out and fostering what is already in their readers, but education in the sense of leading on towards higher aims and ideals is at most but a by-product of their ministrations.

So, too, it is with the novelist and in less degree the politician. All these are unconscious psychologists: they use methods well suited to the attainment of their ends, and since their aims are usually legitimate it would be

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unjust to blame them for not doing what they do not set out to do. The typical scientist and dry-as-dust professor as a rule cannot be stigmatized as psychologists even by their worst enemies. For years the former has fought an uphill fight against the citadel of the grammarians, and when we look back over the incidents of the campaign, we are more astounded at the jejune strategy and tactics employed by the assailing forces than surprised at the mediocre results they have attained.

It has long been evident that the greatest needs of the community are co-ordination and organization, and now that the War has come people have awakened to the fact that without them we shall go under, and have registered a grim determination to achieve them at all costs. This is one of the best of good resolutions, but good resolutions require to be organized themselves; otherwise they lead to anarchy. What is this organization we are determined to secure? Germany has probably the greatest organization the world has ever seen, but we certainly do not want that type.

Psychology teaches that there are three chief types of social organization. The first is that of the aggressive herd—the lupine type, the German type. It is the easiest to achieve because it appeals to the deeply rooted predatory—pugnacious and acquisitive—instincts. In its grosser features it appeals also to the base appetites of mankind—lust for wealth and lust for women, and all that these imply. In its higher features it is sublimated into attractive philosophical conceptions, such as the Will to Power, and finds weighty support in the Jahvist theology of the Old Testament. It possesses a social morality all its own, and is blind to all other morality. It has but one watchword—aggression. Like the Wandering Jew it is doomed to an endless march from conquest to conquest, carrying murder, rapine, and pestilence in its train: if its march is stayed it sickens, withers, and dies.

The second type of social organization is the defensive type—the ovine type. It responds most readily to the emotion of fear, which has become so sensitive to appropriate excitation that the normal motor response—flight—is the chief protective mechanism of the herd. Most

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herbivorous animals, the sheep, deer, &c., belong to this type. Their food is of such a nature that they are compelled to spend most of their time grazing, and if they had not adopted gregarious habits, thus increasing the sensitiveness to signs of danger, they could scarcely have survived the onslaughts of their carnivorous foes. Flight is not the only response to fear, and even when it does occur it is often preceded by a brief period of tense excitement, when attention is strained to the utmost, the sensory organs are tuned up to maximal receptivity, and the motor mechanism is in a state of active immobility, with every muscle taut and braced up for immediate action. In some animals this immobility, which may simulate death, is the normal and final response to fear. The panoramic vision of most lower animals is specially sensitive to movements in surrounding objects; stationary objects are but dimly seen and fail to attract attention. Hence the great protective value of immobility, which is further enhanced by mimicry, &c.

The defensive gregarious type in man must be regarded as a degenerative product, in which the protective element itself has dwindled into insignificance. It is exemplified by the native races of India, where the caste system has abolished initiative in the three most populous of the four castes; by the Chinese, who have for ages been the passive puppets of Manchu interlopers; by the peasants of Russia, and indeed by the agriculturists of many nations. The defensive gregarious type is slow of thought, or busies its mind with abstract philosophical conceptions, which engender mysticism and other-wordliness, Utopian ideas, and an unpractical outlook on life beyond the requirements of mere subsistence. It is submissive and even servile under oppression, though liable to outbursts of fanatical revolt. In times of plenty—and it is essentially an Oriental type, situated where wants are few and are generally supplied with minimal effort—it is passive and lethargic. It is not a type which a great nation should emulate.

The third type of social organization is the pre-eminently social, and may be termed the democratic type. It is the highest product of social evolution and is confined to man, as might be expected. It is exemplified by the principal

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Allied nations, and there are good reasons apart from egotism for regarding the English-speaking peoples as the highest manifestations of the type yet evolved. An analogy has been drawn between this social type and the gregariousness of bees and ants (e.g., by W. Trotter). In my opinion the analogy is fallacious. These insects have an organization which is as entirely mechanical as can be conceived among living organisms. Their mental activities are of the most rigid and contracted nature. They are structurally so highly specialized that the individuals are incapable of any but the slightest adaptation, and are fit for nothing but the precise functions which it is their lot to perform. These individuals are rather to be compared to the specialized cells of a multicellular organism than to the members of a gregarious herd. That they should be capable of such extraordinarily complex activities as they are is indeed a marvellous example of the possibilities of biological adaptation, but it is adaptation to a specific environment, and is so minutely specialized that it admits of no further evolution. They have become side-tracked. The democratic type of gregariousness offers an almost complete contrast. Instead of possessing small and restricted brain power, its members are endowed with large brains and a versatility which has been the foundation of all human progress, and reaches its acme in this type. Unlike the bees with their fixed organization and stereotyped life-history, and unlike the aggressive type of gregariousness, with its predatory aims to which all motive forces are co-ordinated, it struggles beyond merely concrete benefits and the satisfaction of proximate conations to remote and as yet but dimly conceived ideals. Its instincts are melted into fluid streams which intermingle and flow into countless new channels. The Great Society is made up of many communities, each with its own functions, its own proximate conations, its own ideals, and these are neither rigidly fore-ordained nor organized to subserve a single group of predatory instincts or their sublimated abstractions. Its pattern is polychromatic, with ever-changing iridescence, like life itself. The problem is to read the meaning of this radiant cinematographic film, and since we are actors in the drama to co-ordinate our efforts towards an ideal dénouement.

In the solution of this infinitely complex problem and

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in the guidance, so far as may be, of the community into the right tracks, Universities are naturally marked out to play the premier rôle. In order to fulfil their function of fitting individuals to become the most useful citizens, according to their several inherited propensities, temperaments, and mental equipments, they must perforce gain an exceptional insight into the material which forms the community, and it is an essential part of their duty to form some conception, based upon sound scientific research, of the Ideal Society and the methods whereby it may be most nearly approximated in the Great Society. Many ideals are in the air and much research has been accomplished, but far more remains to be done. Yet more important at the present time is the refining of the knowledge obtained from diverse sources from the errors of observation and interpretation by the application of scientific criticism, and the organization of the refined product according to scientific principles. Throughout research, refining, and organization a fundamental criterion is necessary. It should be a constant standard of mathematical accuracy. Such it is impossible to obtain. In my opinion the best criterion at present available is psychology in the sense in which I have tried to explain that science. It is a faulty standard and of limited application, but its accuracy will be increased and its application extended by those very researches to which it will minister.

Much is already done by professors propounding their views in lectures, books, and the press. But the crying need to-day is for co-ordination on some definite plan. Complete uniformity of plan could not be effected, nor is it desirable, but it is manifestly desirable that the intellectual élite of the Universities should emerge from their studies and pay their public tribute to the common fund. As in the body the functions of the various organs are co-ordinated by the nervous system, and as the instincts and innate proclivities are controlled and rationalized by the backstroke action of the cortex of the brain, so must the seething chaos of emotions, instincts, thoughts, and aspirations of the communities of the Great Society be co-ordinated by inter-communication along appropriate channels, and the whole co-ordinated and organized by the backstroke activity of the highest intellects of the nation.

Chapter IX.

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THE prime necessities of a living organism are self-preservation and its correlative nutrition; without these reproduction and evolution are impossible. In 1918 we are having a demonstration on a large scale of what self-preservation means for modern Societies. Many of its lessons are being brought home to us with vivid clearness; there are many others which time and patient research will reveal.

In the twentieth century the nutrition of Societies is effected by that vast nexus of operations which is designated Industry. It is true that nutrition proper is primarily dependent upon certain branches of Industry, e.g., agriculture, but owing to the division of labour the above statement is substantially valid. For several years British Industry has shown ominous signs of ill-health, owing to various economic diseases and disorders, some of which were due to imperfections common to industrial societies in general, while others are to be attributed to specific imperfections of the British temperament. Though many of the disorders were insidious in their origin and development, the more serious, in fact, being coeval with the Industrial Revolution itself and gaining strength from utilitarian tenets which ministered to man's predatory instincts, the symptoms did not pass unnoticed, but like our unpreparedness for war, they failed to arouse effective treatment. The War has at last awakened the Nation to consciousness of the danger. As the result of this great catastrophe we are being brought within measurable distance of national bankruptcy. The National Debt is assuming such a colossal total that it is already nearly half of our estimated total capitalized wealth.

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Now, it is fully recognized that industrial production before the War was far below the possible limits, owing partly to universal lethargy and *laissez faire*, partly to Trade Union restrictions on output, and other causes. The urgent demand for munitions of war on a hitherto unparalleled scale has led to a response which proves that in an emergency which arouses apprehension and patriotism the industrial output can be very greatly increased.

When an individual becomes bankrupt through misfortune he either succumbs and becomes a parasite on Society, or he revises his methods and increases his productivity by greater and better-directed efforts. In many cases his only chance of recovery is to borrow a certain amount of capital in the hope that he may be able to repay the loan by means of his future exertions; and this device is often fully justified. It necessitates, however, that there should be people who have sufficient confidence in him to lend him money under such circumstances.

The British nation is in a somewhat similar predicament, and the fundamental problem of Industrial Reconstruction is how to increase production. In the first place, without such increased production the nutrition of the nation will suffer, it will become anæmic, faint, and die. No matter how high its ideals, it is a biological imperative that the nation must continue to live in order to be able to strive for them. There are many soul-stirring examples of supermen who have starved in the pursuit of an ideal, and perhaps the benefit to Society may have justified the martyrdom. It would be rash, especially at the present crisis, to assert that a nation is never justified in giving up its life for a principle. Such examples are magnificent, but they are not practical rules of conduct. Generally speaking, it is the duty of individuals and of nations to preserve their lives, and the aim of each should be an ordered life directed towards an ideal goal. In such a life the means to live are ennobled and sanctified by the ideal. Let us be done with the prejudice and snobbery which scorns "trade," and at any rate extend to it some equality of opportunity to live the higher life, even if we cannot bring ourselves to fraternize with it. "They also serve who only stand and wait," and he who fulfils his mission

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in Society lives as "complete" a life as he who ministers to souls or suffering.

In the second place, it is a relief from pessimism to remember that increased production is progressive. It not only supplies present demands more fully and satisfactorily, but also creates new demands, as has been amply proved in the past. The creation of new wants, both as regards their nature and their moral significance, is essentially a psychological problem. Hitherto it has been allowed to solve itself without guidance, with results which not infrequently have been deleterious to the community. The supply is a problem of applied science, in which psychology has also a part, if only a minor one, to play.

In the third place, lest optimism be given too free rein, it is also to be remembered that after the War it is unlikely that workers will respond with the same energy to the milder incentives to maximal production which will then obtain.* The need may be scarcely less, but it will be less sharply defined, and will be bereft of the countless and various appeals which the predicament of the country and their comrades in arms makes to the workers. During the period of hostilities Labour and Capital have entered into a "truce of God," which will cease when peace is declared.† The sooner measures are taken to smooth the asperities between employers and employees the better will be the prospects of the future. There are reasons to fear that a bureaucratic régime, if it has not actually increased them, has adopted expedients for keeping them in abeyance which will increase the difficulties of the peacemakers. It requires no psychologist to prove that workers will not willingly revert to a lower scale of wages. In the early days of the Industrial Revolution they were scandalously exploited by employers, and the pseudo-science of Utilitarian Economics militated against the reforms which the outraged

* "It would revolutionize industry if some ideal other than money could be inspired during times of peace" (Lady Inspector, Board of Trade. Cd. 8501, 1905).

† "Any departure during the War from the practice ruling in workshops, shipyards, and other industries prior to the War, shall only be for the period of the War" (Munitions of War Act, 1915).

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feelings of humanity demanded and in some degree eventually secured. Modern economics teaches that high wages are a *sine quâ non* of maximal production, and it is time that Adam Smith was relegated to the top-shelf, where Bentham will afford him congenial company. It is true that many employers would be driven out of business if they granted the wages which are demanded, but this is due, not so much to exorbitant demands, as to the multiplicity of small rival firms and lack of industrial organization. "The labourer is worthy of his hire," and the democratic state will be a failure until he is educated, housed, and paid well enough to make him a decent, efficient, and reasonably contented member of it.

It is not my intention, nor am I competent, to discuss the multifarious problems of Industrial reconstruction—educational, hygienic, economic, and so on. These are problems for experts in their several spheres, and much encouraging preparatory spadework has already been accomplished. What I desire to point out is that there are psychological factors involved in each, and that if they are neglected reforms which appear to be theoretically indicated will fail to attain full fruition or be utterly frustrated.

As already indicated, the fundamental problem is the organization of Industry for the purpose of increasing production, and this involves (1) the amelioration of the conflict between Capital and Labour; (2) the organization of work in factories; (3) the organization of trades *inter se*.

The *conflict between Capital and Labour* has its origin far back in the past, and is rooted in the principle of private ownership of property. In its present manifestations its immediate source is the apotheosis of individualism which brought about the Industrial Revolution. The attractive hedonistic doctrine that men in all their actions consciously seek the greatest pleasure, and thereby attain the greatest happiness for the greatest number, naturally gave birth to the convenient doctrine of *laissez faire*, the self-governing effect of unrestrained competition on supply and demand. The long domination of Utilitarian principles shows how practically successful even a philosophical theory may be if it appeals to the baser desires of mankind. Though *laissez faire* brought a long series of evils in its train, it was also

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responsible in large degree for the enormous increase in the wealth of the country. If a false theory, crudely applied, can have so great a practical influence, we need not despair of practical effects from theories based upon surer psychological foundations and applied with more regard for individual and social (moral) psychology.

It is easy to prove by reasoning that the interests of employers and workers are in the main identical, since both live by production; the fixed wages fund is a myth, and demand is capable of indefinite expansion. But the social cleavage into upper and lower classes, dating from the earliest historical times and emphasized by the feudal system, has permeated society with a tradition against which reason beats in vain. "The ghost of the 'economic man' still haunts the realm of industry; employers are believed to be purely self-seeking, and if their actions appear humane they are open to suspicion. 'Enlightened self-interest' may be a sufficient explanation for the capitalist; but it does not satisfy the labourer, who fears the self-interest of the employer in whatever guise" (E. D. Proud).*

Trade unionism had a difficult struggle to rope in the majority of the workers and to obtain recognition by the employers and the State. The struggle increased the bitterness of the conflict between Capital and Labour, but eventually the armies were each organized against the other, using the weapons of the lock-out and the strike respectively. These tactics lead to diminution of production, which is further reduced by the workers' suicidal policy of limiting output, and their bad time-keeping. The limitation of output has a superficial semblance of reason to the worker, and is regarded by him as a justifiable measure of self-defence. Indeed, it is a natural form of revenge in those cases in which the price of piecework is reduced if the worker earns higher wages than the employer thinks suitable. Bad time-keeping is almost wholly due to drink, and it is noteworthy that the men who earn most lose most time.

In the matter of wages, high wages ought to mean

* E. DOROTHEA PROUD. "Welfare Work." 1916.

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greater efficiency, and therefore greater production.* If, as at present, the cost of necessities is equally increased, the worker is no better off than before. Further, if increased wages mean bad time-keeping, there is both industrial and moral loss. From the employer's point of view, unless high wages lead to increased production there is loss, which may indeed be fatal to the firm, and even if increased production is secured, it is useless unless the employer has the enterprise and takes the necessary means to expand his trade. "The cost of the article and not of the man is the only thing that matters" (E. J. P. Benn).† The lethargic employer is therefore averse from thus increasing expenses. Moreover, "experience in wages has shown that there is no such thing as a sectional increase" (Alex. Ramsay).‡ Raising the wage rate of the unskilled man inevitably means in the long run a general increase in wage-rates. The whole question of wages bristles with psychological problems. Schemes have been devised for encouraging output by progressively increasing wages according to a wage graph. "The psychological advantage of having a definite 'reward' at a certain point is comparable to the 'goal' in football, which may convert the mere 'kicking' a bit of leather about a field' into a scientific game" (E. D. Proud).

It has been proved that under certain conditions output is increased by reducing the hours of work.§ The limits of profitable reduction have not, however, been determined and must vary from trade to trade, and, indeed, according to the individual operations; nor is much known about the relative amounts of fatigue occasioned by long hours and by speeding up during short hours. The employer is chiefly concerned with the economic aspects of the question, the worker with health and wages. "Yet the nation's economic

* See J. SCHOENHOF. "Economy of High Wages." N.Y., 1892.

† E. J. P. BENN. "Trade as a Science." 1916.

‡ ALEX. RAMSAY. "Terms of Industrial Peace." 1917.

§ J. C. GOLDMARK. "Fatigue and Efficiency." 1912. A. F. STANLEY KENT. "Second Report on Industrial Fatigue." Cd. 8335. 1916. SIR ROBERT HADFIELD, F.R.S., in "Industrial Reconstruction." 1917. Memoranda of the Health of Munition Workers Committee.

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interest in future generations often has little in common with the immediate economic interests even of the workers; the nation unwittingly relies on individual parental instincts, which often conflict with individual economic interests. With an increase of knowledge and an abandonment of abstractions, it might prove that the vital interests (if not the economic interests) of all would coincide" (E. D. Proud).

The usual method of dealing with open ruptures between employers and employed is by so-called arbitration. For its success it is necessary to allow the combatants to reach the stage bordering on financial or psychological exhaustion, during which period no productive work is performed. The Board of Trade expert, or in his absence a barrister, usually ignorant of industrial matters, then meets the representatives, and peace is patched up by the ungraceful capitulation of the employers, who pay an indemnity in the form of increased wages, usually a substantial moiety of the increase demanded. Industrial arbitration differs from legal arbitration in that there is no effective power of compelling the parties to keep the agreed terms. Employers usually keep faith; labour, by no means always. If cessation of work were a mere question involving only the two parties, either would be at liberty to terminate the contract. In lock-outs and strikes, however, the State suffers more or less severely, and strikes affecting the workers in key industries—railway transport, coal mining, &c.—may be of extreme national gravity. Hence the State is fully justified in intervening, not only in the guise of a peacemaker, but also as a judge armed with penal powers. Strikes are invariably supported by trade unions, even though, as is becoming more frequent, the trade union officials may be opposed to them. It has been pointed out that penalties might be inflicted in the form of compulsory fines levied on trade union funds, but that this could only take the form of a penal clause in "a definite, equitable, and comprehensive agreement regulating the distribution of the profits of industry" (Alex. Ramsay).

It is clear, however, that peace will never be declared between Capital and Labour until their psychological attitudes to each other are profoundly altered. This can only be brought about by exhaustive investigation of their

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collective mentalities and the underlying motive forces, and by patient conciliatory measures and educative influences. Reasoned arguments may suffice to convert the more intelligent employers, but they leave the vast majority both of employers and employed unmoved and still a prey to deeply ingrained traditional prejudices. These have already been undermined to some extent by the increasingly bitter and alarming lessons of experience. The labouring classes have undergone a transition from the serfdom and defensive gregariousness which existed in the early years of the Industrial Revolution to a stage of aggressive gregariousness, which is now showing increasing signs of socialization. In France, before the War, the aggressive stage persisted and evolved into syndicalism, the aim of which is to make Labour the lord of industry. Socializing tendencies have put a drag upon the predatory instincts in this country, and the panaceas of reform have been devised upon the familiar rationalizing lines. The hopes founded upon the products of reasoning—co-partnership, profit-sharing, and so on—have not been fulfilled, partly because of their limited application to trades under existing conditions, partly because neither employers nor workers are for the most part sufficiently educated or evolved to respond to abstract reasoning. In favourable conditions all these schemes have met with encouraging success, but the time is not ripe for their wide extension. Profit-sharing and co-partnership are a one-sided arrangement as long as wages are such that loss-sharing is impossible for the worker. They are at present applicable only to municipal undertakings, such as gas companies, and businesses of established prosperity. In the latter the increased efficiency of the workers doubtless repays the employers, even to the extent of making them enthusiastic advocates of the system, like Lord Leverhulme. In less favourable circumstances the workers are inclined to view with distrust the approaches of the employer, which savour either of charity or patronage or vaguely suspected cunning. With increase of wages the scope of these systems may be expected to widen, and this tendency will be facilitated if profits are also limited by State interference. Excessive profits, in which the workers do not participate, are a potent cause of labour unrest.

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Limitation of profits has been a necessity of the War, and there are good reasons why it should be continued in times of peace. Profits are the great incentive to production and trade, and care must be taken not to kill the goose which lays the golden eggs. But excessive profits are usually the product of monopolies or protected industries, such as mining, steel making, shipping, &c., and they are often obtained at the expense of the community or of interrelated trades. It is fair that a proportion of the profits of production should belong to the workers, and it is in any case inevitable that they will obtain it in the future. It is by no means impossible to devise an equitable scheme for the limitation of profits without seriously impairing trade. "To make it impossible to pay unreasonable dividends is one of the surest ways of making it possible to pay reasonable wages. To take away from the supplier of raw material and the shipper of finished product, the inducement to charge exorbitant rates and freights, is one of the surest ways of increasing the prosperity of the general manufacturer. To increase our product, and lessen the price at which we can produce, is the most certain way in which to develop overseas trade, and promote the interests, men and masters alike, of that large bulk of our industrial community whose prosperity depends upon it" (Alex. Ramsay).

Psychology teaches that the strongest impulses to effort in unregenerate man are those which aim at the satisfaction of instinctive desires. "Nothing is more effective with kings or subjects than self-interest, nor can there be any lasting compacts or friendships save where there is hope of some advantage."* Employers and, it is encouraging to note, the more enlightened trade union officials may be stimulated by higher and more remote ends, but the mass of the workers must, in the meantime, be offered the satisfaction of proximate desires. Reformers and peace-makers should search out the means whereby both may

* "Sit animo fixum, nulla re tum principes tum privatos moveri magis utilitate: neque ulla firma foedera putet, nullas amicitias, unde nihil speratur commodi" (Juan de Mariana, *De Rege et Regis Institutione*, Lib. III, cap. XV. 1599).

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be directed into a common path, in which the instinctive conation will be but the first link in the chain of conations which leads to the ideal goal. The Draft Recommendations of the British Workers' League* provide a good foundation to work on, and the recommendations of the Sub-Committee (of the Reconstruction Committee) on Relations between Employers and Employed† (the Whitley Report) suggest the mechanism—Work Committees, District and National Councils—whereby details, which are also enumerated, may be worked out. Meantime the Labour Party, an essentially political organization, is undergoing reconstruction, and has taken an important step in the recognition of all producers "by hand or by brain."‡ It is an innovation for Labour to recognize the part played by the mind in production, and it is a step in advance, even if it be prompted by ulterior motives. Too much weight must not, however, be attached to the authority of the Labour Party, which at present represents only about 3,500,000 trade unionists and 40,000 Socialists out of a population of, roughly, 16,000,000 adult persons.§ Moreover, the articles on "The Ferment of Revolution" in *The Times*,|| and the correspondence to which they gave rise, show that there are sinister agencies at work, which, if allowed free play, may lead to anarchy.

There is already in existence an Industrial League which aims at bringing about a better understanding between employers and employed. It confines its activities to social conferences. Towards the close of 1916 an important step was taken in the formation of a National Alliance of Employers and Employed. The draft constitution provides for personal and financial support by employers' associations and trade unions on an equal basis. The programme includes (1) A living wage for all workers; (2) regulations of the hours of work, especially in arduous occupations; (3) adequate wages for women, and equal rates with men

* *The British Citizen*, November 3, 1917; *The Times*, November 2, 1917.

† Cd. 8606.

‡ *The Times*, October 19, 1917.

§ C. JESSON, L.C.C., in *The Observer*, October 28, 1917.

|| *The Times*, September 25-28, 1917.

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if work, skill, and output are equal; (4) improved workshop conditions; (5) satisfactory housing accommodation for workers; (6) encouragement of workers to take an interest in the efficiency and success of the works in which they are employed; (7) the establishment of joint committees in works to consider the interests of the industry; (8) maximum output with maximum pay; (9) continuity of employment in slack times; (10) the encouragement of trade unionism and adherence to agreements; (11) the liberal education and technical training of children.

Many of the suggestions towards reconstruction take too little account of the changes produced by the War. Arbitration has led to wholesale concessions, e.g., to the South Wales coal-miners, and to partial stultification of Government measures, e.g., the Military Service and Munitions Acts, and National Service. These grave signs of weakness will be taken advantage of by ill-educated and discontented workers, and the difficulties of reconstruction seriously increased. Nevertheless, there is no need to despair, but it is the more important that no stone should be unturned to discover the underlying motive forces and to direct them into the right channels.

The *organization of work* in factories opens up another series of difficult problems. In the first place, efficient work cannot be done except by efficient workmen. The question of industrial training teems with psychological problems, as has indeed been partially, but inadequately, recognized. Apart from actual experience, no better insight into the defects of industrial training could be obtained than by a perusal of N. B. Dearle's excellent monograph.* This author surveys the various methods whereby workers enter trades—regular service, migration, following up, picking up, and so on; the conditions of engagement and employment; technical training in schools and the shop; the problems of boy labour—the blind alley, the partial blind alley, wasteful recruiting, unemployment, the needs of the future. "Under existing circumstances many boys are ruined industrially before they have had time to find their occupation, others

* N. B. DEARLE: "Industrial Training." 1914.

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are spoilt by making a wrong choice and going to the wrong thing, and others, again, are injured because the conditions under which they are employed make successful teaching, or at least the full and proper use of it, impossible" (N. B. Dearle). The chief recommendations as to School Education, which are largely founded on the Majority Report of the Poor Law Commission of 1905-9,* have for the most part been incorporated in the new Education Bill (1917), which it is to be hoped will soon become law. Compulsory attendance at elementary schools is to be extended to the age of fifteen (instead of fourteen), and attendance of young persons, i.e., from fifteen to eighteen years of age, at continuation schools is made compulsory. In order that the latter requirement may be carried out, the young person's "employment shall be suspended on any day when his attendance is required, not only for the period during which he is required to attend the school, but also for such other specified part of the day, not exceeding two hours, as the authority consider necessary in order to secure that he may be in a fit mental and bodily condition to receive full benefit from attendance at the school." There is no doubt that the compulsion of employers in this matter is as essential as that of young persons. Dearle rightly lays stress upon what I have called the psychological diagnosis of children: curricula based upon the capacities and predilections of the pupils will then cease to be meaningless drudgery. "But in boys or girls just released from school and plunged into industrial life, the desires of the moment prevail over visions of future prosperity" (cf. p. 78), and "even the Factory Acts are based upon the assumption that young persons of 14 to 18 are primarily workers, not potential workers in process of development" (E. D. Proud). It is imperative that the learners should be definitely distinguished from full wage-earners.

Important as is the early training of the worker, education, or at any rate the opportunities for education, should be liberally supplied to the adult wage-earner. If the youths have been set off on the right paths the difficulties will not be great. The more enlightened labour leaders quite appre-

* Cd. 4499. 1909.

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ciate the advantages,* and the trade unions have no use for unemployables. We are familiar with the pig-headed labourer, who is so ignorant that he often acts contrary to his own interests; the better educated workman will be more intelligent, more progressive, and more adaptable to changing circumstances. Moreover, "the development of a good workman is the best foundation on which education for citizenship can be based" (E. J. P. Benn).†

When the working man is brought to realize that increased efficiency pays not only his employers, but also himself, he will no longer oppose the more extended use of labour-saving machinery and methods of "speeding up." He will not willingly surrender to the American workman, who is accustomed to conditions of surveillance which at present he would not countenance for a moment. So-called "scientific management"‡ means increased efficiency and increased output, and does not involve over-pressure, which in fact would frustrate its object.

Unfortunately, the employers need education as well as the employees, but this should be the easier task. The uncompromising attitude towards Labour, born of a feudal tradition and fostered by Utilitarian philosophy, has become greatly modified, only in small part it is to be feared by the dictates of pure reason, but chiefly by the stern lessons of experience. They have yet much to learn, not a little of which can be taught them by the Germans. However unpalatable it may be, it is an incontrovertible fact that Germany has utilized scientific research and organized her industries far better than we have. It was only what might be expected, for industry after all is still essentially a form of aggressive warfare, limited only by prudence and such social morality as the given nation has attained. Germany has organized her industrial warfare against competing nations: we have frittered away half our efforts on internecine strife and competition.

* Cf. CHARLES HOBSON (*Sheffield Labour Leader*). "The Teaching of Trades in Continental Countries." Quoted in "Eclipse or Empire."

† E. J. P. BENN. "Trade as a Science." 1916.

‡ See N. A. BRISCO. "Economics of Efficiency." HUGO MUNSTERBERG. "Psychology and Industrial Efficiency." 1913. H. N. CASSON and C. CHISHOLM, in "Eclipse or Empire."

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Scientific research and the application of Science to Industry are subjects which have been so strenuously canvassed that it is unnecessary to advocate their indomitable claims here. At the same time it is futile to expect the arguments to effect revolution in minds which are incapable of appreciating them. So long as the physical sciences are a closed book to our legislators, the vast majority of schoolmasters and University professors, and a preponderance of employers and "educated people," progress will be slow and faltering. Nevertheless, the outlook is now hopeful, which it has never been before, and the stimulus, self-preservation, is the strongest which can be applied.

There are many other lessons which employers have to learn. They have succeeded in organizing themselves *against* Labour; they have now to learn to organize themselves *with* it. Most English trades have grown up and acquired methods which have become fossilized by custom. It is far more difficult to introduce innovations than, e.g., in the United States. Both employers and employed are conservative to the core, in spite of the revolutionary and anarchic ideas which the latter sometimes indulge in. If some measure of co-operation can be secured between them the greater enlightenment of the employers and the trade union leaders will have some chance of introducing reforms. An excellent object lesson in organization is given by an American example in "Terms of Industrial Peace" (Alex. Ramsay).*

The third fundamental problem of industrial organization for the purpose of increasing production is *the organization of trades inter se*. Employers in the same trades must learn to co-operate with each other against the common enemy.† The dangers of the Trust are not insuperable; perhaps something in the nature of the German "Kartelle"

* Cf. ANGUS WATSON. "The Ideals of Business," in "Eclipse or Empire."

† On "The Importance of Scale" and "The Reorganization of Business and Agriculture upon the lines of National Trusts" (see "The Elements of Reconstruction." 1916).

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can be adopted. So far as export trade is concerned the Trust System is indeed definitely indicated. The difficulties here are very largely psychological, and depend upon the intense individualism of the Englishman, which makes his mind as inviolable a territory as his house.

Two chief conclusions arise out of the consideration of the conditions and difficulties of Industrial Reconstruction. Their inter-relations are extremely intimate and intricate, e.g., increased efficiency in the working man depends upon education, improved environment, and higher wages; higher wages depend upon economic conditions, increased efficiency in the working man, increased enterprise in the employer, and so on. It is clear that the correlation and co-ordination of these diverse factors cannot be accomplished without the assistance, authority, and, if necessary, compulsion of the State. This aspect of the subject will receive attention in the next chapter.

The second conclusion is that the comparative chaos which now reigns is due to ignorance of the underlying motive forces. This ignorance is due to lack of scientific investigation by experts, and results in *laissez faire*, the misapplication of curative measures, and the application of wrong remedies.

Let us briefly sketch the life-history of an imaginary factory hand. He is born in a slum, perhaps in one of those overcrowded tenement houses in Glasgow, where the family is fortunate if it has two rooms, which have to suffice for living, cooking, eating, washing, and sleeping. In such an environment decency of life and morals is impossible. The traditional mentality which the child acquires can be imagined only with difficulty. He goes to school until he is 14: his lessons are a drudgery, and his out-of-school hours are spent playing about the streets. Very probably he begins to earn money by selling newspapers—a useful occupation, but one which initiates him into the mysteries of betting and an unwholesome knowledge of the worst aspects of life on the streets. He is very likely to gravitate into a blind alley, for occupations which lead nowhere are apt to have attractively high wages. In any case, release from school is regarded as emancipation, but his parents have other views; they often belong in the strictly

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etymological sense to the proletariat, and from their point of view he has to earn money. They have no means of finding out what the boy is specially suited for, nor where and how the most suitable work is to be obtained. He drifts into the nearest vacancy, and if there is a choice chooses the one with highest pay. Here he becomes a learner, but he, his parents, and his employers expect him first and foremost to be an earner. The result is that it is a matter of chance whether he becomes an efficient workman, or one of the vast army of unskilled labourers.

Let us suppose that, owing to his innate proclivities or to good luck, he has acquired some ambition to rise. He attends evening classes, usually when he is worn out with many hours of manual labour. He has no means of obtaining books, and if he had them it is impossible for him to find the time, the place, and the quiet necessary to study them properly. If he only knew of them, how he would envy those *Maisons du Peuple* in Belgium, built by co-operative effort, and providing lecture halls, reading rooms, concert rooms, cafés—recreation and education! Is it any wonder that he loafs at street-corners and drifts into public-houses, the only places where he can give rein to his social instincts, meet and converse with his mates? There he wastes such money as he has and more than he can spare on drinking, for he has to pay toll, and on gambling, for being young he has to have some excitement. On a half-holiday he goes to a football match, and delivers himself of his suppressed instincts in one great explosion.

Perhaps his employer is one of the progressive type who wish to better the lives of his workpeople. What about housing? He and others have succeeded in getting the Corporation to run tramways to a suburb, where ground is cheap and available for building purposes. When the lines have been laid, at the cost of thousands of pounds to the ratepayers, behold! the rent of the land has gone up—an excellent example of the uncontrolled workings of supply and demand. In fact, the ratepayers have very kindly presented the landowners with a nice round sum, and the workmen may whistle for their houses. Here is obviously a case for State interference. Or the employer starts Welfare Work in his factory. Now, the workman is a

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Britisher, however much he may fall short of the ideal, and he has inherited the instincts and absorbed the traditions of his fellow citizens. Consequently he is intensely individualistic, probably rather taciturn, but above all independent. All Welfare Work savours of patronage and charity, and consequently he starts with a strong prejudice against it. The employer's traditional acquirements are not such as usually to make him very tactful, though he is easily stimulated to resentment by the rejection of his favours. Welfare workers are generally conscientious and enthusiastic, but their virtues are often of the hard, tactless kind bred of a Puritan tradition. So, for success, the welfare worker must be chosen and trained with the same minute care as the school teacher of the future, and with as little regard for expenditure of time, trouble, and money. The scope and difficulties of Welfare Work are admirably expounded in Miss Proud's monograph on the subject, and it is outside my purpose to go into details here. It may, however, be mentioned in passing that welfare workers often brush difficulties aside with the phrase: "That's a matter of psychology"—as though that settled the question. On the other hand, "psychologists have not yet sufficient confidence to attempt what is attempted in their name" (E. D. Proud). When psychologists realize the scope of *their* subject and set their house in order this indictment will no longer hold true. If we temper it with the humility born of an appreciation of the manifold and great difficulties—economic, psychological, and political—which beset us, we may subscribe to the following enthusiastic utterance:—

"Improve the standard of national intelligence, develop the national mind, enlarge the outlook of the worker, inspire him with fresh ambition, enthuse him with fresh hopes, give him a glimpse of positions which he may attain, and make it possible for him to begin to climb, by first of all giving him an education which will form a substantial groundwork upon which he can build. Remove the blighting influence of environment, inevitable to the conditions in which he is at present housed, and give him a dwelling in which he can live with comfort and a certain measure of refinement. Supply a means by which his natural craving for fellowship and recreation can be satisfied, away

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from the body-and-soul-destroying influences of the public-house. Having offered that which is for his good, rigidly suppress, in the public interest, that which will do him harm. Thus you will breed a new race of men, upon whom the industrial and civic responsibilities of the country may be safely placed, and in whose hands our national future will be secure " (Alex. Ramsay).

Chapter X.

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It would be difficult to discover a clearer example of the disparity between the dictates of pure reason, as set forth in what is commonly known as political science, but should more properly be termed the philosophy of politics, and the practice of constitutional government in civilized nations. The history of political philosophy may be said to commence with Plato and Aristotle, who represent respectively the deductive and inductive schools. Though these methods of reasoning are necessarily employed by both schools, the predominance of one or the other will, with due precautions, be found to be a fair criterion of their respective scientific merits.

Plato's "Republic" is a magnificent, beautiful, and instructive, but none the less grotesque, effort of the imagination. As we trace the history of political theory down the centuries, reasoning founded upon imaginary concepts reigns supreme until recent times, and still vitiates the teachings of historical and observational methods. The imaginary "Golden Age" of Seneca and his predecessors developed into the "State of Nature," which forms the starting-point of the political theories of Polybius, Aquinas, Althusius, Mariana, Bodin, Suarez, Grotius, Fortescue, Hooper, Milton, Hobbes, Pufendorf, Locke, and many others.

By the common fault of attributing reasoning powers of which they were not capable to primitive savages, the application of the Hebrew idea of contract and consent as the basis of political authority and of the doctrines of Roman private law to the state of nature gave rise to the fatal theory of the Social Contract. At first it was a purely

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governmental compact between ruler and people (e.g., Languet, Buchanan, Althusius); later it assumed the form of a true social contract of the individuals of the community *inter se* (e.g., Grotius, Hooker, the Pilgrim Fathers, Milton, Hobbes, Locke, Bolingbroke, Rousseau). For mediæval Catholics the autocracy of the Pope was a God-given revelation, though Gerson and others fought hard for conciliar aristocracy. The conflict for supremacy between the Emperor Frederick II and the Pope led to the assumption of spiritual supremacy by secular monarchs, which crystallized into the theory of the Divine right of kings. Moreover, one of the effects of the Reformation was to increase the power of kings and to promote the development of absolute monarchy, in spite of the aristo-democratic teachings and practices of the Calvinists and their Puritan successors.

Upon such flimsy foundations as the state of nature, and the law of nature and natural rights which sprang from it, the Social contract, the theories of sovereignty, the Divine right of kings, and so on, an immense superstructure was erected by processes of deductive reasoning which ignored the fundamental facts of history and human nature. The followers of Aristotle were few, but it is noteworthy that they are now held in the greatest esteem. Machiavelli was the first to make any great advance on the right lines. He realized that the art of politics depends on the principles and motives of man's self-interest, and that the only sources of knowledge of them were history and experience. Jean Bodin was impelled by the same scientific spirit. He adopted the historical method, and appears, like Grotius, to have based the development of society on the social instinct; he laid stress upon the effects of environment. His view of sovereignty reminds one of the primitive savage's *mana*. Filmer and Hume realized the absurdity of the current theory of the social contract, but Montesquieu is the father of modern historical research. "He held fast to the great truth that serious politics cannot be constructed in the air by playing with imaginary men of no particular race or country, and building them into arbitrary combinations, as a child builds castles with wooden bricks" (Sir Frederick

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Pollock).^{*} For him, laws are "the necessary relations springing out of the nature of things," a scientific definition which was received with ridicule, but which paved the way for Comte's wider generalization. What he calls positive laws include the laws of nations, i.e., laws common to all civilized nations; and political law and civil law, both of which vary with the character and environment of individual nations. Governments, whether republican (either democratic or aristocratic), monarchic, or despotic, are actuated by moral or emotional principles—virtue, honour, and fear respectively. They undergo transitions and transformations if the spirit of the nation and its motive principle changes. Montesquieu first propounded the separation of powers in the modern form, viz., legislative, executive, and judicial; and was strongly of opinion that they should be kept rigidly independent of each other. Political liberty, which he found in its purest form in England, he held to depend upon the balance of the three powers and their mutual checks upon each other. Civil liberty is a product of social expediency. Here, at last, was a body of political maxims which merited to be called scientific, for it was derived from deductions based upon as accurate observation of the facts of history and experience as the knowledge of the time admitted. Europe, however, was in the thralls of abstract reasoning. Montesquieu, as *persona grata* at court, and de Brosses, the father of modern anthropology, later, by virtue of his social position, gained a transient and supercilious hearing, while Voltaire, d'Argenson, Diderot, and the philosophers monopolized attention.

Innumerable ideal political systems, some admittedly impractical, such as Plato's "Republic," Campanella's "City of Sol," More's "Utopia," and Harrington's "Oceana," were founded upon unrestrained theorizing from false or questionable premises. They were mutually discordant, demonstrating by impeccable logic the indubitable superiority of well-nigh every form of government, from the absolute monarchy of Bodin, Grotius, James I, Hobbes, and Bossuet, to the democracy of the Independents and Levellers, Milton,

^{*} Sir FREDERICK POLLOCK. "Introduction to the History of the Science of Politics." 1890.

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Locke, and Hume. The extreme democratic tendencies culminated in the *volonté générale* of Rousseau's "Social Contract," put into practice with disastrous results in the French Revolution, still, however, to live on in an etherialized form in the philosophies of Kant and Fichte. While Locke is responsible for the concept of "the public will of the society," Hobbes drew attention to "felicity" or happiness* as the aim of all human actions, and must therefore be regarded as the forerunner, with Hume, of James Mill, Grote and the Utilitarians. Locke stands for limited monarchy, and finds his lineal descendants in the Whigs of later days. Both the wisdom of the wise, and their foolishness, have therefore a profound influence on the history and evolution of civilization.

Fortunately for us, in England "an advanced stage of development in both public and private law was attained before the abstract principles involved entered to any important extent into the consciousness of the statesmen and lawyers. The English Constitution, like the Roman, was a product of practical political sagacity, administrative ability and a spirit of legalism in the dominant classes; and the later system owed as little to the scholastic political theories that prevailed on the Continent as the earlier system owed to the refinements of Greek speculation" (W. A. Dunning).† The salient features in the growth of the English Constitution are, "first, the establishment (by William the Conqueror and his successors) of monarchic power sufficiently strong to resist the disintegrating tendencies of feudalism; second, the development of a council, the organ of the great men of the realm, both lay and ecclesiastical, through whose necessary co-operation in the government the tendency to tyranny was checked; third, the union of this council with delegates of the lesser social classes, in a Parliament with far-reaching authority in taxation and general legislation; and fourth, the organization of the fiscal and judicial administration in such manner as to ensure a permanent and important part to the popular organs of local government" (W. A. Dunning). For many

* Cf. "Communis utilitas" of William of Ockham (14th c.).

† W. A. DUNNING. "A History of Political Theories from Luther to Montesquien." 1916.

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centuries custom and precedent ruled the course of English politics, in spite of angry contests between kings and barons, kings and the Papacy, and kings and the people. "Of legalism there is much; of political science, none" (W. A. Dunning). The enormously important rights guaranteed in Magna Carta are assumed merely to declare "the law of the land." It is the same with the Common Law. The earliest authorities, Glanvil and Bracton, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, state in the strongest terms that even the king, while subject to no man, is always subject to the law. Apart from Magna Carta and a few other formal documents, there is no statutory expression of the law. It moves on "from precedent to precedent," and still continues to do so. Even when theory commences to gain sway the "Excellence of the Laws of England" (Sir John Fortescue, 1470) is the theme. Buchanan, Hooper, Coke, Milton, Hobbes, Algernon Sidney, and Locke were all moved by some great political event, thus applying their theories to a concrete problem, and the English Constitution, Government, and administration inspired some of the greatest Continental theorists, especially Montesquieu and Voltaire.

Right down to the present day it is the jurists who alone hold firmly to historical evolution and look askance at abstract theories. Blackstone and John Austin effected the segregation of legal from political principles, not wholly to the benefit of either, but much to the clarification of thought. In the nineteenth century the researches of Sir Henry Maine, Frederick Harrison, Professor Holland, Lord Bryce, Maitland, Sir Frederick Pollock, and a host of others, by a further process of analysis, have separated political ethics, constitutional politics, and positive law. But, far more important, they have arrived by a different route at Burke's conclusion that "in all forms of government the people is the true legislator." Laws which are destined to permanency are not imposed from above, but grow out of the psychological motive forces which sway the masses of the people. "Das Gesetz ist das Organ des Volksrechts" (Savigny). The germs must be sought in history and experience.

Burke was born out of due season. Bentham carried on

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the Hobbesian tradition of founding political theories upon "a few simple principles" of human nature, and the political economists followed the same *a priori* methods. Political "science" is still taught in our Universities on the basis of such assumptions as that man, being a reasoning animal, acts according to the dictates of pure reason, draws inferences and forms judgments by a process of ratiocination; and that psychology is "useless" or "non-sense."*

We can best arrive at some idea of the value of political theory, past and present, by a brief consideration of the Government of England as it is to-day. Theoretically our Constitution is a strictly legal system and is part of the Common Law. Yet if the strict legal position were acted upon or taken advantage of the result would be chaos. For example, the law takes no account of our representative system; there is no reference to the great political parties, to the Cabinet, and the fact that it holds office at the mercy of the parliamentary majority; and the office of Prime Minister, which has been in existence since the time of Walpole, waited until 1905 before it received recognition, and then it was only in the Table of Precedency! According to political theory we are a democracy, with Parliament as legislator; as a fact we are an aristocracy (in the classical use of the term) in which the Cabinet is both legislator and executive. Moreover, this aristocracy consists of one party only; its committee, the Cabinet, sits in secret, and has for a long time been dominated by the Inner Cabinet. Legally, the members of the Cabinet are merely members of the Privy Council, "His Majesty's Servants"; actually they are a committee of the parliamentary representatives of one political party. There is no question of separation of powers: the Cabinet is a political council, a party committee, and an administration board. Even greater latitude

* See GRAHAM WALLAS. "Human Nature in Politics." 1914. Henry Sidgwick's "Elements of Politics," published in 1891, must have influenced a vast number of readers. It admittedly draws its deductions from "individuals having only the few simple and general characteristics which are all we can include in our conception of the civilized man to whom our abstract political reasoning relates"! Yet this book is not usually classified as fiction.

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than that described is permitted; Ministers almost invariably are, but legally need not be, members of Parliament.

So far as party government is concerned it has received universal condemnation on theoretical grounds, yet it works. Group-government is theoretically much more rational, yet it fails, as is seen in France. British Government is entirely in the power of the majority; the minority, as Cobden said, has only one right, that of using all its efforts to become the majority. We witness the spectacle of millions of free men in a free state, habitually governed in opposition to their own will and their own convictions (Sir Sidney Low).*

Theoretically, two Houses of Parliament are designed on the principle of "checks and balances"; practically, in England, they are, to say the least, very inefficient in this respect. For example, legally the House of Lords possesses powers of veto over the bills of the House of Commons; the application of this long-suspended right in 1909 led to the Parliament Act of 1911.

Ministerial responsibility rests entirely with the legally non-existent Cabinet. With it "the law has no direct concern" (Dicey).† Yet "the king can do no wrong," i.e., some minister is responsible for his every public act. Moreover, when one minister falls, the Cabinet falls with him.

Parliament is, from the legal point of view, the seat of sovereignty; politically, sovereignty resides in the electorate. "A dissolution is in its essence an appeal from the legal to the political sovereign" (A. V. Dicey); yet, as we have seen, sovereignty really belongs to the Cabinet. Theoretically, the Many rule; practically, there is a ruling class. The reasons are essentially psychological and are not taken into account by political "science." Among these causes are the lack of interest of the community and their recognition of the superiority, or at any rate prestige, of the socio-political class from which politicians are chiefly drawn; the snobbery innate in human nature—an Englishman still

* Sir SIDNEY LOW. "The Governance of England." 1915.

† A. V. DICEY. "Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution." 1914.

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dearly loves a lord; the influence of the Public Schools—a quarter of the Cabinet has usually been to Eton or Harrow; the love of the successful man; the influence of wealth—as a means of entry into Society, and as a safeguard against bribery; the suspicion of the expert—a manifestation of the herd instinct; and so on.

“There is certainly no such thing as the English monarchy, as it is represented in the statutes, in the courts of law, and in proclamations, orders in council, and formal documents in general” (Sir Sidney Low). Most of the royal prerogatives are really exercised by the Cabinet. “The Executive *de jure* is the Crown in Council” (Anson),* and “the Crown in this capacity is wholly outside Parliament” (Anson), as has been amply demonstrated during the War.

Such are a few specimens of the anomalies of the Government of England, regarded as a machine devised and worked by reason. They might be multiplied indefinitely by reference to authoritative text-books, such as A. Lawrence Lowell’s,† and legal works. A similar study of the American Commonwealth,‡ the French Republic,§ the German Empire,|| and other governments would reveal as many anomalies, though of different kinds. A comparative study could not fail to elicit psychological facts of the greatest value.

The evolution of the British nation and the development of its institutions have been profoundly different from those of Continental nations. The causes are, of course, very numerous and extremely complex. So far as physical environment is concerned, the asperities of a northern climate, combined with the fertility of the soil and the richness and variety of mineral resources, together with an insular geographical position, are the most important. The struggle against Nature has bred a community which is

* Sir W. R. ANSON. “The Law and Custom of the Constitution.” 1909.

† A. LAWRENCE LOWELL. “The Government of England.” 1912.

‡ Viscount BRYCE. “The American Commonwealth.” 1902.

§ J. E. C. BODLEY. “France.” 1902.

|| HENRI LICHTENBERGER. “L’Allemagne moderne, son Evolution.” 1908.

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characterized by physical strength and enormous energy, primarily also physical. The weaklings have been eliminated by a natural eugenic process, and the survivors are distinguished for their restless activity and predilection for immediate action, whether in sport, politics, or industry, rather than for the postponed and deliberate behaviour which is regulated by reflection. In this respect they resemble young animals, and to these causes they owe their perpetual youth, with its concomitant enthusiasm and optimism. On the other hand, their geographical isolation has fostered extreme individualism and conservatism, just as a biological species in isolation persists with a minimum of variation. It is in very large measure to this fact that we owe the extraordinary difference which is to be observed in the historical development of the British as compared with Continental nations. Our sea-girt island has sheltered us from the full blasts of European conflicts, both of deed and thought, and has lengthened the latent periods during which decisions for meeting new developments must be taken. While we have been shielded from the worst consequences of our slowness of response, and have indeed in many instances benefited by the opportunities for deliberation, we have, on the other hand, been encouraged in our habits of mental indolence, procrastination, and absorption in our own immediate and local affairs. As individuals, from one end to the other of the social scale, and as a nation, we are self-centred and given up to the satisfaction of proximate conations. The bludgeonings of Fate are met with the minimal readjustments which will serve to ward off the direct onslaughts; of remote consequences we take little heed—sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof. Hence, rather than change a law, we squeeze the new instance into the old, and often quite inappropriate, category; rather than make a law, we establish a convention; rather than abolish an institution, we use it for new purposes; rather than create a new institution, we re-name an old one; rather than solve a problem, we ignore it as long as possible, and then throw a sop to Cerberus.

To the reasoning mind it is extraordinary how successful we have been, but, after all, is it not because we have really followed the great biological law of adaptation? We have

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had our revolutions and restorations, but as a matter of fact we have never had a real revolution. Adaptation has been strained to its limits, but it has always been victorious. The contest with James I was a fight for Common Law against absolute monarchy; that with Charles I was for the supremacy of Parliament, not for the destruction of monarchy. How little influence the republican element had, in spite of the extreme views of the Levellers, is shown by the monarchic régime of the Lord Protector. Englishmen in the mass have never been swayed by abstract principles, other than purely religious; whereas, not only the French Revolution, but countless examples of French domestic policy since the Revolution have been initiated and carried through, with more or less disastrous effects, at the inspiration of abstract theory.

To-day we are faced with the greatest problem the nation has ever encountered. The question which arises is: Will a Constitution, "which has been found to meet our practical requirements, though it is partly law, and partly history, and partly ethics, and partly custom, and partly the result of the various influences which are moulding and transforming the whole structure of society, from year to year and, one might almost say, from hour to hour" (Sidney Low)—will such a Constitution submit to the adaptation which is necessary to bring the country safely through the present ordeal, or will it have to be scrapped? The alternatives are Adaptation or Revolution. The latter, if the lessons of history are of any prophetic value, means a facile descent to ochlocracy and anarchy such as now seethe in Russia, to be followed by a military dictatorship, home-grown or imported. So far as Reconstruction is concerned, we have to deal only with Adaptation. The adaptation of the after-the-War period, with which reconstruction deals, presumes adequate adaptation for immediate needs. By various methods—good, bad, or indifferent—we have succeeded in holding our own up to the present. What are the chances of the immediate future no one can foretell, but for our present purpose we must accept the postulate of survival, if only to the extent of an inconclusive peace. The more inconclusive, the greater will be the need of reform.

Adaptation to subserve complex requirements means the

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suitable modification of existing institutions—even to the extent of abolition of the effete—and their thorough co-ordination. Its motto is “*Festina lente*”—but not too slowly! Revolutionary methods are to be deprecated as much for details as for great affairs of State. They never produce the expected results unalloyed, and the actual results may be irremediable errors. “The capacity of our race to make any conceivable institution succeed” (Lord Rosebery) will be strained to the utmost. Any scheme whose success depends upon the appreciation of broad generalizations by the masses of the people will be foredoomed to failure. They are incapable at present of accepting these as efficient stimuli to suitable and continued efforts. Just as the highest social morality of the individual is built up by the synthesis and appropriation or apperception of ideal concepts derived from subconscious inherited instincts, innate proclivities, tradition, history, literature, and art (*v. p. 37*), so collective ideals must be built up in the constituent communities and co-ordinated to the erection and preservation of the Ideal Society. Just as the subconscious instincts, modified and rationalized by evolution and the backstroke of intelligence, are the raw material upon which conceptual thought exercises its refining and controlling influence, so the chaotic instincts and aspirations of the constituent communities are the motive forces which the intellectual élite must use, refine, co-ordinate, and, so far as may be, control, for the benefit and idealization of the Great Society. Thus will Plato’s “philosopher guardians” find their scientific counterparts in the Modern State.

Carlyle, in his abounding egotism, said that the majority of people are fools: it would be more accurate to say that they are *idiōtai*, in the ancient Greek sense of the term, persons who perform no public duties and take no interest in public affairs. They are wholly wrapt up in their families, their industrial communities, and their religious or other coteries. Only when the events of the greater world impinge in some unusual way upon their microcosm, offering welcome excitement, infringing their established rights, imperilling their livelihoods, or threatening their narrow religious principles, do they awake to unwonted

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activity. Such occasions are rare in peace time, and since they generally bode no good, they are met with sullen or angry resentment. The War, which has gathered fathers and sons, mothers and daughters, into its clutches, is the greatest shock the dream of placid security and contentment has yet received. The country has acquired a new meaning to many people, and new vistas have opened out to their astonished eyes. Millions have been brought face to face with Death; others are revelling in unexpected prosperity. To all such as survive the barriers have been broken down: new forces, and old ones diversely applied, will be brought to bear upon the established institutions.

When individuals have grievances they appeal in last resort to the Law; when the communities of which the Great Society is constituted have collective grievances they appeal to the State. What is this mysterious entity which is the source of law and so impresses people with its immense power that many act on the assumption that it is practically omnipotent? The State is a mysterious entity, as is shown by the fact that no definition of it is wholly satisfactory, and consequently the term is applied, even by the learned, to many quite different entities. In the light of social psychology, bearing in mind the teachings of anthropology, it seems to me that the State is best defined as the collective power of the Great Society as a whole—it is the *mana* of the Great Society. It is not simply the combined power of the individuals who make up that Society, nor of the electorate, nor of parliament, nor of the cabinet, nor of the legislature; though each of these from time to time exercises the power which is sometimes called the State and is sometimes said to be embodied in the State. In a much fuller and richer manner than Locke or Rousseau ever conceived, the State is the collective will of the People. Its relationship to individuals or groups is contingent and evanescent. In an absolute monarchy, “*L'état, c'est Moi*” is no mere idle boast, yet the power flits from one embodiment to another, from king to parliament, from parliament to electorate, and when anarchy is abroad it vanishes into thin air. It is a power delegated to groups and individuals by rites which are no longer regarded as religious, a power which waxes and wanes.

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varies in quantity and content, and is both divisible and indivisible. In other words, it is a chaotic, undifferentiated concept, as yet incompletely analysed, and therefore not yet submissible to scientific definition. None the less it is a convenient term to use for expressing the power which appears to be outside themselves, constraining people to abide by the laws and conventions of their particular Great Society and to act as a corporate unit in relation with other Great Societies. In the former sense, it is the conscience of Society; in the latter, the will. Just as the individual conscience appears to be a power outside oneself, constraining to proper social behaviour, yet is in reality a mental attitude derived from heredity, tradition, and experience, so also the collective conscience, the State. And just as the individual will is the inner motive force, the resultant of all the egoistic and altruistic forces, impelling to action, so the State is the collective will of Society—as much or as little subject to determinism.

Judged by these considerations, the State is the authority of the Society delegated to various persons or groups of persons for diverse purposes. According as the delegates exercise authority in such a manner as to subserve those ends, they, i.e., the State, in the ordinary use of the term, are not only justified, but are in duty bound, to constrain individuals. Differences of opinion will arise, and when these acquire sufficient motive force the control of the State will be modified accordingly. The question, therefore, whether State interference is right or wrong, expedient or inexpedient, is futile: it can be judged only by results, the most important of which may be very remote. If the exercise of authority in the aggregate benefits the Society as a whole, State interference is obviously right and expedient. Consequently, so far as practical politics is concerned, State interference is only another name for Government interference. The Government, having had delegated to them, for better or for worse, the authority to control the Society, have a perfect right to adopt any measures they see fit. They will be guided chiefly by expediency. There is undoubtedly an implied contract that they shall govern for the benefit of the Society as a whole. As a matter of fact, in England, this broad generalization

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is submerged beneath a mass of party detail, and expediency assumes the form of party expediency. Yet, even so, the instincts and traditions of the people have developed a large body of national principles and prejudices which neither political party would find it expedient to outrage. The liberty of the subject, and liberty of speech and of the press, cannot be infringed with impunity, and legislation with regard to land and private property, and above all religion, has to be approached warily. Whether, therefore, a given policy of "State interference" really expresses the collective conscience and will of the Society can be decided only by "referring the question to the country" or by the *fait accompli* being received with passive acquiescence. Under existing circumstances both methods are crude in the extreme, but they can only be improved by substituting better methods of representation.

In any case, State interference is not a mere deduction from abstract theories of State Socialism, and so on. Long before Socialism was heard of, State interference had evolved, and manifested itself in standing armies and forms of taxation; its later and more prolific developments are seen in free education, the compulsory regulation and inspection of public health, trades, &c., and so on. The amelioration of social conditions resulting from these paternal, and sometimes grandfatherly, ministrations provides a conclusive argument derived from experience in favour of State control in suitable circumstances, against the individualistic arguments of the Utilitarians which so long reigned supreme. Extension of State interference cannot, therefore, be ruled out as inadmissible on *a priori* grounds; it has a sound basis in induction. On psychological grounds, however, we may rest assured that any extension will be hotly contested, being recognized as a blow struck at British individualism. It will be branded as Socialism, on the one hand, and on the other as an infringement of the liberty of the subject. In general, Socialism is a term to be avoided, because it has become inextricably associated with communistic and other revolutionary ideas, and has been received with favour in this contaminated form by the Radical wing of the Liberal party. As a matter

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of fact, as Whetham* has pointed out, State Socialism is a mere expansion of the old Tory "policy of power," i.e., working for the benefit of the State as a whole, thereby improving the condition of individuals indirectly. In regard to international relations the policy of power cannot but regard foreign nations as potential enemies, and in this respect it is supported by biological considerations. In the present-day struggle for existence, nations, instead of individuals, are the units, and the fittest to fight the battle, whether by armed force, industry, or intellect, or all combined, will alone survive. Nations must rise far above their present condition of enlightenment, by each collectively striving towards a high ideal of Society, so that the Ideal State becomes as much a conative force to each Great Society as ideal conduct is a conative force to individuals, before the inter-national struggle for existence can be abolished. Only then will wars cease. Long before that time arrives they will have become as infrequent as murder in civil life, or perhaps as rare as duelling.

The criteria of the conditions which make State interference expedient *pro bono publico* are psychological, and in this problem, as always, the cognitional, affective, and conative elements of thought—individual and social—play their respective parts. In accordance with mental processes in general the cognitional element is the primary stimulus. Reason suggests the application and scope of the method, but it must act by co-ordination of the forces at its command in order to ensure success—and first, it must comprehend and adjudicate upon these forces, passing gradually and guardedly from the known to the unknown. There are certain conditions in which reason and experience alike show that State interference is beneficial, viz., those in which the safety of the State is specially involved. Under this category come defensive measures, finance, education, and public health. Even in these matters ignorance of the psychological conditions has been responsible for glaring blunders, e.g., in recruiting. In the initiatory stage of the application of this policy equity is the safest guide, but it is to be remembered that in practice it is more blessed to receive than to give: equity proves a poor stimulus to the

* W. C. D. WRETHAM. "The War and the Nation." 1917.

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selfish, especially in dealings with the State. On grounds of equity, in all cases in which individuals, groups, corporations, or communities benefit in some special manner by State protection or aid, the State should receive some appropriate *quid pro quo*. It can hardly be doubted that the occasions on which the State acts in a purely philanthropic manner should be reduced to a minimum. Any such extraordinary circumstance should be met by private charity. Thus, it was a cardinal error to make Old Age Pensions permanently non-contributory. The State, no more than an individual, has the right deliberately to levy an increasing charge upon posterity. Such policy is cumulative, and disastrous in its remote effects. In the reconstruction of industry after the War many trades will require financial support from the Government, which has, indeed, in several cases pledged itself in this respect. The State in such circumstances is fully justified in exercising control over these industries to the extent of demanding that the country shall obtain an equitable recompense for the expenditure of public funds.

The War has shown, what should have been accessible to recognition without this catastrophe, that certain industries are essential to the safety of the State. These industries should therefore be definitely under the control of the State. Such control need not, in most cases should not, be absolute, but conditions should be so arranged and co-ordinated that the State should be able to guide policy for the benefit of the State, and at once to take over complete control in emergency. Among these industries are agriculture, the coal and iron trades, transport, and certain so-called "key" industries, to which must be added export trade. At the beginning of the War military exigencies made it evident that the Government should take over the control of the railways. Subsequently it became necessary to extend Government control to the South Wales coal mines, and probably much labour unrest would have been avoided if shipbuilding and other engineering industries had been subjected to a similar policy. These matters are receiving much attention, and it is not in my province to deal with them in detail. It is, however, germane to my theme to point out that reasoning, which is so hard-worked in justify-

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ing or criticizing after the event, is more usefully employed in the form of rational foresight. The intelligent animal modifies his response according to the teaching of experience, and acquires an elementary capacity to forestall future events. Man has developed this capacity to a much higher degree, but exhibits a deplorable inertness and pusillanimity in utilizing it. The working man, also endowed with reason, though relatively uneducated, adopts ready-made ideals derived from doubtful sources. They are mostly the product of abstract philosophical reasoning, originating as a rule in the teachings of Karl Marx and *hoc genus omne*. He accepts them, not as the conclusions of logical syllogisms which he makes for himself or even understands, but because they make an extravagant appeal to his self-interest. They become clothed in shining apparel and studded with the false gems of political rhetoric, thus acquiring a stimulating influence altogether incommensurate with their true value.

The legislative and executive functions are inextricably mingled in our constitutional government. As the authors of "The Elements of Reconstruction"* point out, the form of the British governing machine was determined long ago by the needs and conditions of a comparatively small feudal monarchy. Its three tiers of King, Lords, and Commons still represent very fairly the three organs of such a simple community—the law and the State, the landowner and land administration, and the tenantry. Everything is referred to topographical constituencies, in spite of the fact that there are now innumerable non-local interests which have no direct representation at all. The new-made peer, no matter what his origin or the reason of his elevation, takes a territorial title, thus falsely assimilating himself to the old nobility. Members of Parliament theoretically represent the local constituencies for which they stand, though this is palpably absurd in the case of many Labour Members, for example. The method of voting in elections entirely ignores the representation of minorities, and consequently is the fundamental cause of the clear-cut dual Party

* "The Elements of Reconstruction." Reprinted from *The Times*, 1916.

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System. The party system originated in extra-constitutional political associations,* which gave rise to the Liberal and Conservative organizations, which in turn enabled the parties to arrogate to themselves powers which rightly belong to the State. The party system has so permeated every department of government that the relative immunity of Law and the Civil Service is the more remarkable. Representative Government has become replaced by party representation, in which every act of legislature—municipal, educational, industrial, &c.—is adjudicated upon from the party standpoint, often to the exclusion of justice and progress. The eclectic politician or mugwump must be sought for in England in other spheres of life than that of the practical politician.

The enormous growth of legislative work which the increased complexity of modern conditions has thrown upon Parliament, the application of the party touchstone to this heterogeneous mass of material, combined with the finite capacity of the individual legislator, however superior in energy and intellect, the utter insufficiency of departmental methods for the collection and collation of information, and the lack of co-ordination, have produced ridiculous anomalies and deplorable obstruction to progressive measures, and threaten a complete deadlock. The muddles of peace time and of the South African War failed to arouse our lethargic minds. We amused ourselves unctuously with "social problems" and neglected the safety of the State.

It has long been obvious that the House of Commons is so overwhelmed with work that it has ceased to fulfil its proper functions satisfactorily. Some form of devolution is imperative. As suggested in "The Elements of Reconstruction," the chief functions of the Imperial Parliament should concern: (1) The Navy and naval establishments throughout the Empire; (2) the Army; (3) the Imperial control of the food supply and of the Imperial resources of raw material; (4) Imperial transit, posts, money, standards, ports, and sea-ways; (5) Imperial trade policy; (6) education; (7) the Supreme Court of the Empire; (8)

* See Ostrogorski. "Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties." 1902.

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Foreign policy and Imperial trusteeship over the non-represented Dependencies (India, &c.). All the details of national legislation—agrarian, urban, industrial, marine, religious, &c.—should be decentralized, extending the policy already adopted in municipal government. This legislation would be revised or vetoed by committees of Parliament, specially selected for the various departments.

The authors of "The Elements of Reconstruction" advocate proportional representation with the single transferable vote, a method which practically originated with Hare and J. S. Mill, and is gaining increasing favour. There can be little doubt that it would break up the party system, and would probably replace it by group representation. Government by groups, as exemplified in France, cannot be said to be brilliantly successful. Moreover, the Dual Party System has far too firm a hold for it to be abolished without revolutionary measures. It would seem best, at any rate for the present, to retain the party system with its topographical representation by a single non-transferable vote for the reformed House of Commons. Proportional representation should be used for the local municipal, agrarian, industrial, and other subsidiary Councils.

The House of Lords is already in the melting-pot. Its constitution should be on a totally different plan from that of the House of Commons. So long as it persists on a similar basis it is a weak consultative body, and its veto is a farce. It should be an elective body composed of experts—political, legal, naval, military, industrial, scientific, medical, literary, and so on—retaining, however, representative peers elected from the best of the old hereditary stock. In fact, the House of Lords should be representative of the highest *intellects* of the country in all the socially important spheres. In it, too, the Britons beyond the seas should be represented. Each group in the House would form the highest committee in the State on its particular subject, and it should be elected by the constituency which it represents. Selected from these various groups there should be an elaborate organization of liaison committees. Such a House of Lords, so far as it in reality represented intellect and not influence, wealth, age, or any other

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contaminating quality,* would be a powerful energizing and co-ordinating body.

It is already recognized that the existing Government Departments require reorganization and redistribution of functions. At present they are lamentably inefficient and their spheres of action overlap. The nation owes an immense debt to the highest permanent officials who have so long enabled the government of the country to be carried on in spite of the frequent changes in the amateurs who are responsible to Parliament for the various departments. The low-g geared machine succeeds in keeping in motion during peace time, but the stress of war makes it groan and rattle, and it would stop if it were not for hasty improvisations. It is often said, and with much truth, that no private business could be conducted successfully if it adopted the official methods. Embryo civil servants resemble young manual workers who should be learners when they are already earners. If they learn to do their job well—and an extraordinary number of them do—it is by their own efforts. They start badly equipped with the Public School and University training which passes for education. They learn their special jobs by the process of “picking up.” Their career, however, is no “blind alley”; no matter how mediocre their ability time will bring them promotion, and even honours if they possess tact and influence. Their golden rules are to take no responsibility which can be avoided and not to criticize or attempt to innovate: both functions are the privilege of seniority, and even then are kept strictly within conventional bounds. The path of safety is the strait track of age-long routine.

There is nothing more stultifying to individual and social progress than the bondage of red tape. Only those who have been caught in its meshes can realize its paralysing effects, and those who fail to escape soon become drilled to passive submission. In this atmosphere difficulties are not surmounted, but circumvented. Any attempt to initiate a reform, however slight, is met with frigid disapproval, and

* We have not yet travelled far enough from the time when it was said “that every English gentleman is qualified to hold any post which he has influence enough to secure” (Lord Melbourne).

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perseverance is rewarded with official snubs. Even if a reform is admitted to be obviously desirable it has to be fitted into the extraordinarily complicated network of laws, Orders in Council, rules, regulations, and by-laws—a piece of jugglery which only the seasoned expert dare attempt. Any comprehensive reform is impossible, for it would inevitably require new legislation, which is so preposterously difficult that it sets the final limit to even the highest permanent official's dreams. He, indeed, may succeed in gaining the ear of the Right Hon. amateur who for a brief moment presides over the department, but the latter is very loth to worry the Cabinet with a matter outside the Party programme, and one not unlikely to raise a hornet's nest. Moreover, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred legislation is impossible, because the available time is all too little for urgent Government business.

As matters now stand, Government departments are very inefficient in fulfilling their primary functions of facilitating administration and new legislation. The routine work is carried out methodically so long as it is contained within the rigid limits of the pettifogging legal system, which admits of no latitude or elasticity. Just as law in general lags far behind the ripened products of ever-changing public opinion, so everything militates against rapid adaptation in a Government office. The methods are hoary with age, even in such elementary matters as the collection and indexing of information and the manipulation of statistics. The system of checks and balances, so conspicuously absent where theory posits them, are here so perfectly organized that the machine is well-nigh brought to a standstill. Nothing but very radical changes can break this cake of custom. As a nation we are not lacking in individuals possessed in the highest degree of the most varied abilities; but the greatest intellects refuse to be curbed and by the trammels of red tape. Only in a supreme emergency, such as has been brought about by the War, are they moved by patriotism to come to the rescue of the State. Even then their offers are slighted or misapplied, unless the crisis is so acute that they alone can cope with it. When this has been the case, as for example in the arrangement of financial affairs immediately after the Declaration of War and in the formation and

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administration of the Ministry of Munitions, their success has been remarkable.

With decentralization such as has been suggested, and choice of officials strictly according to their capacities and efficiency, a department might in time be transformed into a business-like affair. A Ministry of Commerce, for example, such as has been outlined by E. J. P. Benn,* or a Ministry of Health, gathering together the scattered strands now tangled up in half-a-dozen departments, might become as practically self-contained as the London County Council. If the welfare of London's millions can be safely delegated to local control, there is no inherent reason why the organization of Commerce, Public Health, Education, and so on, should not be deputed to competent experts. Each is a business proposition, which for success must be run on business lines; each is a complex scientific problem which requires specialized scientific training and ability for its management. The one safe criterion is efficiency, and upon this alone the distribution of rewards and punishments must be made. Until discipline is effected by the ruthless degradation or dismissal of the incompetent, nothing but muddling is to be expected. Hence, entry into the Civil Service must no longer be regarded as a "cushy" job, lasting the rest of the individual's life. The implied contract with the State is for an efficient workman, and the State is not fulfilling its part if it condones incompetency.

Now it does not follow that men chosen from the socio-political class are necessarily incompetent for high office. Many have proved themselves to be so, and our indolence, prejudices, and good nature have too often borne with their defects. It is time that the principle which ordains that the fall of one Minister entails the fall of the Cabinet should be abolished. On the other hand, the majority of these amateurs have not only proved themselves able administrators, but many have shown themselves extraordinarily endowed with the qualities which are specially required. The psychological reasons are not far to seek. This class as a whole, at any rate up to recent times, has been concerned with the management of large estates, and has

* E. J. P. BENN. "Trade as a Science." 1916.

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benefited by the moulding influences of a long tradition. The members have been born in the purple, and have assimilated the methods of government with their mother's milk. They have passed on to Eton and Harrow, where, however faulty the intellectual education, their surroundings have carried on the same tradition. In many ways the training fosters just those inherited characteristics, and inculcates just those qualities which are of greatest moment to the "public man." For many years this class possessed a monopoly of ministerial appointments. Times have changed; landed proprietors no longer have the same intimate local interests, and have consequently drifted away from public life, many of them degenerating into the worst type of *idiôtrai*. Yet many are actuated by a deep sense of duty to their country, and are an asset of which England may well be proud. It is to be hoped that they will not be pushed out of the running by the influx of more self-assertive competitors from other classes.

The crystallization of party organizations, initiated by the Birmingham caucus, which was eventually copied by the Conservative National Union, has had a malign effect upon both leaders and the electorate. It has smothered the freedom of thought and opinion of the former, coercing them by no mean threats into conformity with a programme to which all cannot conscientiously subscribe. It has supplied the latter with ready-made party principles, labelled with suggestive names and subsidized by appeals to self-interest and the enticements of politico-social fêtes. The levelling effects of the industrial revolution, of the extension of the franchise, and of universal education have resulted in the generalizing of tastes and habits and the submergence of individuality. Professional politicians have proved able practical psychologists, appealing to the instincts and emotions of the people, collected together for the purpose in crowds. Their reasoning powers have been hypnotized, so that these no longer exercise even the feeble control which they are normally capable of. Leaders and people alike have allowed their minds and consciences to be fettered by the wire-pullers of the party organizations. It would seem that their emancipation can only be effected from outside, by the establishment and educative influence

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of a powerful consensus of opinion, initiated and activated by the most enlightened members of the community.

The War has interrupted the natural evolution of political opinions in this country. There is every reason to think that the same general tendencies will reassert themselves, but with greatly enhanced vigour, after the War. The battle for political equality is ended; that for material equality had already commenced and will continue. As Sir Sidney Low says, political power rests with the mass of the poorer members of society. It might have been anticipated that the struggle would long ago have been across this transverse cleavage of rich and poor. It has often seemed to be tending that way, but owing to extraordinary crises whenever it has seemed most imminent it has been thwarted, and the longitudinal cleavage of political parties has remained the dividing line. Such may still continue to be the case, but the indications are not favourable to this view. If, then, a war of classes is to follow this great war of nations the collective psychology of the contending groups assumes an outstanding importance. As we see in Russia, the clash of contending reasonings serves only to split up groups into fragments and give free sway to deeply seated instinctive forces whose uncontrolled activities lead to bloodshed and anarchy. Yet we shut our eyes to these fundamental springs of conduct, and persist in solving our political and social problems by logical arguments, in spite of the fact that experience proves with damnable iteration the falsity of the premises.

Chapter XI.

CONCLUSION.


“THE State came into being in order that we might live; it persists in order that we may live the good life.”* Aristotle’s oft-quoted maxim enshrines a truth which will endure as long as men gather together into societies. As times change the complexities of mere existence increase. Each individual is no longer master of his own subsistence; his means of livelihood depend upon the ordered working of a vastly intricate industrial system, which is itself dependent upon the security of the State. Life itself is maintained by social co-ordination, and its mode, whether a mere animal existence or the “good life” in all its richness and fulness, is determined by the direction and organization of the motive forces. Whether we deliberately organize “*omnia serviliter pro dominatione*,” as Tacitus tells us the ancient Germans did, and as their descendants certainly do, or aim at the highest good for the greatest number, the forces which we strive to direct, control, and co-ordinate are generated by the fires which smoulder deep down in our common humanity. They are stoked into activity by winds from countless quarters, which fan the flames of passion and high endeavour alike. Psychology has taught us something of these hidden and elusive forces, and can yet teach us much more. Through it we have begun to train our infants according to scientific principles. I have endeavoured to show that through it we can immeasurably improve the training of our citizens from the cradle to the grave. When it is generally realized that psychology includes great sections of biology, anthropology, and history within its scope, the extent of its future conquests surpasses the range

* γιγνομένη μὲν τοῦ ζῆν ἐνεκεν, οὗθα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν.—Aristotle, “Politics.”

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of our most prophetic vision. From biology we shall learn many lessons, not least of which is the fact that evolution proceeds by slow and steady processes of adaptation, and uses revolutionary and violent methods only to clear away the lumber of past failures. From biology and anthropology and history we learn the place of reason in the mental life of the human social animal, its gradual emergence and growing control over the inherited instincts, its freedom, and the limits of its freedom. As time goes on its limits, while steadily extending, will become more clearly defined.

In the previous pages I have but touched the fringe of this immense subject. I am well aware that the critical and explanatory matter far exceeds the constructive, but this was unavoidable. Here and there I have given indications of wider applications of psychology to the problems of social life, but in a question of this kind little can be done without combined effort. There is room for workers of every description, and there is no need for them all to be professed psychologists. But it is imperative for the best results that the work should be co-ordinated and controlled by those who have a sound knowledge of scientific psychology, i.e., psychology based upon biological principles.



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